Lyren v. Ohr, Record No. 050768.
Citation | 623 S.E.2d 883 |
Decision Date | 13 January 2006 |
Docket Number | Record No. 050768. |
Parties | Marilyn LYREN v. Christopher OHR, et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
Page 883
v.
Christopher OHR, et al.
Alan S. Toppelberg, Washington, DC (Andrew S. Kasmer, Greenbelt, MD; Alan S. Toppelberg & Associates, on brief), Washington, DC, for appellant.
August W. Steinhilber, III (Julia B. Judkins; Brault, Palmer, Grove, White & Steinhilber, Trichilo, Bancroft, McGavin, Horvath & Judkins, on brief), Fairfax, for appellees.
Present: All the Justices.
CYNTHIA D. KINSER, Justice.
The issue in this appeal concerns whether a defendant, who was served with process more than one year after commencement of an action and did not take advantage of that defect in service of process by filing a motion in accordance with Code § 8.01-277, can raise the bar against judgment in Rule 3:3(c) after having entered a general appearance by filing a pleading to the merits. Because a general appearance waives all questions concerning service of process, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 3:3(c).
The appellant, Marilyn Lyren, filed a motion for judgment against Christopher Ohr on December 27, 2002, seeking damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of an automobile accident. Process was not issued until December 2003. Ohr filed an "Answer and Grounds of Defense" on January 14, 2004.
Before filing his grounds of defense, Ohr's attorney contacted Lyren's attorney to confirm that proper service of process had been made upon Ohr. On several occasions between January 2004 and August 28, 2004, Lyren's attorney represented to Ohr's attorney that Ohr had been timely and properly
Page 884
served in person with the motion for judgment and that either a proof of service or an affidavit of service had been filed with the circuit court. However, no proof of service or affidavit of service was filed in the circuit court until August 25, 2004, in response to Ohr's motion to quash service of process, which he filed on August 6, 2004. At that time, Lyren filed an affidavit from a private process server stating that he had served Ohr personally at Ohr's home sometime before December 25, 2003 (he could not remember the exact date), and that he had filed the proof of service in the circuit court clerk's office during the first week of January 2004. The circuit court denied Ohr's motion to quash service of process.
Ohr subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice under the provisions of Rule 3:3(c). He asserted that a judgment could not be entered against him because he had been served with process more than one year after commencement of the action.2 After hearing testimony from the private process server and Ohr, the circuit court found that service of process on Ohr occurred on January 7, 2004, more than one year after commencement of this action, and that Lyren presented no evidence that she had exercised due diligence in attempting to serve Ohr on or before December 27, 2003. Thus, the circuit court granted Ohr's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3:3(c). Lyren appeals from the circuit court's judgment.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in granting Ohr's motion to dismiss under Rule 3:3(c). In relevant part, subsection (c) of Rule 3:3 states:
No judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with process more than one year after the commencement of the action against him unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have timely service on him.
Lyren argues that Ohr's filing a pleading to the merits constituted a general appearance and thus waived any defect in service of process. Citing the provisions of Code § 8.01-277, Lyren contends that, in order to challenge the defect in the service of process in this case, namely her failure to serve Ohr with process within one year of commencement of the action, Ohr would have been required to raise the...
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...of the court whether he intended to do so or not.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Lyren v. Ohr, 271 Va. 155, 158-59, 623 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 (2006) (appearance for any purpose other than objecting to the jurisdiction is general appearance even if denominated "special"); Ma......
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