Lytle v. Lytle
| Decision Date | 13 October 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 8.,8. |
| Citation | 319 Mich. 47,29 N.W.2d 138 |
| Parties | LYTLE v. LYTLE. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Joseph County, in Chancery; Theo T. Jacobs, Judge.
Action for divorce by Mary Lytle against Henry Lytle, wherein plaintiff obtained a divorce and subsequently filed a petition to punish defendant for contempt for default in payment of alimony and defendant filed a petition for modification of decree with respect to alimony. From a decree finding no default in payment of alimony and purporting to reduce total payments to be made under divorce decree, plaintiff appeals
Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Before the Entire Bench.
J. Paul Wait, of Sturgis, for plaintiff and appellant.
Raymond H. Dresser, of Sturgis, for defendant and appellee.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce from defendant on January 22, 1946, on the ground of extreme cruelty. She was awarded the custody of their two children, a girl who would be 17 within a month following the entry of the decree, and a boy 13 years of age. Prior to the filing of her bill of complaint and within two days after she had positive proof of defendant's misconduct, plaintiff entered into a separation agreement with the defendant. Under its terms, plaintiff received an assignment of the land contract for the purchase of their home at a price of $2,300 and on which $1,612.57 was still owing. It was agreed that plaintiff was to have custody of the children and that until the youngest child attained the age of 17, defendant was to pay plaintiff the sum of $30 per week for the support of the children and herself and to enable her to make the payments on the land contract. They further agreed that if a divorce followed, the terms of the separation agreement were to be incorporated into the decree, in which event payments would be made to the county clerk for transmittal to plaintiff. Although such an agreement might be considered by a trial judge in reaching his own independent determination, neither party claims that the agreement was binding on the court.
When the divorce case was heard almost a year later, the separation agreement was introduced in evidence. At the hearing, the judge sua sponte suggested that it would be more advantageous to plaintiff to divide the sum of $30 per week into two separate items and that $10 per week be treated as a part of the property settlement and $20 per week be treated as alimony, so that plaintiff might be better able to enforce payment of the larger amount should defendant become delinquent in his payments. Thus, in the decree, under the caption of ‘Alimony,’ the trial judge ordered defendant to pay the county clerk the sum of $40 every two weeks for the support and maintenance of the minor children until the further order of the court; and in compliance with Court Rule 51, § 5, under the caption of ‘Property Settlement,’ the judge also ordered defendant to pay the sum of $20 every two weeks to the county clerk until the further order of the court. This made a total sum of $30 for each and every week. The customary provision was inserted with reference to release of dower and satisfaction of all other claims of plaintiff to property owned by defendant. The decree also prohibited defendant from remarrying for a period of two years.
On September 6, 1946, less than eight months after the entry of the decree on petition filed by plaintiff, defendant was ordered to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt for being in arrears in his payments to plaintiff in the sum of $240. On January 10, 1947, defendant filed a petition to modify the decree on the ground that the oldest child had reached the age of 17 years and was self-supporting. In her...
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Kephart v. Kephart
...Reaching the same result as Watts v. Watts, the Massachusetts case discussed in the text, under similar statutes, see Lytle v. Lytle, 1947, 319 Mich. 47, 29 N.W.2d 138; Conklin v. Conklin, 1947, 223 Minn. 449, 27 N. W.2d 275, 6 A.L.R.2d 1274; Ashby v. Ashby, 1921, 174 Wis. 549, 183 N.W. 965......
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Sword v. Sword
...respect rather than defy the order of the court').3 Also see Wellman v. Wellman, 305 Mich. 365, 9 N.W.2d 579 (1943) and Lytle v. Lytle, 319 Mich. 47, 29 N.W.2d 138 (1947).4 E.g., Mr. Sword had been in a hospital at one time, in jail another time and in prison twice. When and for how long?5 ......
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Chisnell v. Chisnell
...812 (1928). This principle is not without exception. Property settlements may be revised for fraud or like reasons. Lytle v. Lytle, 319 Mich. 47, 29 N.W.2d 138 (1947); Greene v. Greene, 357 Mich. 196, 98 N.W.2d 519 (1959). Modification may also be permitted to rectify mistakes or clarify an......
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Roddy v. Roddy
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