M and A Elec. Power Co-op. v. Nesselrodt, No. 9579

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: TITUS; HOGAN, C.J., STONE and BILLINGS, JJ., and DOUGLAS W. GREENE
• Citation: 509 S.W.2d 468
• Parties: M & A ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert A. NESSELRODT et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Decision Date: 03 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 9579

Page 468

509 S.W.2d 468 M & A ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Robert A. NESSELRODT et al., Defendants-Respondents. No. 9579. Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District. May 3, 1974.

Page 469

James C. Bullard, Dalton, Treasure & Bullard, Kennett, for plaintiff-appellant.

James E. Reeves, Ward & Reeves, Caruthersville, for defendants-respondents.

TITUS, Judge.

Plaintiff condemned an easement across a farm owned by defendant Gee for the purpose of erecting and maintaining an electrical transmission line. Among other defendants named relative to the Gee tract was W. L. 'Cowboy' Ramsey, Jr., a tenant on the farm and also sheriff of New Madrid County. A jury returned its verdict to the Circuit Court of New Madrid County assessing defendants' damages at $15,240. Plaintiff's motion for new trial was denied and it appealed.

The penultimate and last points relied on in plaintiff's appeal brief are: 'II The trial court erred in failing to excuse for cause possible jurors whose relationship with the parties would prohibit them from being impartial. III The trial court erred in failing to set aside the verdict and judgment herein because of the cumulative

Page 470

effect of the intentional prejudicial inflammatory statements and arguments of counsel for respondent.' Neither point preserves anything for appellate review and both violate the requirements of Rule 84.04(d) V.A.M.R. which are mandatory. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Quinn, 429 S.W.2d 7(2) (Mo.App.1968).

Point II does not identify the 'possible jurors,' it does not advise what 'relationship' existed, and it does not identify which parties were concerned with the unknown relationship. The point does not attempt to illustrate how the failure of the trial court to excuse the unidentified 'possible jurors' constituted error 'against the appellant, materially affecting the merits of the action.' Rule 84.13(b). In other words, plaintiff's second point does not undertake to explain 'why' the relationship (whatever it might be) prohibited the 'possible jurors' (if indeed it would) from being impartial. 'Nakedly stating what the alleged errors are without elucidating 'why' they are errors neither satisfies the rule nor preserves anything for review.' Freshour v. Schuerenberg, 495 S.W.2d 116, 118(7) (Mo.App.1973). In short, who the possible jurors were, what their relationship was, or 'why' it may have prevented them from being impartial to some undersignated party, is left to conjecture and sheer speculation, and this court is not obliged to thresh the transcript or argument portion of appellant's brief to remove the guesswork inherent in the point by reason of plaintiff's failure to heed the rule. In re Estate of Barks, 488 S.W.2d 928, 930(5) (Mo.App.1972).

Although point III, supra, expresses displeasure with the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict and judgment by reason of statements and arguments of defendants' counsel, it nowhere identifies what the statements or arguments were nor labors to explain why plaintiff believes them to be intentional, prejudicial or inflammatory. Compliance with Rule 84.04(d) required plaintiff, at least, to specify the statements and...