M.C.L. v. State
| Decision Date | 13 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95-4544,Nos. 95-3409,s. 95-3409 |
| Citation | 682 So.2d 1209 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2445 M.C.L., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Louis O. Frost Jr., Public Defender; Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender; and Jack W. Shaw Jr. and Harris Brown of Brown, Obringer, Shaw, Beardsley & Decandio, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Edward C. Hill Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The minor M.C.L. (ML) 1 and his parents appeal from the terms of an order adjudicating ML delinquent, arguing that the terms--imposing moral and spiritual training, abstention from interviews with representatives of the media, and restitution--are unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. We consolidated the appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
ML, in exchange for the State's agreement to drop three counts of burglary, pleaded guilty to eight counts of burglary and one count of cruelty to animals. ML committed these crimes in Duval County between January 20, 1995 and February 8, 1995. ML's crime against the animal involved forcefully holding a bag over the head of a small household pet, breathing marijuana smoke into the bag, and then tossing the pet back and forth between juvenile codefendants. ML's burglaries included destruction of walls, windows and plumbing fixtures in a number of homes, and resulted in $52,085.71 in damages. The above crimes were videotaped by the juveniles themselves. Members of the broadcast media as a result became interested in ML's case, and invited him to appear on national talk-show television.
The trial judge adjudicated ML delinquent; committed ML to high-risk juvenile detention for a term not to exceed ML's nineteenth birthday; imposed immediate conditions regarding moral and spiritual training and media interviews; and ordered restitution. We address the four issues raised by the parties.
The trial judge imposed the following immediate condition:
(n) The child and mother shall attend an organized moral and spiritual training program (chosen by his mother ) for at least 2 hours each week, and he shall spend at least 30 minutes each day in some form of moral and spiritual training, and shall keep a daily journal categorizing what he has read and reflected upon. This shall be available for the counselors or the Court to inspect. During the next 9 months, he shall have covered in this personal spiritual training at least the lives of Moses, Kings David and Solomon of Israel, Jesus of Nazareth, Mohammed, Buddha, Confucius, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King. This daily journal requirement and reading shall begin to be required immediately and shall be required if possible during any commitment program.
(Emphasis added.) ML objects to this condition on state and federal constitutional grounds. (ML's mother's objection to the application of this condition to her is treated below.)
The Florida Constitution, article I, section 3, provides:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
(Emphasis added.) The Florida Supreme Court, interpreting this provision, tells us:
A state cannot pass a law to aid one religion or all religions, but state action to promote the general welfare of society, apart from any religious considerations, is valid, even though religious interests may be indirectly benefited. If the primary purpose of the state action is to promote religion, that action is in violation of the First Amendment, but if a statute furthers both secular and religious ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to determine whether the state could reasonably have attained the secular end by means which do not further the promotion of religion.
Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So.2d 256, 261 (Fla.1970) (). The instant probation condition, by fostering ML's rehabilitation, promotes the general welfare of society, and promotes public morals, peace and safety.
The Florida Supreme Court moreover, in Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.2d 697 (Fla.1959), interpreting the predecessor provision of the Florida Constitution's Bill of Rights, 2 holds:
[A] Board of Trustees of a Florida School District has the power to exercise a reasonable discretion to permit the use of school buildings during non-school hours for any legal assembly which includes religious meetings, subject, of course, to judicial review should such discretion be abused to the point that it could be construed as a contribution of public funds in aid of a particular religious group or as the promotion or establishment of a particular religion.
Id. at 700-01 (emphasis added). The instant trial judge, by requiring ML to study historically renowned moral leaders, exercised reasonable discretion to foster ML's rehabilitation.
ML notwithstanding relies on this court's holding in L.M. v. State, 587 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (L.M.I). We held there: "Requiring a probationer or community controllee to submit to a course of religious instruction contravenes the First Amendment." Id. at 649. ML ignores that we held that even a juvenile's instruction at a church facility, if parent-directed, is constitutional. L.M. v. State, 610 So.2d 1314, 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (L.M.II). The condition imposed in the instant case moreover is distinguishable from that imposed in L.M. I: The instant probation condition merely mandates that ML study renowned moral leaders; the judge has mandated neither enrollment in any church group, nor instruction by any pastor. The instant condition furthermore is modified by the requirement that the training program be "chosen by [ML's] mother."
The instant condition therefore is consonant with the Florida Constitution and our holding in L.M. II. We note however that some uncertainty exists as to the meaning of "spiritual," as opposed to "moral," training. The State at oral argument conceded, and we agree, that "spiritual" training, to the extent that it means religious training, is unconstitutional. We therefore strike the words "and spiritual" from the judge's order.
The United States Supreme Court tells us how to evaluate legislation to determine whether the legislation violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution: The legislation must pass the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (). The court explains the Lemon test:
Under the Lemon standard, which guides "[t]he general nature of our inquiry in this area," a court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose, if its primary effect is the advancement of religion, or if it requires excessive entanglement between church and state.
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 2570, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (citations omitted) ( constitutional on its face the Adolescent Family Life Act--an act providing grants to religious and other institutions giving counseling on teenage sexuality, without expressly requiring that the funds not be used for religious purposes--but remanding for a determination of the act's constitutionality as applied).
The instant probation condition, as it applies to ML, passes the three-part Lemon test: It has a valid secular purpose--ML's rehabilitation; it primarily advances ML's rehabilitation, not religion; and it leads not at all to entanglement of church and state, for no church is involved. The judge's order avoids mandating the study of any religious practices; it merely orders the juvenile to study the lives of individuals who have made significant contributions to the code of civilized conduct upon which societies exist. The study of these lives presented as intellectual history neither necessitates the study of religion nor is unconstitutional. Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist., 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir.1994) (). We share the Eleventh Circuit's observation that:
In searching for the proper teaching of an [Emotional Maturity Instruction] course it is probably difficult to locate one who can teach morality without reference to religion, but that is the task which must be accomplished. We recognize that there is a fine line between rehabilitation efforts which encourage lawful conduct by an appeal to morality and the benefits of moral conduct to the life of the probationer, and efforts which encourage lawfulness through adherence to religious belief.
Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (11th Cir.1982) (). The "fine line" that exists between an appeal to morality and adherence to religious belief is observed in the instant case.
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