M. C. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Texas Foundries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-2246,74-2246
• Citation: 517 F.2d 1059
• Parties: 1975-2 Trade Cases 60,446 M. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TEXAS FOUNDRIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1059

517 F.2d 1059

1975-2 Trade Cases 60,446

M. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TEXAS FOUNDRIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 74-2246.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 21, 1975.

James R. Cornelius, Jr., Lufkin, Tex., B. J. Bradshaw, Houston, Tex., Thomas W. Hathaway, Tyler, Tex., for defendants-appellants.

Jim Ammerman, Marshall, Tex., Jack Price, Longview, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, CLARK and GEE, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs, M. C. Manufacturing Company, Inc. (M.C.), and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Universal Automatic Machine Company, Inc. (Universal), initiated this private antitrust action against defendants, Texas Foundries, Inc. (Texas Foundries) and H/R Products, Inc. (H/R), alleging that the defendants conspired to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, through the utilization of a price discrimination scheme which also was violative of Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a & f). Trial to a jury resulted in a general verdict for plaintiffs of $73,000.00 which was then trebled by the trial court to $219,000.00. Texas Foundries and H/R petition this court for relief from the judgment entered pursuant to that award. We reverse.

Universal alleges that this controversy arose while it and H/R were actively competing for a December, 1971 government contract to supply a finished military hardware item known as a Type "G" lifting plug, ¹ because Texas Foundries quoted H/R a lower price than it quoted Universal to supply the required unfinished plug castings. ² According to For their part, the defendants contend that Texas Foundries' agreement to sell to H/R at a lower price was reached after the December, 1971 contract had been awarded and then only after H/R's intended suppliers communicated to H/R that they could not satisfy H/R's requirements. They further contend the price reduction by Texas Foundries was intended to meet the price offered by H/R's other suppliers and to find a market for a substantial overage of castings which had been produced under Texas Foundries' preexisting contract with Universal. ⁴

plaintiffs, H/R and Texas Foundries clandestinely agreed by telephone on the 29th of November, 1971, to a price of 31 cents per unfinished plug casting delivered to H/R's plant (South Bend, Indiana). Texas Foundries had quoted Universal a price of 32.5 cents f.o.b. Texas Foundries' plant (Lufkin, Texas) only 11 days earlier, on the 18th of November. Plaintiffs assert that the price discrepancy between the two offers was the result of a conspiracy between Texas Foundries and H/R in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act aimed at the destruction of Universal as a competitor. They further assert that the ultimate sale to H/R of a portion of the castings required to perform the contract at the lower price constituted a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act's proscription of price distinctions between purchasers since on November 12, 1971, Texas Foundries and Universal had entered into a subcontract at 32.5 cents per casting to fulfill a prior government contract award to Universal. ³

Because the particular facts underlying this case are crucial to our resolution of the controversy, a detailed review of the events leading to selection of a contractor on government contract No. DAAA-09-72-C-0208 is warranted.

On October 27, 1971, the Ammunition Procurement Supply Agency (APSA) distributed a solicitation inviting bids on a contract to supply 1,984,006 Type "G" lifting plugs. A total of 159 prospective bidders were solicited, of which 16, including Universal and H/R, ultimately submitted bids.

Upon receiving a solicitation from the APSA, Universal asked Texas Foundries to bid on a subcontract to supply unfinished plug castings. On November 18, 1971, Texas Foundries responded with a 32.5-cent per casting price, f.o.b. Texas Foundries' plant. Based upon Texas Foundries' quotation for the unfinished plug, Universal submitted a final bid to APSA of 49.28 cents per finished plug. During the time prior to opening of bids, Texas Foundries was also called upon by several other potential bidders to give similar casting price quotations. As a result, Texas Foundries sent written quotations to both Deco Grand, Inc., an uninvolved third party, and H/R containing the identical price quoted Universal, i. e., 32.5 cents per casting, f.o.b. Texas Foundries' plant.

The sixteen bids ultimately received on the APSA contract were opened on December 3, 1971, revealing that H/R was the low bidder at 47.6 cents per casting, Land-Air, Inc. was second at 48.8 cents per casting, and plaintiff, Universal, was the third lowest bidder at 49.28 cents per casting. Pre-award surveys and cost evaluations ⁵ were then conducted on the lowest group of bidders.

⁶ These studies resulted in evaluated bids (lowest cost to government) of 47.362 cents per plug for H/R, 48.678 cents per plug for Land-Air, Inc. and 49.107 cents per plug for Universal. Having thus entered the lowest evaluated bid and having received a satisfactory pre-award survey analysis, H/R was awarded the contract on December 30, 1971.

SHERMAN ACT CLAIM

At trial plaintiffs' evidence tended to show a discriminatory pricing conspiracy between Texas Foundries and H/R aimed at the destruction of Universal as a producer of Type "G" lifting plugs. From the outset, plaintiffs have contended that on the 29th of November, 1971, Texas Foundries and H/R consummated a secret telephonic agreement whereby Texas Foundries committed itself to supply unfinished plugs to H/R at 31 cents per casting, at H/R's plant, after only eleven days earlier having assured Universal that a 32.5 cent per casting price, f.o.b. Texas Foundries plant, was the lowest price it could possibly offer. The reason for this discrepancy in price quotations is found, according to plaintiffs in H/R's precarious financial situation in November of 1971. Until 1970, the year of Universal's entry into the lifting plug market, H/R had been the leading producer of military lifting plugs. In 1970, however, Universal received the only government contract let that year, causing H/R a concomitant 60,000 dollar loss. At this point, plaintiffs' theory continues, realizing that failure to obtain the 1971 contract would necessitate abandonment of its plug business and fully aware that Universal's failure to get at least a portion of the 1971 contract would portend the latter's business demise, ⁷ H/R resolved to take whatever steps were necessary (including participation in a discriminatory pricing scheme) to insure that it would not again be underbid by Universal. ⁸

If plaintiffs' theory of the case and version of the evidence were accepted by the jury, as they may have been, then a Sherman Act violation has been established. We assume arguendo that the jury verdict was based on this premise, and that it was supported by the evidence. Under Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal." However proof of the existence of an actionable conspiracy is not enough. In addition to proof that the antitrust laws were violated, a plaintiff must also establish that such violation proximately caused injury to his business and adduce evidence that at least gives an indication of the amount of damage which resulted. Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 496 F.2d 878, cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S.Ct. 246, 42 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).

Under the facts of this case, plaintiffs failed the second of this three-pronged test, i. e., they failed to prove that an injury to Universal resulted from defendants' discriminatory pricing scheme. While the fact of injury most often involves evidentiary questions which are properly for the jury (e. g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562, 51 S.Ct. 248, 250, 75 L.Ed. 544, 548 (1931)) no such jury issue exists where, as here, plaintiffs failed to establish that in the absence of defendants' discriminatory pricing scheme Universal would have received this contract. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for defendants on the Sherman Act claim at the close of plaintiffs' case.

Plaintiffs' premise is that, absent the illegal bid to H/R, Universal would have received the contract. However, the facts as adduced at trial reveal that even if H/R's bid is disregarded, Universal would not be the low bidder. Rather, Land-Air, Inc., a party wholly unconnected with either defendant, stands second behind H/R. Thus, without H/R's bid, Universal still would not have received the contract. To show that the asserted conspiracy did in fact injure them, plaintiffs contend that Land-Air was not a viable intermediary. They point out that its bid was classified by the APSA as unresponsive and therefore its position should not be considered. While it is true that Land-Air's bid was initially classified as non-responsive and consequently Land-Air did not receive a pre-award survey, a memo from the APSA contract specialist in charge of contract DAAA-09-72-C-0208 negotiations introduced at trial reveals that an amendment was received from Land-Air on December 1, which negated the previous non-responsive action considered, and led to reinstatement of Land-Air's bid prior to award. It is crystal clear that Land-Air was a viable bidder and that, even after disregarding H/R's low bid because of the special, conspiratorially low price it received from Texas Foundries, Land-Air's bid stood between Universal and the opportunity to acquire this contract.

Plaintiffs attempted to...