M.C. v. Cnty. of Westchester
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | 16-cv-3013 (NSR) |
| Parties | M.C., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, NEW YORK; WESTCHESTER MEDICAL CENTER; CHERYL ARCHBALD; IRMA W. COSGRIFF; ADA HUANG; LAUREL SKELSON; GERMAINE JACQUETTE; MIRAL A. SUBHANI; SHERLITA AMLER; JOHN DOES #1 - #3, and JANE DOES #1 - #3, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Before the Court are the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants: (1) Sherlita Amler, Cheryl Archbald, County of Westchester, New York, Ada Huang, Germaine Jacquette, and Laural Skelson (collectively, the "WCDOH Defendants") (ECF No. 132); and (2) Westchester Medical Center and Dr. Miral A. Subhani (collectively, the "WMC Defendants") (ECF No. 133). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Opinion assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying claims, factual allegations, and procedural history in this matter. To briefly summarize, this action arises out of Plaintiff's (referred to herein as "Plaintiff" or "M.C.") involuntary hospitalization at Westchester Medical Center ("WMC") between April 23, 2015 and June 22, 2015. Prior to his involuntary hospitalization, Plaintiff had been diagnosed with Tuberculosis ("TB"). On March 4, 2015, after WCDOH Defendants submitted affidavits and testified during a court proceeding (which Plaintiff did not attend) before the Honorable Justice Lester Adler, New York Supreme Court Westchester County ("Justice Adler"), Justice Adler issued an Order and Decision authorizing Plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization pursuant to New York Public Health Laws § 2120 ("PHL § 2120") for a period of thirty (30) days after his initial arrest. Plaintiff was apprehended on April 23, 2015. During the intervening time between Justice Adler's Order and Plaintiff's initial arrest, Plaintiff received outpatient treatment with a private physician, Dr. James Cooke, and experienced documented side effects often associated with the ingestion of anti-TB medication. WCDOH Defendants, through correspondence with Dr. Cooke, became aware of certain developments in Plaintiff's treatment.
Following his arrest, Plaintiff objected to his continued hospitalization, largely complied with the medication regimen prescribed to him by the physicians at WMC, and provided some, but not all, of the sputum samples for testing that were requested by his physicians because he disputed the clinical necessity of additional testing. During his detention, Plaintiff obtained legal counsel and filed a notice of claim indicating that he intended to bring a legal action against the WCDOH Defendants and WMC Defendants. On May 18, 2015, after becoming aware of the notice of claim, and as the expiration of Justice Adler's March 4, 2015 order was approaching, WCDOH Defendants filed an order to show cause application to Justice Adler seeking an extension of Plaintiff's confinement for an additional 60 days. Prior to the hearing on WCDOH Defendants' order to show cause application, Plaintiff's counsel and WCDOH Defendants' counsel agreed to several adjournments—first through June 2, 2015, and then through June 18, 2015—and agreed to Plaintiff's continued hospitalization at WMC until the hearing could be conducted.
At the June 18, 2015 hearing, the parties presented Justice Adler with an agreement to discharge Plaintiff subject to several conditions relating to Plaintiff's testing, clinicalimprovement, and the provision of out-patient treatment for Plaintiff after his discharge from WMC, which was memorialized and so-ordered in Justice Adler's June 22, 2015 Decision and Order. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged from WMC on June 22, 2015.
WCDOH Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal claims of Section 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure, substantive due process violation, and First Amendment retaliation, and state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and malicious abuse of process. WMC Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to the claims pending against them - i.e., state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and malicious abuse of process. Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment with respect to all causes of action. (See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Pltf Opp.") (ECF No. 138).) The motions were fully briefed as of December 6, 2019. (See ECF Nos. 132 & 133.)
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see also Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2017). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Nick's Garage, 875 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Whether particular facts are materialis determined by the substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "The same standard applies whether summary judgment is granted on the merits or on an affirmative defense ...." Giordano v. Market Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the admissible evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). He cannot "rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation' but 'must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.'" Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., 781 F.3d 42, 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) ). "For a seizure to be reasonable, it must generally be supported by probable cause." Mara v. Rilling, 921 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir. 2019). "The Fourth Amendment's protection applies in civil context" and "applies to involuntary commitment." Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that an involuntary hospitalization may be made only upon probable cause,that is, only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the governing legal standard." Id. (quotation omitted).1
"[P]robable cause is a fluid concept" that "turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)) (cleaned up). "The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate...." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Probable cause is "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability" that the person identified has committed the alleged crime or otherwise engaged in requisite conduct. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
Given the initial subjective standard, "a reviewing court generally accords substantial deference to the finding of an issuing judicial office that probable cause exists, limiting [the]inquiry to whether the office had a substantial basis for his determination." United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, the presumption that a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer is reasonable can be overcome when the defendant "(1) knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard of the truth procured [the judicial finding], (2) based on false statements or material omissions, that (3) were necessary to the finding of probable cause." Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017).
WCDOH Defendants asserts that, among other claims, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim fails because Plaintiff's involuntary confinement was authorized by Justice Adler's March 4, 2015 Order and was supported by probable cause. Plaintiff counters that probable cause did not exist, and accordingly his claim survives, because: (1) materials submitted in support of the application to Justice Adler contained material misrepresentations and omissions; (2) even if probable cause existed as of the time of the March 4, 2015 order, such probable cause was stale as of April 23, 2015 (when he was ultimately detained); and (3) Plaintiff's continued confinement between May 23, 2015 and June 22, 2015 resulted from a separate order that only authorized his confinement due to material misstatements and omissions submitted in connection with that application.
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