A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.

Decision Date22 July 2011
Docket Number2100353.
Citation75 So.3d 1206
PartiesA.M.F. v. TUSCALOOSA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stuart D. Albea, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Karen P. Chambless, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

A.M.F. (“the mother) appeals from a judgment of the Tuscaloosa Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to C.G. (“the child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The child was born on May 26, 2004. Before the child was born, the mother had been convicted of armed robbery; she was placed on probation. When the child was 17 months old, the mother was sent to prison for violating her parole. The mother remained in prison until September 2007. The mother did not have any contact with the child while she was in prison. The mother entered the supervised-reentry program at the Lovelady Center when she was released from prison.

The Tuscaloosa County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) first became involved with the family in July 2008. At that time, the child was living with her paternal relatives due to the mother's incarceration and subsequent placement at the Lovelady Center. When DHR became involved with the family, the child's paternal grandfather had tested positive for marijuana use. The child also had extensive dental-health issues. Additionally, DHR performed a child-abuse and neglect investigation of the child's father, R.G. (“the father), which resulted in indicated findings for sexual abuse and neglect of the child. DHR removed the child from the care of the paternal relatives and placed the child in foster care.

After DHR was awarded legal custody of the child, it placed the child with the mother at the Lovelady Center as a trial placement. According to the mother, she successfully completed the program at the Lovelady Center; however, she did not leave the Lovelady Center at the time she completed the program because she had nowhere else to live. In March 2009, the Lovelady Center asked the mother to leave, alleging that she had violated its rules regarding having men in the center. When the mother left the Lovelady Center, she left the child in its day-care facility. The mother testified that she did not notify DHR that she had left the Lovelady Center or that she did not have a place to live. On the same day that she left the Lovelady Center, the mother executed a consent to the adoption of the child through an attorney specializing in private adoptions. DHR was not involved in arranging the execution of the adoption consent; DHR, which had legal custody of the child, refused to allow the child to be adopted because the child was in its care and because the child had a legal father. DHR retrieved the child from the Lovelady Center and placed her in foster care in Tuscaloosa.

According to the mother, after she left the Lovelady Center, she lived on the streets for three months. She had no contact with DHR or the child during that three-month period. The mother then moved to Brewton in June 2009, where she lived with a man who was the mother's boyfriend at the time. While living in Brewton, the mother worked for three months at a Dollar Tree discount store. The mother had some contact with the child by telephone during the time she lived in Brewton. The mother did not have any visitation with the child during that time. The mother testified that she did not have an automobile or a driver's license; the mother stated that she suffers from seizures, which prevent her from obtaining a driver's license.

In June 2010, the mother moved to Tuscaloosa, where she lived with her aunt. The mother's uncle also lived in the aunt's mobile home, along with S.D., who the mother claimed at trial was actually the father of the child. In October 2010, the aunt asked the mother to leave the aunt's home because the mother and S.D. were not getting along; S.D. continued to live in the aunt's home. The mother then lived for a short time with an elderly woman in a mobile home that lacked electricity or running water.

The mother testified that, during the time she had lived in Tuscaloosa, she had visited with the child seven times. The mother did not visit with the child from the time she left the child at the Lovelady Center in March 2009 until June 2010. Rhonda Lee, a DHR caseworker, testified that the mother visited with the child four or five times. The visits were all supervised by DHR. Lee testified that the visits all occurred at times requested by the mother. Lee also testified that the mother could have had additional visits with the child but that she had not requested any additional visits.

In October 2010, the mother moved to Dora in Walker County, where she continued to live at the time of trial. The mother testified that she was living with her fiance, R.L., in a three-bedroom, two-bath mobile home. R.L.'s mother and stepfather also lived in the mobile home, which was titled in R.L.'s mother's name. According to the mother, she became engaged to R.L. around the time she moved in with him; the mother stated that she had known R.L. “since third grade.” The mother testified that R.L. had been previously convicted of burglary and that he was currently on probation. The mother further testified that R.L. worked with the local carpenter's union, where he earned $16.95 per hour plus overtime.

The mother also testified that she had obtained employment with Diversco, which she was scheduled to start in January 2011. The mother stated that the job would entail cleaning duties at various Alabama Power Company facilities and that she would earn $10 per hour. Lee testified that the mother had not been in contact with DHR after she moved to Dora. Lee further testified that the mother had not informed DHR of her address in Dora or that she was living with R.L.; DHR also had not had an opportunity to check R.L.'s background.

Lee testified that DHR had offered the mother drug screens, counseling for the child, visitation, and telephone contact with the child. Lee further testified that DHR had attempted to make contact with the child's relatives. DHR also offered the father counseling. Lee answered “no” when asked whether the mother had completed any counseling. Lee stated that the mother had not obtained stable housing or a means of support during the entire time that the child had been in foster care. The mother admitted that she could not take care of the child at the time of the trial. The mother testified that she thought she could be ready to provide for the child in an additional six months. When asked how long she thought was fair to make the child wait for her to turn things around, the mother answered that making the child wait was not fair to the child. The mother also admitted that she had not been able to provide a stable home for the child at any time during the two and a half years that the child had been in foster care. The mother further testified that DHR had tried to work with her, and she answered “no” when asked whether there was anything else DHR could have done.

The juvenile court entered a judgment on December 28, 2010, terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights to the child.1 The juvenile court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in its judgment. Among its findings, the juvenile court determined that the conduct and condition of the parents rendered them unable to properly care for the child and that such conduct and condition was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, that the parents had failed to provide for the material needs of the child during the time the child had been in the custody of DHR, that the parents had failed to comply with the conditions of their individualized service plan, that the parents had exhibited a lack of effort to adjust their circumstances to meet the needs of the child, and that DHR had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents to enable the child to be reunified with the family but that those efforts had failed. The juvenile court also determined that no viable alternatives existed to the termination of the parents' parental rights. The juvenile court further stated that it had considered the recommendation of the child's guardian ad litem, who recommended termination of the parents' parental rights. The mother subsequently appealed to this court.

Issues

The mother raises two issues in her appeal: (1) whether the juvenile court erred when it determined that DHR had used reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with the child and (2) whether the juvenile court's judgment was supported by clear and convincing evidence.2

Standard of Review

“The juvenile court's factual findings based on evidence presented ore tenus in a judgment terminating parental rights are presumed correct. R.B. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 669 So.2d 187 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). The judgment terminating parental rights based on those findings will be reversed only if the record demonstrates that the decision is unsupported by the appropriate quantum of evidence, i.e., clear and convincing evidence, and is plainly and palpably wrong. Ex parte T.V., 971 So.2d 1, 4–5 (Ala.2007).”F.I. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 975 So.2d 969, 972 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).

Analysis

The mother first argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because, she says, DHR did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child.3 Whether DHR has made reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and a child is a fact-dependent inquiry. J.B. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 869 So.2d 475, 482 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). [T]he efforts actually required by DHR in each case, whether the court is considering rehabilitation or reunification, depend on the particular facts of that case, the statutory obligations regarding family reunification, and the best interests of the child.” J.B., 869 So.2d at 482.

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