M.G., P.C. v. N.Y.S. Office of Mental Health
| Decision Date | 15 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-CV-639 (CS) |
| Citation | 572 F.Supp.3d 1 |
| Parties | M.G., P.C., C.J., M.J., J.R., D.R., S.D., W.P., and D.H., individually and on behalf of all similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, Ann Marie T. Sullivan, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Anthony J. Annucci, in his official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Anne Marie McGrath, in her official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Joshua Rosenthal, Elizabeth Woods, Disability Rights New York, Brooklyn, New York, Elena M. Landriscina, Stefen R. Short, Robert M. Quackenbush, Veronica Vela, The Legal Aid Society, New York, New York, Walter G. Ricciardi, Emily A. Vance, Crystal Parker, Samuel Margolis, Chantalle Hanna, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, & Garrison LLP, New York, New York, Counsel for Plaintiffs,
Jane R. Goldberg, Jeb Harben, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, New York, Counsel for Defendants.
Anthony J. Sun, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New York, New York, Counsel for Interested Party United States of America.
This opinion serves to memorialize the Court's September 29, 2021 decision from the bench, (see Minute Entry dated Sept. 29, 2021), which DENIED Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, (ECF Nos. 155-56).
For the purposes of the instant motion, I accept as true the facts, but not the conclusions, alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 134 ("SAC").) Plaintiffs, formerly incarcerated individuals with serious mental illness who are indigent, brought this lawsuit to challenge their institutionalization in New York State's prison system and the subsequent failure of the state to provide community-based mental health housing and supportive services upon their release. Defendants include the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH"), Ann Marie T. Sullivan, in her official capacity as OMH Commissioner, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), Anthony Annucci, in his official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of DOCCS, and Anne Marie McGrath, in her official capacity as deputy director of DOCCS.1
Plaintiffs wish to represent three classes. The first is a "General Class" of people with serious mental illness whom Defendants hold in prison past their release dates – including their approved conditional release dates, open dates for parole release, and even the end of their prison sentences – due to the inadequate capacity of state community-based mental health housing programs. (SAC ¶ 5.) The second is an "RTF Subclass," made up of General Class members who Defendants purport to have released to Residential Treatment Facilities ("RTFs") upon the maximum expiration dates of their court-imposed prison sentences, but who in fact are held in prisons where they are treated just like prisoners.2 (Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 10.)
The third proposed class is a "Discharge Class." This group consists of "people with serious mental illness whom Defendants unnecessarily segregate or place at serious risk of institutionalization upon their release from prison because Defendants fail to provide the community-based mental health housing and supportive services that Plaintiffs need." (Id. ¶ 13; see id. ¶ 698.) Discharge Class members are evaluated by Defendants and are determined to require and be eligible for community-based mental health housing and supportive services, (id. ¶ 14), but instead of providing the Discharge Class Plaintiffs with those services in that setting, Defendants rely on state-operated, segregated settings to deliver these services, or, alternatively, release these individuals to a hodgepodge of hotels, motels, homeless shelters, and shelter-like parole housing facilities that lack the essential services these individuals require, (id. ¶¶ 15, 542-44). Plaintiffs allege that of the 364 people with serious mental illness released from state prisons to homeless shelters, hotels, or motels between January 23, 2019 and January 31, 2020, at least 342 were individuals who had been receiving mental health services in a state prison designated for individuals with the highest mental health needs, (id. ¶ 600), and that the housing to which they are released lacks the mental health services necessary for these individuals to transition to the community and maintain psychiatric stability, (id. ¶¶ 568-69). Some of these individuals remain in these settings for months while waiting for permanent housing. (Id. ¶ 551.)
For example, named Plaintiff S.D., who has a diagnosis of schizophrenia
, (id. ¶ 217), was discharged from prison to a homeless shelter and then transferred to a "mental health shelter" after being placed on a waiting list for the community-based mental health housing and supportive services that were deemed appropriate for him, (id. ¶¶ 225, 231-32, 234, 237-38). These shelters were unable to provide appropriate mental health care, manage S.D.’s care needs, maintain his medication regimen, or refill his medications for him, resulting in his rationing his medication, suffering mental health episodes, and ultimately being institutionalized. (See id. ¶¶ 244-275.)
Similarly, Defendants released named Plaintiff W.P., who has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder
, bipolar type and anti-social personality disorder, (id. ¶¶ 279-80), to a homeless shelter, despite "prior, and repeated, determinations that while incarcerated he could not function in an environment [like the general prison population] that does not provide adequate mental health supportive services," (id. ¶ 298). The shelters in which W.P. was living did not provide "the services that W.P. would receive in an integrated, community-based mental health housing program." (Id. ¶ 305.) W.P. was transferred between shelters and later to a hotel room at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted his ability to meet with his case worker. (Id. ¶¶ 301, 303, 312-14.) During his time in the shelter system, W.P.’s mental health has deteriorated, and the condition of his housing "greatly increases the risk that W.P. will suffer a mental health crisis resulting in hospitalization." (Id. ¶¶ 316-17.)
Named Plaintiff D.H., who has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder
, bipolar type and anti-social personality disorder, was also determined to be an eligible and appropriate candidate for community-based mental health housing and supportive services. (Id. ¶¶ 324, 332.) Despite this determination, D.H. remains on a waitlist for such services, and each time he has been discharged from prison, it has been either to parole housing or to his grandmother's house. (Id. ¶¶ 334-40.) D.H. did not receive supportive services at either of his release locations. (Id. ¶¶ 338, 340.) "The absence of housing and supportive services greatly exacerbated D.H.’s stress and impaired D.H.’s ability to manage his needs and cope with the demanding requirements of his DOCCS parole officer." (Id. ¶ 342.) D.H. was most recently re-incarcerated on March 2, 2020 and on June 22, 2020 was transferred to an Intensive Treatment Unit located within Rockland Psychiatric Center to await community-based mental health housing, which segregates him from the community and risks deterioration and relapse. (Id. ¶¶ 344-51.)
Plaintiffs allege that because Defendants fail to adequately fund and administer state programs that provide community-based housing and supportive services, Discharge Class members such as S.D., W.P., and D.H. must stay on lengthy waiting lists for the housing and supportive services they need and for which they are eligible, causing them to remain in segregated settings and/or placing them at an increased risk for institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act ("RA").
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on January 23, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) On May 13, 2019, I held a pre-motion conference regarding Defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss, at which I gave Plaintiffs leave to amend, (Minute Entry dated May 13, 2019), and Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 47 ("FAC")), on June 3, 2019. On August 2, 2019, I referred the case to Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith, who has since retired, for general pretrial supervision. (ECF No. 52.) After Defendants filed and the parties fully briefed the motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 79), Plaintiffs requested and obtained from Judge Smith permission to amend the FAC, principally to add the "Discharge Class" of Plaintiffs referenced above, (ECF Nos. 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132). Plaintiffs filed the SAC on August 27, 2020. (ECF No. 134.)
On September 25, 2020, I granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC. (See Minute Entry dated Sept. 25, 2020).3 After the ruling, Defendants requested another pre-motion conference in anticipation of a motion to dismiss the portions of the SAC pertaining to the Discharge Class. (ECF No. 141.) Plaintiffs responded, (ECF No. 144), and the Court held a pre-motion conference on November 12, 2020, (Minute Entry dated Nov. 12, 2020). This motion followed. (ECF Nos. 155, 156.)4 On September 29, 2021, I denied Defendants' motion in a decision from the bench, for the reasons stated herein.
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