M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 Civ. 4639SAS.,13 Civ. 4639SAS. |
| Citation | 15 F.Supp.3d 296 |
| Parties | M.G. and V.M. on behalf of themselves individually and their son, Y.T.; M.W. on behalf of herself individually and her son, E.H.; A.D. on behalf of herself individually and her son, D.D., Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ; New York City Board of Education; Dennis Walcott,in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City School District, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Elisa F. Hyman, Esq., Friedman & Moses LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew James Rauchberg, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.
The parents of three autistic children bring this action against the New York City Department of Education and other defendants (“the City”), alleging a failure to provide adequate special education services to their children in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the New York State Constitution, and several New York State education laws and regulations. Plaintiffs also allege that the City employs unlawful policies and practices regarding the provision of services to autistic children on a systemic basis.
On July 9, 2013, Y.T. and his parents, M.G. and V.M. (“the Y.T. plaintiffs”) sought a preliminary injunction to compel the City to provide certain services to Y.T. during the pendency of his administrative proceedings. On August 1, 2013, I granted plaintiffs' motion with respect to the 1:1 applied behavioral analysis (“ABA”) home services, which I concluded were part of Y.T.'s then-current educational placement. As such, the ABA services constituted pendency services exempt from administrative exhaustion.2 However, I denied the remaining relief requested because plaintiffs had not established that their failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused. Therefore, I lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' request for services beyond Y.T.'s then-current educational placement.3
On July 25, 2013, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add E.H. and his mother M.W. (“the E.H. plaintiffs”), and D.D. and his mother A.D. (“the D.D. plaintiffs”). Although the City did not contest the pendency services requested by the E.H. and D.D. plaintiffs, the hearing officer assigned to their cases refused to sign the requested pendency orders.4 On July 29, 2013, I endorsed a pendency order enumerating services to be provided to E.H. and D.D. during the course of their administrative proceedings.
The City now moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in accordance with the IDEA and cannot demonstrate that exhaustion should be excused. The City also moves to dismiss the claims implicating state administrative procedures unless New York State is joined as a necessary party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the City moves to dismiss Y.T.'s claims from the 2008–2009, 2009–2010, and 2010–2011 school years as time-barred under the IDEA'S statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, the City's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The IDEA requires participating states to provide disabled children with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) through an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) to be revised at least once a year.5 The IDEA also grants parents certain procedural rights, including the right to an impartial due process hearing regarding their child's placement and services.6 In New York, an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) from the local educational agency conducts the initial due process hearing and issues written findings.7 The IHO's decision may then be appealed to the New York State Education Department's (“NYSED's”) Office of State Review, where a State Review Officer (“SRO”) will examine the record and issue an “independent decision.”8 After exhausting the two-tiered administrative review process, an aggrieved party may then seek judicial review in federal or state court.9
Y.T. is an eleven-year-old boy who entered the public school system after moving to New York City from Egypt in 2008.10 In February of 2012, the Y.T. plaintiffs filed a due process complaint challenging the recommendations made for Y.T. in the 2008–2009, 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 school years.11 After entering several interim orders, the IHO rendered a final decision on February 11, 2013.12 In brief summary, the IHO denied compensatory services but ordered additional 1:1 after-school services for the 2011–2012 school year.13
On March 25, 2013, plaintiffs appealed the IHO's decision to NYSED.14 The matter was fully briefed and submitted in July of 2013.15 As of December 3, 2013, the SRO still had not issued a decision.16
On July 3, 2013, the Y.T. plaintiffs filed another due process complaint challenging the recommendations made for Y.T. for the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 school years.17 Although the City states that an initial hearing was scheduled before the IHO for October 17, 2013,18 the hearing still had not commenced as of December 3, 2013.19
E.H. is a student classified with autism
who has received special education services from the City since the 2009–2010 school year.20 M.W. has filed due process complaints regarding E.H.'s educational program in each school year since that time. Two of those complaints prevailed at IHO hearings, and two were settled by stipulation.21 On July 8, 2013, M.W. filed a due process complaint challenging the City's recommendations for the 2013–2014 school year.22 According to the City, the impartial hearing is currently before the IHO.23
D.D. is a student classified with autism
who has received special education services since at least 2010.24 A.D. filed due process complaints regarding D.D.'s services for the 2010–2011 and 2012–2013 school years.25 Although A.D. allegedly prevailed at both of those hearings, she claims that the City did not implement all of the IHO's orders.26 On July 8, 2013, A.D. filed another due process complaint challenging the City's recommendations for the 2013–2014 school year.27 In September of 2013, the IHO granted the services requested in full, and the City did not appeal.28
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “ ‘accept[ ] all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.’ ”29 The court “may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.”30
The court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the “two-pronged approach” suggested by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.31 Under the first prong, a court may “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”32 For example, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”33 Under the second prong of Iqbal, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”34 A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”35 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”36
The IDEA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review.37 However, the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion is excused where it would be “futile or inadequate.”38 Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate under the circumstances.39
In the Second Circuit, exhaustion may be excused in “cases involving systemic violations that [cannot] be remedied by local or state administrative agencies ‘because the framework and procedures for assessing and placing students in appropriate educational programs [is] at issue.’ ”40 The same rationale applies where “ ‘an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law.’ ”41
Exhaustion may also be excused where the local educational agency failed to notify parents of their due process rights and thereby “deprived [them] of the opportunity to take advantage of the procedural safeguards offered by the statute.”42 Moreover, lengthy delays in the administrative process may justify a finding that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.43 Although the specific threshold for such a finding is unclear, lower courts have excused exhaustion in cases with delays ranging from one month to two years.44
Failure to join a necessary party in accordance with Rule 19 can be grounds for dismissal.45 A party is necessary if, “in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.”46 If joinder of a necessary party is not feasible, the court must “determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”47
Under the IDEA, a parent's due process complaint must be filed “within 2 years of the date [the parent] knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”48 The two-year statute of limitations does not apply if the...
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