M.H. v. State
Decision Date | 11 March 2022 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-JV-2326 |
Citation | 186 N.E.3d 1145 |
Parties | M.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Mark D. Altenhof, Elkhart, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] In November 2020, the Indiana Supreme Court held that our juvenile courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent under the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm statute, Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018). K.C.G. v. State , 156 N.E.3d 1281, 1282 (Ind. 2020). Thereafter, the Indiana General Assembly enacted emergency legislation to amend Indiana Code section 31-37-1-2 to read in relevant part as follows: "A child commits a delinquent act if, before becoming eighteen (18) years of age, the child commits an act ... in violation of [ I.C. §] 35-47-10-5 [.]" P.L. 84-2021 § 1 (effective Apr. 19, 2021).
[2] The only issue in this appeal is a question of law: did the juvenile court here lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the juvenile a delinquent under I.C. § 35-47-10-5 for an act the juvenile committed prior to the statutory amendment? We hold that the law in effect at the time of the act, as interpreted by our Supreme Court in K.C.G. , requires holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the State's petition. We further hold that retroactively applying the statutory amendment would allow juveniles to be punished for acts that, at the time they were committed, were legally not acts for which juveniles could be punished, which would violate a juvenile's right to be free from ex post facto laws. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate M.H.’s adjudication as a delinquent under the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm statute for an act he committed in 2019.
[3] In June 2019, Elkhart Police Department officers observed M.H. and two other juveniles trespassing and placed all three juveniles under arrest. M.H. then "began to pull away forcefully" from the officers, and, "[d]uring a brief scuffle," M.H. "was tackled to the ground" and handcuffed. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 4. Officers then discovered a silver and black .380 caliber handgun on M.H. The handgun was loaded.
[4] The State filed a formal delinquency petition against M.H. and alleged in relevant part1 that M.H. committed a delinquent act when he was in dangerous possession of a firearm in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018). In July, the juvenile court held an initial hearing on the delinquency petition. At that hearing, M.H. admitted to the dangerous possession of a firearm, and the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent accordingly.
[5] In November 2020, our Supreme Court held that our juvenile courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate juvenile delinquents under Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018). K.C.G. , 156 N.E.3d at 1282. Following that holding, M.H. filed a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6)2 and asserted that, because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate him a delinquent under Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018), that judgment was void ab initio and must be vacated. After a hearing, the juvenile court denied M.H.’s motion. This appeal ensued.
[6] M.H. asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied his motion for relief from judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate him a delinquent under Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018). This issue presents us with a pure question of law. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion Corp. , 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. As we have explained: Id. ( )(internal citations omitted). Therefore:
[7] Again, in K.C.G. , our Supreme Court held that Indiana's juvenile courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate juvenile delinquents under Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5 (2018). 156 N.E.3d at 1282. That statute provides:
A child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 5 felony if the child has a prior conviction under this section or has been adjudicated a delinquent for an act that would be an offense under this section if committed by an adult.
[8] Our Supreme Court explained why that statute failed to authorize our juvenile courts to adjudicate juvenile delinquents for the dangerous possession of a firearm:
[9] The court added the following analysis:
Id. at 1283–84. Finally, the court concluded: Id. at 1285. The court therefore "vacate[d] the juvenile court's adjudication of K.C.G. as a delinquent child for dangerously possessing a firearm" and "remand[ed] with instructions...
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