A. M., In Interest of, 80-54

• Citation: 94 Ill.App.3d 86,418 N.E.2d 484,49 Ill.Dec. 630
• Decision Date: 18 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-54,80-54
• Parties: , 49 Ill.Dec. 630 In the Interest of A. M., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 484

418 N.E.2d 484

94 Ill.App.3d 86, 49 Ill.Dec. 630

In the Interest of A. M., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 80-54.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 18, 1981.

Mary Robinson, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Donna R. Palm, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for respondent-appellant.

Eugene Armentrout, State's Atty., Geneva, Phyllis J. Perko, Marshall Stevens, State's Attys., Appellate Service Commission, Elgin, for appellee.

REINHARD, Justice:

In this appeal, we consider whether a continuance under supervision permitted by the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 37, par. 704-7) is a final, appealable order.

The State's petition for adjudication of delinquency alleged the minor, A. M., age 14, committed an aggravated battery upon Karen Breese knowing her to be a teacher and on school grounds in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-4. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the minor was found guilty of simple battery, Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-3, and the matter was continued for a dispositional hearing without an adjudication of delinquency or wardship. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, however, the court expressly declined to adjudicate the minor a delinquent and, instead, upon the minor's request, continued the minor under court supervision until age 18, pursuant to section 704-7 of the Juvenile Court Act. The pertinent provision of section 704-7 provides that:

"(1) In the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his parent, guardian, custodian or responsible relative, the court may, before proceeding to findings and adjudication, or after hearing the evidence but before noting in the minutes of proceeding a finding of whether or not the minor is a person described in Section 2-1, continue the hearing from time to time, allowing the minor to remain in his own home subject to such conditions as to conduct and visitation and supervision by the probation officer or other designee of the court as the court may prescribe."

On appeal, the minor seeks reversal of the finding of "guilt", his sole contention being that he was denied his constitutional right to adequate notice of the charges as a result of the court's alleged reliance on an additional battery not recited in the State's petition for adjudication. Although the State has not raised any jurisdictional issue relative to the finality of the supervision order, we do so sua sponte. Allabastro v. Wheaton National Bank (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 222, 414 N.E.2d 537; In re Wheat (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 471, 25 Ill.Dec. 7, 386 N.E.2d 278; In re Kerwood (1977), 44 Ill.App.3d 1040, 3 Ill.Dec. 773, 359 N.E.2d 183.

Our jurisdiction is limited to appeals taken from final judgments, except where the Supreme Court Rules permit interlocutory appeal. (People v. Miller (1966), 35 Ill.2d 62, 219 N.E.2d 475; People v. Zach (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 17, 32 Ill.Dec. 528, 395 N.E.2d 758.) While the rules permit interlocutory appeal from certain orders under the Juvenile Court Act not pertinent to this case (Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110A, pars. 662 and 663), the minor's right of review of delinquency proceedings is otherwise limited to final judgments, in accordance with rules governing criminal cases. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110A, par. 660(a); see In re Davis (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 970, 3 Ill.Dec. 548, 358 N.E.2d 1233). In the context of criminal proceedings, a "final judgment" is generally perceived as that which terminates the litigation on its merits. (People v. Wasilewski (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 1, 22 Ill.Dec. 667, 383 N.E.2d 31.) Usually, that consists of a judgment of guilt and imposition of a sentence. People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill.2d 493, 309 N.E.2d 1; People v. Robinson (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 526, 354 N.E.2d 117.

The salient features of section 704-7 supervision are in sharp contrast to the foregoing principles of finality. It is, in essence, an initial alternative to a formal section 704-8 proceeding, which could taint the minor with an adjudication of delinquency and wardship. The supervision order is entered with the minor's consent prior to any adjudication of delinquency. It is merely a continuance of the proceedings upon prescribed conditions. Inasmuch as a supervision order is entered without an adjudication of delinquency or wardship (see In re Serna (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 406, 408, 24 Ill.Dec. 320, 385 N.E.2d 87), it is necessarily not based on a judgment. (See People v. Breen (1976), 62 Ill.2d 323, 326, 342 N.E.2d 31.) In fact, it represents one of the few instances in which the legislature has authorized a disposition the court may impose not based on a prior, still existing judgment of guilt. (People v. Breen at 327, 342 N.E.2d 31.) As is expressly provided under section 704-7, the continuance under supervision does not finally dispose of the merits of the State's petition for an adjudication of delinquency, but provides for a continuance of the proceedings. However, upon the minor's violation of the prescribed conditions of supervision, the court may revoke the minor's supervisory status and enter an adjudication of delinquency on the basis of the original petition. In re R. J. W. (1979), 76 Ill.App.3d 159, 31 Ill.Dec. 746, 394 N.E.2d 1064; In re Serna.

While no Illinois reviewing court has considered the finality of supervision orders entered in juvenile proceedings, several cases have addressed the finality of analogous supervision orders in the context of criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. The Appellate Courts have dismissed appeals from these orders on grounds they were not final in the absence of an adjudication of guilt. (City of Chicago v. Severini (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 38, 414 N.E.2d 67; PEOPLE V. KOONCE (1978), 65 ILL.APP.3D 86, 22 ILL.DEC. 127, 382 N.E.2D 447;¹ People v. Breen (1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 547, 325 N.E.2d 738, rev'd other grounds (1976), 62 Ill.2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31; see also People v. Glidden (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 741, 338 N.E.2d 204, in which, upon supplementation of the record to show an adjudication of guilt, the court vacated its prior opinion wherein it dismissed the appeal from a supervision order entered under Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 561/2, par. 710). Our supreme court expressly declined to consider the finality question in the Breen case and, instead, exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to rule that in the absence of legislation, courts are powerless to enter orders of supervision in criminal cases not based on an adjudication of guilt. People v. Breen (1976), 62 Ill.2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31. ²

Recently, however, the legislature has authorized the court to impose a disposition of supervision in criminal cases if the defendant is not charged with a felony and meets other prescribed considerations. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-1.) A disposition of probation without the entry of a judgment has been an authorized disposition for several years under the Illinois Controlled Substance Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 561/2, par. 1410) and the Cannabis Control Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 561/2, par. 710) for first-time offenders. Under all three of these legislative enactments the right to appeal from that disposition is specifically allowed under that act. ³ Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3.1(i); Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 561/2, par. 1410(f); and Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 561/2, par. 710(f).

In contrast to the foregoing, the Juvenile Court Act does not contain any appeal provision...