M., In re

• Decision Date: 20 February 1969
• Citation: 70 Cal.2d 444,75 Cal.Rptr. 1,450 P.2d 296
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 450 P.2d 296 In re Dennis, M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Warren E. THORNTON, Probation Officer, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis M., Defendant and Appellant. Sac. 7819.

Page 1

75 Cal.Rptr. 1

70 Cal.2d 444, 450 P.2d 296

In re Dennis, M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

Warren E. THORNTON, Probation Officer, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis M., Defendant and Appellant.

Sac. 7819.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 20, 1969.

Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, and Michael S. Sands, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Dennis M., a juvenile, appeals from a judgment declaring him to be a ward of the court and committing him to the Youth Authority. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 725, 800.) He contends that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and that his confession was introduced into evidence in violation of the rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. We have concluded that the points are not well taken and the judgment should be affirmed.

MOSK,Justice.

At the time the events in issue took place, appellant was 15 1/2 years old. On August 18, 1966, appellant and his friend Gilbert took an automobile without the owner's consent. Before abandoning it, appellant stole a .22-caliber revolver from the glove compartment, and Gilbert stole a shotgun from the trunk. About 8:30 p.m. on August 28 appellant called on his 15-year-old girlfriend Yolanda. After the two had stood outside her house talking for some 15 minutes, a shot was heard. Yolanda's father rushed out and found his daughter shot in the head, the bullet having entered under her chin. No gun was visible, and no other persons were present. Appellant immediately claimed that the shot had been fired by a passerby; asking, 'You want me to go after him?' appellant mounted his bicycle and appeared to give chase. He returned empty-handed, and when Deputy Sheriff Piper arrived a few minutes later appellant volunteered a detailed description of the incident and the alleged assailant. ¹

At 10:15 p.m. Sheriff's Officers Stamm and Tobler went to Yolanda's house to talk with appellant about the shooting. They had discussed the event with Officer Piper, and believed that appellant had given him a false story. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Tobler found a .22-caliber revolver in a flower bed of the house next door. The chamber of the weapon contained an empty cartridge. ² The officers then asked appellant to step outside, showed him the revolver, and advised him of his constitutional rights under the decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. When asked if he wanted to talk about it, appellant acknowledged that he had shot Yolanda. At this point he was arrested and placed in the officers' car. He explained that the shooting was an accident, that he had been 'playing' with the gun and 'I asked her if she wanted to see it. It just went off, I didn't know it was loaded.' He further admitted the theft of both the gun and the car with Gilbert.

An hour and a half later appellant was questioned in the sheriff's office by a deputy district attorney, who began by readvising appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant stated he understood, and proceeded to elaborate on his story of an accidental shooting. In substance, he related that after stealing the gun he had loaded it and practiced firing it; that on the evening he visited Yolanda he pulled it out to show her; that he thought he had removed all the bullets while talking with her, but 'I didn't know if it was loaded or not'; that he pointed the gun upwards and pulled the trigger twice while hugging Yolanda, and it fired the second time; and that he immediately threw the gun over the fence and told Yolanda's father and Officer Piper the tale of the phantom assailant.

On August 30 a petition was filed in the juvenile court, praying that appellant be adjudged a ward of that court on the ground that he was a 'person under the age of 21 years who violate(d) any law of this State' (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602). The violations alleged were that appellant had stolen the .22-caliber revolver and used it to commit an assault with a deadly weapon against Yolanda. She died later the same day. Accordingly, on September 1 a supplemental petition was filed, seeking such an adjudication on the additional ground that appellant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the killing of Yolanda; he was also charged at that time with the August 18 theft of the automobile. ³

At the outset of the hearing, appellant, represented by counsel, admitted the theft of the gun. The above-related evidence was then introduced, and the court found that appellant had committed the three charged violations of law and hence was within the jurisdiction defined by section 602. Judgment was thereafter rendered declaring appellant to be a ward of the court ⁴ and committing him to the care and custody of the Youth Authority.

I

The appeal is devoid of merit insofar as it attacks the 'jurisdictional' finding. Appellant, represented by counsel, judicially admitted the charge of stealing the .22-caliber revolver. Such a violation of law, standing alone, is sufficient to bring a juvenile within the purview of section 602, and the record discloses that the court so found: in the course of the hearing the court ruled, 'Without making any disposition at this time, I'll sustain the petition * * * as to the violation of (Penal Code) Section 484 (i.e., theft of the gun).' Appellant has not challenged the propriety of that ruling; nor, indeed, has he questioned on appeal the finding that he was also guilty of the theft of the car. The juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over appellant is thus more than adequately supported.

Nevertheless, we recognize that the third stated jurisdictional ground, i.e., that appellant was guilty of manslaughter in the shooting of Yolanda, may have had significant weight in the court's subsequent ruling on disposition. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 702 et seq.) Accordingly, we consider the merits of appellant's attack on that ground.

We meet at the outset a contention advanced by appellant at oral argument: i.e., that the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, compels the state to establish the facts supporting a charge of juvenile delinquency by the criminal standard of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' We do not so read Gault. It is true, of course, that the decision inaugurated a sweeping constitutional reform of the rights of juveniles in this country. It drew from the teaching of earlier cases the fundamental proposition that 'neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone' (387 U.S. at p. 13, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1436), and laid down specific guidelines for implementing those guarantees in juvenile proceedings. Yet in so doing the court took repeated pains to limit its holding by warning that 'We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents. " (Ibid.) First, the decision was intended to affect only the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, and then only when the outcome may be commitment to a state institution. (Ibid.) Secondly, the court made it clear that even if the foregoing conditions are met, the Constitution does not require that the full panoply of rights accorded to an adult accused of crime be erected in the juvenile court. (Id. at pp. 27, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428.) Rather, the opinion (at pp. 30--31, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1445) adopts for juvenile court adjudications of delinquency the holding of Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, that 'the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' Those essentials, as the remainder of the opinion spells out, are (1) adequate notice of the charges, (2) assistance of counsel, (3) opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and (4) the privilege against self-incrimination. (387 U.S. at pp. 31--57, 87 S.Ct. 1428).

Not only is standard or quantum of proof missing from the foregoing itemized list, but the court expressly declined to reach this very issue. In the course of its opinion below, the Arizona court had ruled on the question of the appropriate standard of proof in juvenile cases; referring inter alia to that ruling, the United States Supreme Court stated (387 U.S. at pp. 10--11, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1435) that 'We emphasize that we indicate no opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to such other issues does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal Constitution.' And one year later the court again refrained from deciding the issue. ⁵

We infer that at least for the present the Supreme Court has left this matter to the states and the lower federal courts. The results, however, are still highly inconclusive. At least three different formulae have been sanctioned. The great weight of authority holds that in juvenile proceedings the general civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence governs. (See cases collected in Note, 43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1138--1141.) Some courts, including the Arizona Supreme Court in Gault itself, have adopted the special civil standard of proof by 'clear and convincing evidence.' (See, e.g., Application of Gault (1965) 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760, 768.) And the few jurisdictions to consider the issue since Gault are divided: in Illinois and Texas it has been held that the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is now constitutionally compelled in juvenile cases (In re Urbasek (1967) 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716; Santana v. State (Tex.Civ.App.1968) 431 S.W.2d 558; see also ...