M.J. v. State

Decision Date18 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. 4D12–3106.,4D12–3106.
Citation121 So.3d 1151
PartiesM.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

WARNER, J.

In this appeal from an adjudication of delinquency, the juvenile contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession, which resulted from what he claims was an illegal detention for loitering and prowling. We agree that, even though the deputy could have reasonably stopped the juvenile for truancy, he did not have probable cause to arrest the juvenile for loitering and prowling. Thus, the transport and questioning of the juvenile at the police station, which resulted in the juvenile's confession to burglary, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We reverse.

On a Thursday about mid-day, Broward Deputy Sheriff Johnson, who was on road patrol, observed appellant, M.J., in front of a house in a high crime area of Broward County. Deputy Johnson knew M.J. from prior dealings, including the fact that he was seventeen and should have been in school at that time. The deputy made a u-turn in his vehicle to initiate a truancy investigation. By the time he turned around, he saw M.J. start running and disappear from his view. The deputy stopped at the house where he had seen M.J., went up to the porch, and found M.J. lying along the concrete wall inside the porch.

The deputy grabbed M.J. and told him to stand up. He then read M.J. Miranda rights. He asked M.J. what he was doing there. M.J. said he was at the house to see a friend. The deputy knocked on the door but no one answered.

A second deputy came on the scene and Deputy Johnson, being suspicious about the circumstances, walked around the house. In some bushes on the side of the house, he discovered three boxes containing new sports sneakers. At that point, about five or ten minutes after M.J. was detained, Deputy Johnson noticed the home's resident, whom he knew from prior dealings, at the home's window. Through the window, the resident told the deputy that M.J. had brought the shoes to his residence. The deputy knew that the resident had prior burglaries on his record. The deputy never asked the resident whether M.J. had permission to be on his property.

The officer arrested M.J. for loitering and prowling and transported him to the sheriff's office where an interrogation was conducted. At the time of the arrest, the deputy had “no idea that the sneakers were stolen.” When he got to the station, however, a third deputy informed him that a burglary of shoes had been reported. M.J. ultimately confessed to that burglary during the interrogation.

Deputy Johnson admitted that generally a truancy investigation would result in the return of the child to school or the child's parents. He did not return M.J. to school because he arrested him for loitering and prowling. The circumstances Deputy Johnson identified as supporting the arrest were M.J.'s running and hiding from him when he turned his vehicle around and that M.J.'s explanation as to why he was on the porch—to see a friend—was not “valid,” because when Deputy Johnson looked at the resident through the window, it appeared as though the resident had just awoken.

The trial court ruled that Deputy Johnson was authorized to commence a truancy investigation. Based upon the totality of the circumstances after Deputy Johnson observed M.J. fleeing from him, the court believed the circumstances were “suspicious”and justified Deputy Johnson's continued detention and investigation of M.J. The court then denied the motion to suppress.

M.J. reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress, and the state did not contest the dispositive nature of the motion. Following the denial, he entered a no contest plea to the charge of burglary of a dwelling. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced M.J. to juvenile probation. This appeal follows.

Our standard of review requires us to defer to the trial court's factual findings but review its legal conclusions de novo. Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 605 (Fla.2001); State v. E.W., 82 So.3d 150, 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). The trial court made the factual finding that the officer was authorized to conduct a truancy investigation when he stopped M.J. Section 984.13, Florida Statutes (2012), allows a law enforcement officer to take a child “into custody” when “the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is absent from school without authorization ... for the purpose of delivering the child without unreasonable delay to the appropriate school system site.” § 984.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). The officer may also deliver the child to his parents if the student has been suspended or expelled from school. Id. Therefore, Deputy Johnson had the authority to take M.J. into custody.

Truancy, however, is not a crime. See C.G. v. State, 689 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). While a law enforcement officer has the authority to take a juvenile into custody, that authority is limited to returning the child to school or the child's parents. The officer does not have the statutory authority to transport the child to a police station for further questioning based upon truancy.

Where the officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity, the officer may conduct an investigatory stop. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). That investigation should be limited and cannot extend beyond the place of initial encounter. See Kollmer v. State, 977 So.2d 712, 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To transport an individual for additional questioning, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause for an arrest.

Where ... the detained individual is physically removed from the scene and involuntarily transported to the police station for questioning and/or investigation, the courts have had little difficulty in construing such a detention to be a de facto arrest requiring either probable cause or prior judicial authorization.

Id. (citing Saturnino–Boudet v. State, 682 So.2d 188, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)); see also Mathis v. Coats, 24 So.3d 1284, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In this case, Deputy Johnson placed M.J. under arrest and transported him to the sheriff's office for questioning; therefore, the question we must answer is whether the totality of the circumstances provided him with probable cause to arrest M.J. for loitering and prowling.

Section 856.021, Florida Statutes (2012), provides: “It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.” § 856.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). When a person takes “flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer” or “manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object,” this is a circumstance for consideration in determining the alarm or immediate concern element. § 856.021(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). Prior to arrest, a law enforcement officer must give the suspect the opportunity to explain his conduct. Id.

We have explained, [b]ecause of its potential for abuse,...

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  • Lu Jing v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 2021
    ...investigatory stop, in violation of [the defendant's] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights." Id. ; see also M.J. v. State , 121 So. 3d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that to "transport an individual for additional questioning, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause fo......
  • Gomez v. State
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    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 2014
    ...but the circumstances amount to the defendant not being free to leave the encounter, requires probable cause. See M.J. v. State, 121 So.3d 1151, 1154–56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). “Probable cause to arrest or search exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowl......
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    • Florida District Court of Appeals
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  • State v. C.J.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 31, 2017
    ...to suppress, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo but defer to the trial court on issues of fact. M.J. v. State , 121 So.3d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). An officer may arrest a child if that officer "has probable cause to believe that a child is in violation of the condi......
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