M.L. v. Eskenazi Health / Midtown Mental Health CMHC
| Decision Date | 27 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1612-MH-2823 |
| Citation | 80 N.E.3d 219 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: M.L., Appellant-Respondent, v. ESKENAZI HEALTH / MIDTOWN MENTAL HEALTH CMHC, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant : Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee : Jessica Barth, Eskenazi Health, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Appellant-Respondent, M.L., appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee-Petitioner's, The Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County d/b/a/ Eskenazi Health/Midtown Mental Health CMHC (Eskenazi), request for temporary commitment.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
[3] M.L. raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: Whether Eskenazi presented sufficient evidence to support the special condition of commitment.
[4] Eskenazi presents one issue, which we restate as: Whether Eskenazi is entitled to appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).
[5] On November 14, 2016, thirty-year-old M.L. was admitted to the inpatient unit at Eskenazi hospital on an emergency detention. Eskenazi filed a petition for involuntary commitment that same day, which was denied by the trial court. M.L. was released from the hospital on November 22, 2016.
[6] On November 24, 2016, M.L. returned to the hospital to speak with Dr. Aimee Patel (Dr. Patel), the attending psychiatrist. When he learned that Dr. Patel was not there that day, M.L. asked the staff for a list of the chemicals he had been exposed to during his recent hospitalization. M.L. left, but returned on November 28, 2016, again requesting to speak with Dr. Patel. Dr. Patel observed M.L. to be (Transcript p. 7). She became concerned and filed another petition, seeking an emergency detention of M.L. The application included a physician's emergency statement, which was signed on the same date. Dr. Patel re-admitted M.L. to the inpatient psychiatric unit. The hospital filed a Report Following Emergency Detention on November 30, 2016, which included a physician's statement.
[7] Upon M.L.'s re-admission, Dr. Patel determined that (Tr. p. 7). M.L. was given emergency medication for agitation several times at the hospital but refused all offered medications. M.L. was (Tr. p. 7). He made threatening statements and gestures toward other people on the unit and spoke of purchasing a gun for protection.
[8] On December 5, 2016, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. During the proceedings, Dr. Patel testified that M.L. was both dangerous to himself and others, and gravely disabled by his mental illness in that he was not able to provide his own food, clothing, shelter, and basic needs. Dr. Patel also requested that the trial court impose certain special conditions on M.L. as part of the Order of Commitment, including that he "not use alcohol or drugs, other than those prescribed by a certified medical doctor." (Tr. pp. 18-19). At the close of the evidence, the trial court ordered M.L. to be involuntarily committed to Eskenazi hospital on a temporary basis for a period not to exceed ninety days. Among the special conditions made a part of the Commitment Order was the trial court's mandate that "upon attaining outpatient status," M.L. "shall not use alcohol or drugs, other than those prescribed by a certified medical doctor." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 7).
[9] M.L. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[10] Eskenazi's appellate brief is entirely devoted to devising legal avenues so as not to address the merits of M.L.'s appeal. However, all of these contentions fail due to an apparent misunderstanding of the legal mechanics of objection and waiver.
[11] In their respective appellate briefs, Eskenazi advocates and M.L. concedes that the case is moot because the Order of Commitment expired on March 5, 2017. Therefore, this court cannot render effective relief to M.L. See In re Commitment of T.K ., 993 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied . "When a court is unable to render effective relief to a party, the case is deemed moot and usually dismissed." Id . However, although moot cases are usually dismissed, Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions of "great public interest." Id . Typically, cases falling in the "great public interest exception" contain issues that are likely to recur. Id .
[12] "The question of how persons subject to involuntary commitment are treated by our trial courts is one of great importance to society." Id . (quoting In Re Commitment of J.B ., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ). "Indiana statutory and case law affirm that the value and dignity of the individual facing commitment or treatment is of great societal concern." Id . (citing In Re Mental Commitment of M.P ., 510 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ind. 1987) ). The instant case involves the proof necessary to impose special conditions upon attaining outpatient status. Because this is an issue of great public importance that is likely to recur and for which Indiana case law is practically undeveloped, we will address it here.
Next, Eskenazi advances that M.L. waived this appeal, as he failed to object to "the imposition of the special condition." (Appellee's Br. p. 8). Finding "the record replete with M.L.'s opportunities to object to the imposition of the special condition," Eskenazi reiterates our well-known doctrine that "[a] party may not present an argument or an issue to an appellate court unless the party raised that argument or issue to the trial court." (Appellee's Br. p. 9) (reference omitted); see, e.g. , Carson v. Ross , 509 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g denied, trans. denied . Consequently, Eskenazi maintains that "[t]o choose to advance this issue to a full appeal is a waste of the scarce resources of three different governmental entities: the public defender, [Eskenazi], and of course this Court." (Appellee's Br. p. 9)
[13] It is clear that Eskenazi harbors a misunderstanding of what constitutes waiver and what represents a meritorious appeal. Eskenazi claims the first waiver to be present when M.L. failed to object to Dr. Patel's direct testimony as to which particular special condition she was requesting the trial court to impose. Then, Eskenazi argues that M.L. failed to ask Dr. Patel "why she was requesting the special condition or refer to it in any way" during cross-examination. (Appellee's Br. p. 9). The hospital contends that "[i]f M.L. had a concern about the particular condition imposed by the trial court, M.L. should have raised it at the hearing, which would have allowed Dr. Patel to explain why it was in M.L.'s best interest not to drink alcohol or use drugs during his acute episode of bi-polar mania." (Appellee's Br. p. 9). And lastly, Eskenazi takes issue with M.L.'s counsel's silence when the trial court ruled in favor of Eskenazi during the proceedings and imposed (Tr. p. 34).
[14] Because civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protections, the burden falls on the petitioner. Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). Accordingly, the burden rested with Eskenazi to present sufficient evidence to support the imposition of the special condition. However, rather than acknowledging that it carried the burden of proof by establishing the necessary evidence, Eskenazi now transfers this burden and places it squarely on M.L. by characterizing it as a failure to object to the imposition of the special condition. In other words, Eskenazi faults M.L. for failing to make the case for it. During Dr. Patel's testimony it was incumbent upon Eskenazi to elicit sufficient evidence with respect to the particularities of its request and its reason to impose the challenged special condition. There was nothing for M.L. to object to, and M.L. was not under a burden to present evidence as to the special condition's necessity. Silence was indeed M.L.'s best strategy here.
[15] When the trial court mandated the imposition of the special condition during the hearing, the trial court issued its judgment. At that time, the proper legal avenue to challenge a trial court's decision is not by raising an objection—as no evidence is presented—but by either filing a motion to correct error or by filing a notice of appeal. Clearly, M.L. choose the latter, and we find that his appeal has merit.
[16] M.L. contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it included the special condition in its Order of Commitment and therefore, the condition should be stricken. Indiana Code section 12-26-14-3 permits a trial court to order special conditions when an individual is involuntarily committed to outpatient care:
Such special conditions "must be reasonably...
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