M.N. v. Sparta Twp. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-19977
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
• Parties: M.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A.D., & A.D., Plaintiffs, v. SPARTA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, & ANGELICA ALLEN-MCMILLAN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendants.

M.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A.D., & A.D., Plaintiffs, v. SPARTA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, & ANGELICA ALLEN-MCMILLAN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-19977

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 24, 2022

Not for Publication

OPINION & ORDER

JOHN MICHAEL VAZQUEZ, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs M.N. and A.D.'s motion to dismiss Defendant the Sparta Township Board of Education's (“STBOE”) counterclaim for money spent on A.D. while he allegedly improperly attended Sparta High School, D.E. 23, and Plaintiffs' related motion for sanctions, D.E. 39. The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions^[1] and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78 and L. Civ R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates by reference the factual and procedural background recounted in its Opinion in response to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. D.E. 61. The Court adds that the STBOE, in its counterclaim, alleges that A.D. improperly attended Sparta High School from May 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019 and September 8, 2019 to June 30, 2020. D.E. 20 (“CC”) ¶¶ 3-4.^[2] The taxpayers of Sparta Township bore the expense incurred by A.D.'s attendance. Id.

As of the date of this Opinion, M.N.'s appeal of the administrative proceeding before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law remains pending before the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. See D.E. 1 at 26.

Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit on November 12, 2021. D.E. 1. They moved for a preliminary injunction on December 11, 2021. D.E. 11. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion on April 12, 2022 in a written opinion and order. D.E. 61; D.E. 62. The STBOE filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on January 24, 2022, raising a single counterclaim. D.E. 20. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim, D.E. 23, and then moved for sanctions, D.E. 39.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs move to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), asserting a lack of standing. The rule provides that a party may move to dismiss a claim based on “lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). To decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack against a complaint. A facial attack contests “subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to ‘consider the allegations of the complaint as true.'” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)).

A factual attack challenges “the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or ‘otherwise presenting competing facts.'” Davis, 824 F.3d at 346 (quoting Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)). The STBOE argues that Plaintiffs raise a facial attack, which Plaintiffs do not dispute. D.E. 38 at 12; see D.E. 51 at 1-6. As a result, like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must consider the allegations in the counterclaim as true.

B. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiffs also move for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), which provides in relevant part that

[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; [and] the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(2); see also A.W. ex rel. N.W. v. Princeton Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., __ Fed.Appx. __, No. 20-2433, 2022 WL 989348, at *5 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2022). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1) provides as follows:

If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).

“[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus, consistent with the Rules Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is at the discretion of the district court. A.W., 2022 WL 989348, at *5. But “the standard under Rule 11 is ‘stringent[.]'” Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 844 F.3d 387, 391 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016). “Courts apply ‘an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances' to Rule 11's requirements.” Waugaman v. City of Greensburg, 841 Fed.Appx. 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988)). To be sanctionable, a claim must be “wholly without merit[.]” Moeck, 844 F.3d at 392 n.9; see also Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that Rule 11 “‘must not be used as an automatic penalty against an attorney or party advocating the losing side of a dispute,' and it ‘should not be applied to adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates creative legal theories.'”) (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc., 847 F.2d at 94). In sum, “Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for correcting litigation abuse.” Ario, 618 F.3d at 297.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Article III Standing

Plaintiffs contend that the STBOE lacks standing to prosecute its counterclaim. D.E. 23-1 at 2. The Constitution provides that “judicial Power” extends to “Cases” and “Controversies[.]” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To meet the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must show it has standing to sue. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (citation omitted). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”' Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2015)). An injury-in-fact requires a plaintiff to show that she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized[.]” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A particularized injury means that it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. A concrete injury refers to one that actually exists; one that is real and not abstract. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). In addition, “[t]he injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense[.]” Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).

Plaintiffs assert that the STBOE has no cognizable interest in the state or federal tax money that was spent to educate A.D. because those funds did not “originate from” the STBOE. D.E. 231 at 6. They explain that under New Jersey law, the only way for a school district to recoup money erroneously spent on a student's education is through the procedure set forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:38-1(b)(2). Id. Plaintiffs maintain that the STBOE cannot invoke that statute. Id. at 7. The STBOE counters that Plaintiffs' motion, although couched in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, is actually a motion to dismiss on the merits because it challenges whether the STBOE can invoke that New Jersey statute. D.E. 38 at 8.

Under the New Jersey statute, if a school district's superintendent or the administrative principal determines “that the parent or guardian of a child who is attending the schools of the district is not domiciled within the district and the child” is not otherwise entitled to attend a school district on account of his or her domicile, the commissioner of education “shall assess the parent or guardian tuition for the student prorated to the time of the student's ineligible attendance in the schools of the district” after the board of education approves the removal of the child N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:38-1(b)(2).

Plaintiffs' primary argument is that the STBOE cannot invoke that statute because it has not alleged that A.D. and M.N. resided outside the geographic bounds of the school district. D.E. 23-1 at 7. The Court agrees with the STBOE that this is an attack on the counterclaim's merits, and will not consider, at this juncture, whether Plaintiffs can invoke the New Jersey statute.^[3] The Third Circuit has “repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits.” Davis, 824 F.3d at 348. This “is necessary because the standards governing the two rules differ markedly[.]” Id. at 348-49. Whereas a party seeking to dismiss a...