M. P., In re, 114-73
| Decision Date | 04 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 114-73,114-73 |
| Citation | 133 Vt. 144,333 A.2d 116 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re M. P. |
Francis X. Murray, State's Atty., and Paul D. Jarvis, Deputy State's Atty., for the State.
Richard M. Hubbard, Stowe, for M. P.
Richard L. Brock and George E. Rice, Jr., Montpelier, for the mother.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, KEYSER, DALEY and LARROW, JJ.
This appeal is taken by the mother of M. P., a two-year-old girl, from an order of the District Court of Vermont, Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit. The court transferred legal custody, guardianship, and residual parental rights to Vermont Catholic Charities without limitation as to adoption.
The proceedings below were initiated by a petition filed by the Deputy State's Attorney at the request of the Department of Social Welfare. The petition alleged that M. P. was without necessary parental care, control, or subsistence and was thus a 'Child in need of care or supervision' under 33 V.S.A. § 632(12). A hearing on the merits of this petition was conducted on November 13, 1972, at which jurisdiction was established and testimony was received from the child's mother, who is unwed; the mother's two brothers; and a representative of Vermont Catholic Charities. At the conclusion of the hearing the court ordered that the mother undergo a psychiatric examination and continued the matter until such examination could be conducted. The court directed that the child remain in the interim at St. Joseph's Child Center, where it had been living since birth. This latter order followed the court's statement that 'I don't feel the mother is capable of taking care of this child.'
A second hearing, conducted on February 5, 1973, was primarily concerned with the report of Dr. William A. Woodruff, a psychiatrist who had examined the mother pursuant to the court's request. Dr. Woodruff was not able to attend the hearing, and the court inquired of counsel whether they would stipulate that the report could be treated as indicating what the doctor would have testified to had he been present. Appellant's counsel did not directly respond to this inquiry but proceeded instead to point out what he considered to be certain inconsistencies in the report. The record does not disclose that appellant's counsel ever stipulated to the contents of the report.
Towards the close of this second hearing, the court found that 'the child is a neglected child within the meaning of the statute in that, at this time at any rate, based upon the testimony in the previous hearing on November 13, the child was without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education, medical or other care and control necessary for its well being.' The subsequent written findings and order were entered on February 7, 1973, and this appeal followed. The mother challenges here the court's reliance on the psychiatric report, the finding of neglect, and the order divesting her of her residual parental rights. We reverse.
Proceedings of this nature are governed by the Juvenile Procedures Act found in Chapter 12 of Title 33. The Act provides for a hearing before the court on the merits of the petition at the close of which the court makes an order containing its findings thereon. There then follows a disposition hearing at which the court determines what course of action is consistent with the best interests of the child. Although the disposition hearing may, in some cases, be held immediately upon a finding of neglect, the hearing may be continued in order that the court may consider a special disposition report made by the Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitation Services and other pertinent information.
It is difficult to ascertain on the record before us if or when the proceedings below shifted from a hearing on the merits to a consideration of the disposition to be made. Although no findings were entered following the first hearing, the...
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Brueckner v. Norwich University
...There is no absolute prohibition against the use of admitted hearsay evidence to support a jury's verdict. See In re M.P., 133 Vt. 144, 146, 333 A.2d 116, 118 (1975). Particularly in light of the fact that Norwich commissioned the report and moved for its introduction at trial, it cannot co......
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In re M.E.
...Because no party objected to the admission of the statements, the court was not prohibited from considering them. See In re M.P., 133 Vt. 144, 146, 333 A.2d 116, 118 (1975) (explaining that hearsay is inadmissible at merits stage of CHINS proceeding because parties have right to cross-exami......
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In re M.E.
...Because no party objected to the admission of the statements, the court was not prohibited from considering them. See In re M.P., 133 Vt. 144, 146, 333 A.2d 116, 118 (1975) (explaining that hearsay is inadmissible at merits stage of CHINS proceeding because parties have right to cross-exami......
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R.M., In re
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