M Restaurants, Inc. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. Culinary etc. Union

Decision Date19 October 1981
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912 M RESTAURANTS, INCORPORATED, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN FRANCISCO LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF CULINARY WORKERS, BARTENDERS, HOTEL, MOTEL AND CLUB SERVICE WORKERS, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 40108.

Davis, Cowell & Bowe, Alan C. Davis, Geoffrey V. White, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Severson, Werson, Berke & Melchior, William W. Wertz, Jan T. Chilton, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

TAYLOR, Presiding Justice.

THE COURT: *

The case at bench concerns the issue of whether a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant unions from threatening and/or committing acts of intimidation and violence and limiting the numbers and spacing of picketers issued prior to the Moscone Bill (CODE CIV.PROC., S 527.3)1 should now be dissolved. We filed an opinion in which we concluded that the trial court's order upholding the preliminary injunction should be affirmed. The Supreme Court granted a hearing and then retransferred the cause to this court "with directions to refile its opinion with appropriate discussion of Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60 (160 Cal.Rptr. 745, 603 P.2d 1341)." We understand our jurisdiction upon retransfer to be limited to execution of the Supreme Court's direction (cf. Nichols v. Canoga Industries (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 956, 958, 148 Cal.Rptr. 459); hence we reject the unions' contention that, in effect, we should now reconsider our previous approval of those parts of the preliminary injunction which limited the numbers and spacing of pickets: As the unions correctly point out, the numbers and spacing issue was not reached in Kaplan's Fruit & Produce, supra. We affirm the trial court's order upholding the preliminary injunction. 2

M Restaurants, Incorporated (hereinafter Mandarin or respondent) operates a restaurant and cocktail lounge in San Francisco. In 1974, San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers, Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Club Service Workers and Dining Room Employees Union Local No. 9 (hereinafter unions or appellants) became the union representative of Mandarin's employees pursuant to a representation election which followed a lengthy and stormy organizational drive.

During the organizational period, Mandarin promulgated a number of work rules and engaged in conduct designed to discourage the unions' organizational efforts. A broad "no solicitation" rule was invoked. Mandarin promised wage increases, discharged union adherents and threatened employees to discourage union activity. This conduct was found to be unlawful by the National Labor Relations Board (M Restaurants, Inc. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board (1975) 221 NLRB 264).

In the meantime, appellants began a picket line to protest the aforementioned "unfair labor practices" of Mandarin. However, on January 14, 1975, the unions intensified their picketing efforts, stationing between 50 and 100 persons at the various entrances to the restaurant. The pickets circled the restaurant entrances and blocked the doorways to such an extent that in order to enter, potential customers had to "wedge" their way through the pickets.

In addition, each time a potential customer attempted to enter the restaurant, the pickets jeered and booed at him and attempted to force handbills upon him. However, when the potential customer seemed to change his mind and not enter, the pickets would cheer loudly. Moreover, the pickets told prospective customers: "They have cockroaches in their food," "Don't eat chop suey food tonight, eat spaghetti," and "Don't patronize THE MANDARIN, they are using slave labor." Such statements and jeering could be heard throughout Ghiradelli Square and inside the restaurant.

Furthermore, on January 19, 1975, Mandarin's president was accosted by a man who said he represented the unions and told her, "God damn you. Don't you know this is a Union town. If you don't join the Union, we'll kill you." The same man also told respondent's secretary-treasurer, "God damn it, you son of a bitch, you'd better talk with us."

On that same day, Mandarin's manager also received several anonymous, threatening phone calls. During the first, the caller stated: "This is only the beginning, this is a Mafia town." In a later call: "Listen carefully, you are dealing with the Mafia. You better put the Union in before Wednesday, otherwise we are going to kill you. You son of a bitch, we are going to fuck your place up tomorrow." In the final call, the same voice stated: "Wednesday, my dear fellow," while a voice in the background repeated: "Wednesday, Wednesday, Wednesday."

A complaint was then filed on behalf of Mandarin, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the unions from engaging in improper or illegal picketing of its premises. On January 24, 1975, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction was later issued on February 7, 1975, enjoining the unions from blocking access or deliveries to the restaurant, threatening and/or committing acts of intimidation and physical violence on anyone working for or desiring to do business with the restaurant, and disturbing the peace. The injunction also limited the number and spacing of picketers, prohibiting any persons in excess of three at each entrance any closer than 10 feet from the entrance, with pickets 15 feet apart and moving.

Thereafter, the unions challenged the issuance of the injunction, applying to this court for a peremptory writ of mandate. Division Four of this court denied the writ, 3 holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient threat to public safety and order. This court also found that the restrictions on the number and placement of picketers was not unconstitutional.

The unions' petition for hearing by the California Supreme Court was denied on September 4, 1975.

On January 23, 1976, the unions again filed a motion in the trial court to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the ground that the enactment of section 527.3 removed equitable jurisdiction from the court to issue or enforce the injunction. No additional evidence regarding the facts of the case was submitted by the unions. However, Mandarin filed an additional declaration showing that the unions had violated the injunction on January 24, 1976. By minute order of May 27, 1976, the trial court denied the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

Unions now seek review of the trial court's order on the ground that the injunction prohibits conduct made legal and nonenjoinable by section 527.3. While the issue presented primarily concerns statutory interpretation, Mandarin has also raised questions regarding the purported retroactive application of the statute to the present controversy as well as the constitutionality of the statute itself. Therefore, our inquiry must first focus on these two threshold questions before examining the central issue.

It is a well-settled principle that every statute will be construed to operate prospectively, absent clear statutory language otherwise. This principle applies to legislation which limits a court's jurisdiction; the statute will not be applied to pending litigation unless it is expressly stated to have retroactive effect (Berg v. Traeger (1930) 210 Cal. 323, 325, 292 P. 495; Dahlstet v. Dahlstet (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 174, 179, 77 Cal.Rptr. 45).

While this principle holds true with regard to pending litigation, it is also an established rule of law that on appeal from a judgment granting or denying injunctions, the law applied is that which is current at the time of the judgment in the appellate court (Cal-Dak Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 492, 496-497, 254 P.2d 497; Callie v. Board of Supervisors (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 13, 18, 81 Cal.Rptr. 440). The reason underlying the application of current law is due to the nature of the preliminary injunction itself.

The preliminary injunction is a decree continuing in nature, directed at future events. It creates no right, but merely assumes to protect a right from unlawful and injurious interference (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 604, 342 P.2d 249; Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 94, 113 P.2d 689). The general purpose of such an injunction is the preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889). Therefore, when it is shown that " 'there has been a change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or where there the ends of justice would be served by modification,' " the trial court has the inherent power to modify or vacate the injunction (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 604, 342 P.2d 249; Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.2d at pp. 95-96, 113 P.2d 689; emphasis added).

Thus, because relief by injunction operates in futuro, section 527.3, which was signed into law and became effective on January 1, 1976, is applicable to the present controversy.

Next, we examine the constitutionality of the statute. 4 Section 527.3 is essentially eclectic in nature. It is patterned after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, adopting its purpose as well as incorporating its statutory definitions of a labor dispute (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115). In addition, section 527.3 parallels the language of the other state anti-injunction statutes, e. g., New Jersey and Wisconsin. 5 Therefore, the constitutionality of these statutes is germane to our examination of the constitutionality of section 527.3.

To remedy the abusive use of the injunction in labor disputes, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was...

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