A.M. v. A.C.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 11SC53
• Citation: 2013 CO 16
• Parties: Petitioners/Cross-Respondents: A.M., by and through his Guardian ad Litem; and L.H. and R.H.; v. Respondent: A.C., and Respondent/Cross-Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of Minor Child: A.M., v. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner: N.M.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

2013 CO 16

Petitioners/Cross-Respondents:

A.M., by and through his Guardian ad Litem; and L.H. and R.H.;v. Respondent: A.C.,

and Respondent/Cross-Respondent:

The People of the State of Colorado,

In the Interest of Minor Child: A.M.,

v. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner: N.M.

Supreme Court Case No. 11SC53

Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

February 25, 2013

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 10CA522

Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part

en banc

Guardian ad Litem for the Minor Child:

James A. Shaner

Cortez, Colorado

Attorneys for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents L.H. and R.H.:

Rocky Mountain Children's Law Center

Jeffrey C. Koy

Denver, Colorado

Law Office of Seth A. Grob, LLC

Timothy J. Eirich

Evergreen, Colorado

Attorney for Respondent A.C.:

Thomas R. Williamson

Durango, Colorado

Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Respondent:

Bob D. Slough, Montezuma County Attorney

Cortez, Colorado

Attorneys for the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner N.M.:

Jon Lewis Kelly, PC

Jon L. Kelly

Dolores, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado State Foster Parent Association:

Arnold & Porter LLP

Matthew Douglas

Jessica Brody

Holly Sterrett

Paul Rodney

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, we review a court of appeals opinion affirming the termination of the father's parental rights and reversing the termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds that the trial court erred by allowing foster parent intervenors to participate fully in the termination hearing. People in Interest of A.M.,No. 10CA522, slip op. at 17 (Colo. App. Dec. 23, 2010) (selected for official publication). The court of appeals construed section 19-3-507, C.R.S. (2012), of the Children's Codeand held that foster parent intervenors possess only a limited right of participation at the termination hearing. The court also held that the parents' due process rights were violated by the full participation of the intervenors in the termination hearing. With respect to the rights of the mother, it held that the full participation of the foster parents violated her constitutional rights warranting reversal. With respect to the father, the court held that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We construe section 19-3-507(5)(a) and hold that foster parents who meet the required statutory criteria to intervene may participate fully in the termination hearing without limitation. We also hold that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing.

¶2 Hence, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals with respect to mother, remand with directions to reinstate the trial court's orderterminating mother's parental rights, and affirm as to the termination of the father's rights.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 A.C. (mother) and N.M. (father), on three occasions in the span of three months, took their infant son, A.M., to the emergency room for treatment of a number of unexplained injuries including a lacerated tongue, a bruised cheek, and a fractured elbow. As a result, the Montezuma County Department of Social Services (the "Department") investigated the nature of the injuries. After x-rays revealed numerous other fractures to A.M.'s ribs, tibia, and cheek bone, the Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect. The court granted the Department temporary custody of A.M., and the Department placed A.M. in foster care with L.H. and R.H. (the foster parents). Based on admissions by the parents, the trial court found A.M. dependent and neglected as to both parents on the specific ground that A.M.'s environment was injurious to his welfare and entered the adjudicatory order. See§ 19-3-102(1), C.R.S. (2012) ("A child is neglected and dependent if . . . . [t]he child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare."). The adjudicatory order allowed the court to enter orders regarding the child and his parents. As a result, the trial court ordered the parents to participate in treatment plans intended to help the parents rehabilitate and the family reunify.

¶4 After A.M. had been in the care of the foster parents for approximately fifteen months,¹ they moved to intervene pursuant to section 19-3-507(5)(a). The foster parents claimed to have "specific knowledge about [A.M.] and what was in his best interest." A.C. objected to the intervention, arguing that the foster parents' desire to adopt the child created a conflict of interest, and asked that A.M. be removed from the foster parents' care immediately. The trial court allowed the intervention, finding the foster parents met the statutory criteria in section 19-3-507(5)(a), and denied the request to remove the child from the foster parents' care.

¶5 Three months after the foster parents intervened and eighteen months after the Department removed A.M. from the parents' care, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of A.C. and N.M.² The Department supported termination of N.M.'s parental rights but opposed termination of A.C.'s parental rights. The parents both objected to the foster parents' full participation in the termination hearing, citing People in Interest of A.W.R.,17 P.3d 193 (Colo. App. 2000), for the proposition that foster parent intervenors are limited to providing information as witnesses at the termination hearing. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the foster parents to participate fully as party intervenors at the termination hearing. As a result, counsel for the foster parents gave an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, made evidentiary objections, and gave a closing argument. The foster parents sought termination of the parents' rights as to A.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated the parental rights of both A.C. and N.M. as to A.M.

¶6 The parents appealed the order terminating their parental rights on the grounds that the trial court erred by permitting the foster parents to intervene and to participate fully in the termination hearing. Again citing to A.W.R.,the parents asserted that section 19-3-507(5)(a) only affords foster parents the limited right to provide information about a child in their care at a termination hearing. The court of appeals found that the trial court erred when it allowed the foster parents to participate fully in the termination hearing and reversed as to A.C., the mother, but affirmed as to N.M., the father. A.M.,No. 10CA522, slip op. at 44-45.

¶7 To analyze whether the foster parents' full participation in the termination hearing constituted error, the court of appeals interpreted the statute authorizing foster parent participation, section 19-3-507(5)(a). Id.at 27-28. That court determined the statute was ambiguous. Id.at 15-17. It then relied on the court of appeals case, A.W.R.,and various canons of statutory construction to hold that subsection (5)(a) restricted the foster parents' participation after being granted the right to intervene. Id.at 12-25. The court concluded that foster parents who intervene have no statutory right to participate to the same extent as the other parties at a termination hearing, and because the trial court's order permitted the foster parents to participate fully, the parents' constitutional right to due process was violated. See id.at 27-28, 38-41. The court of appeals then attempted to resolve whether the error affected the order terminating the parents' rights as to their child. See id.at 41-45. Applying a constitutional harmless error analysis to the trial court's decision to allow the foster parents to participate fully, the court held that the advocacy by the foster parents "substantially influence[d]" the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights by "unduly emphasiz[ing] the testimony of the [guardian ad litem]'s witnesses" and by "unduly cast[ing] doubt on the credibility of the witnesses presented by [the Department] and mother." Id.at 44-45. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed the trial court's order terminating A.C.'s parental rights. Id.at 45. With respect to N.M.'s rights, the court of appeals concluded that the intervention, although an error of constitutional magnitude, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the "strong" evidence supporting termination and affirmed the termination of his parental rights. Id.at 44. We granted certiorari and now reverse the reinstatement of the mother's parental rights and affirm the termination of the father's rights.³

II. Standard of Review

¶8 We review de novo the court of appeals' construction of a statute. Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. HealthSouth Corp.,246 P.3d 948, 951 (Colo. 2011). Our primary task in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In re B.B.O.,2012 CO 40, ¶ 6, 277 P.3d 818, 820. We first look to the language of the statute, giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of words and phrases selected by the General Assembly. Ceja v. Lemire,154 P.3d 1064, 1066 (Colo. 2007). If statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to other rules of statutory construction. Holcomb v. Jan-Pro Cleaning Sys. of S. Colo.,172 P.3d 888, 890 (Colo. 2007). Statutory language is ambiguous when it is susceptible to multiple valid interpretations. State v. Nieto,993 P.2d 493, 500-01 (Colo. 2000). We favor interpretations that produce a harmonious reading of the statutory scheme and eschew constructions that create inconsistency. People v. Dist. Ct.,713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986). Only if the statute is susceptible to multiple competing interpretations may we then resort to "the statute's legislative history, the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment, the problem addressed by the legislation, and the statutory remedy created to cure the...