A.M. v. Roman Catholic Church

• Decision Date: 09 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 79A02-9601-CV-3,79A02-9601-CV-3
• Parties: A.M., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, Diocese, and Monsignor A.S., 1 Appellees-Defendants. 2 .
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1034

669 N.E.2d 1034

A.M., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, Diocese, and Monsignor A.S.,¹ Appellees-Defendants.

No. 79A02-9601-CV-3 ².

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Aug. 9, 1996.

Transfer Denied Jan. 31, 1997.

Jon D. Krahulik, Robert G. Weddle, Yosha Ladendorf Krahulik & Weddle, Indianapolis, for Appellant-Plaintiff.

Daniel J. Harrigan, Bayliff, Harrigan, Cord & Maugans, Kokomo, Thomas B. Parent, John C. Duffey, Stuart & Branigin, Lafayette, for Appellees-Defendants.

OPINION

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Thirty years ago, A. M., then age six or seven, was sexually molested by her Roman Catholic priest [Priest]. A.M.'s mother [Mother] soon learned of the molestations and contacted the Priest as well as the Bishop who supervised the Priest. The Bishop convinced Mother that it would be best for everyone to sweep the matter under the rug. Mother took the advice and never discussed the matter with A.M. Mother and A.M. had both repudiated the Catholic faith by 1977, while A.M. was still a minor.

A.M. had repressed the memory of the molestations until 1994. In 1995, she brought the present lawsuit against the Priest and the particular parish and diocese involved [all of which will be referred to collectively as the Church]. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Church finding that A.M.'s lawsuit was time-barred. This appeal ensued.

A.M. asserts that the influence the Church exercised over her Mother to secure her silence invoked the operation of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and tolled the statute of limitations until 1994, when A.M. discovered her cause of action. We disagree and affirm summary judgment in favor of the Church.

FACTS

The facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant A.M. reveal that she was born in 1960. Her family was Roman Catholic, and she attended a Catholic school. In 1966 or 1967, she was sexually molested on a repeated basis at school by a Priest, Monsignor A.S. Soon afterwards, A.M. reported the molestations to her older sister, who in turn reported them to Mother. Mother called the Priest, who then visited Mother's home and apologized. Additionally, Mother contacted Bishop R.J.G. (now deceased) who also visited the home and apologized to Mother. The Bishop assured Mother that the Church was going to send the Priest away for the help he needed and that the Bishop would take care of the matter. The Bishop repeatedly advised Mother not to talk about the incidents but instead to "keep it quiet." The Bishop stated that it would not be good for Mother, A.M., or him, to discuss the molestations with anyone. The Bishop followed up the visit with a letter, in which he stated:

I wish to thank you for your kindness and understanding, and I wanted to tell you that we are keeping faith with you. Please say a prayer for both [the Priest] and me.

I would suggest that you might destroy this letter after you read it. In this way, we will be protecting both [A.M.] and Monsignor. Thank you.

Mother followed the Bishop's instructions and never again spoke to A.M. about the molestations. The older sister also kept the secret. Mother had decided to take no further action, that it was "better to let sleeping dogs lie," and was determined to get on with life.

The Priest was sent to the St. Joseph Mother House for two and one-half weeks to reflect and meditate about what had occurred. He also received psychiatric therapy on a weekly basis for two and one-half months. The Priest was then reassigned to a different parish. He has continued to visit the Mother House once or twice a year to take a break from parish pressures. The Church has never offered treatment to A.M.

By 1977, both Mother and A.M. had rejected the teachings of, and had severed their relationships with, the Roman Catholic Church, both having joined a Pentecostal church. Mother rejected the Catholic faith based on her belief that it involves the worship of idols. A.M. admitted that she and her Mother had long ago ceased "answer[ing] to the Catholic Church." A.M. reached the age of majority in 1978.

A.M. had repressed all memory of the molestations until 1994, when the memory was triggered by her observation of a little boy with red marks all over his back. Once the memories had surfaced, A.M. experienced stress-related asthma attacks which forced her to resign from her job. A.M. sought treatment and has been diagnosed as suffering from posttraumatic stress syndrome and depression attributable to the molestations by the Priest.

A.M. filed the present lawsuit in 1995. The Priest has admitted that he engaged in sexual improprieties with A.M. during the relevant period. Nevertheless, the Church has asserted that it may not be held legally responsible for A.M.'s injuries because the statute of limitations has expired. The Church obtained summary judgment on this basis, and this appeal ensued. Both the Priest and the Church have submitted Appellee briefs. ³

DECISION

Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the law has been correctly applied by the trial court. Cloverleaf Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Eaton, 641 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Neither the trial court, nor the reviewing court, may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court. Seufert v. RWB Medical Income Properties I Limited Partnership, 649 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). A trial court's grant of summary judgment is "clothed with a presumption of validity," and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993).

Statutes of limitation are favored because they afford security against stale claims and promote the peace and welfare of society. Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1981). They are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay in enforcing it. Id. The defense of a statute of limitation is peculiarly suitable as a basis for summary judgment. Id. at 273, 417 N.E.2d 281.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff's claim for injuries suffered during her childhood will expire two years after she has reached the age of majority. Ind.Code 34-1-2-5; Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ind.1993). However, such opportunity is of no avail to a person who lacks knowledge, or cannot remember, her early childhood trauma and injury. Id. Nevertheless, because of the natural and legal obligations of parents to protect and care for their children, discovery of a cause of action by a child's parent, even absent actual cognition or memory by the child, shall be imputed to the child and shall constitute the accrual of an action and require the plaintiff to file her action within two years of reaching the age of majority. Id. at 251. This general rule is subject to an exception when the plaintiff's claim asserts a childhood injury from the intentional felonious act of a parent. Id. Under that circumstance, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment will be available to estop a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations defense. Id. Under this exception, a plaintiff must exercise due diligence in commencing her action after the equitable grounds cease to operate as a valid basis for causing delay. Id.

In the present case, A.M.'s Mother knew about the molestations. A.M. concedes that, if the fraudulent concealment exception discussed in Fager is limited to the "intentional felonious act of a parent," her cause of action would be time-barred. (A.M.'s brief, p. 8). Nevertheless, A.M. argues that the fraudulent concealment exception in Fager is not limited to actions brought against parents but also applies under the present circumstances where the tortfeasor abused a confidential relationship in order to enlist the parent's cooperation in the concealment of the cause of action. ⁴ In support of this argument, A.M. relies on I.C. 34-1-14-5(4), the priest-parishioner evidentiary privilege, for the proposition that the Church and her Mother stood in a confidential, fiduciary relationship. In her brief, A.M. states:

The defendants in this case are not parents or grandparents or a boyfriend, but instead constitute the 'mother church', perceptively but one step removed from God Himself. The esteem and reverence in which parishioners, such as [Mother], hold the church give it a special power to persuade and convince. Here church officials used this imposing power as well as their superior positions as 'men of God' to convince [Mother] to keep quiet about the molestation and not discuss the facts with [A.M.]. A jury could deduce from the evidence in this case that the defendants thereby fraudulently concealed from A.M. her molestation by [Priest] by abusing the trust and respect they held as trusted, God-ordained officials. They acted in their own interest, without regard for [A.M.'s] best interest in convincing [Mother] to 'keep quiet.' They should...