A.M. v. T.M. (In re Interest of A.M.)

• Decision Date: 16 February 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20SC187
• Citation: 2021 CO 14
• Parties: Petitioners: The People of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of Minor Child: A.M. and A.M., Minor Child, v. Respondent: T.M.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

2021 CO 14

Petitioners: The People of the State of Colorado,In the Interest of Minor Child: A.M.andA.M., Minor Child, v. Respondent: T.M.

Supreme Court Case No. 20SC187

Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

February 16, 2021

Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch's homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association's homepage at http://www.cobar.org.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

Least Restrictive Means—Needs, Interest, and Welfare of Child.

In this opinion, the supreme court reviews a decision of a divided panel of the court of appeals, holding that a trial court must deny a motion to terminate parental rights that has been proven by clear and convincing evidence if a less drastic alternative to termination exists even though it is not in the child's best interests.

The supreme court now holds that the court of appeals' adoption of an "adequacy" standard is at odds with the court's prior rulings regarding the best interests of the child standard in termination cases—a standard that does not run afoul of parents' due process rights. The court further holds that consideration of less drastic alternatives is implicit in the statutory criteria for termination; that due process does not require such findings be made explicit, though it is the better practice for trial courts to do so; and that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct legal standard and, instead, substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA1406

Judgment Reversed

en banc

Attorneys for Petitioner the People of the State of Colorado:

Larimer County Attorney Office

Jeannine S. Haag, County Attorney

Jennifer A. Stewart, Senior County Attorney

David P. Ayraud, Senior County Attorney

Fort Collins, Colorado

Attorney for Petitioner A.M.:

Josi McCauley, Guardian ad litem

Fort Collins, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Blain Myhre, LLC

Blain Myhre

Englewood, Colorado

A.E. Bochniak Law, LLC

Steven E. Baum

Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel:

Christine Van Gaasbeek

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 We review a decision of a divided panel of the court of appeals holding that a trial court must deny a motion to terminate parental rights that has been proven by clear and convincing evidence if a less drastic alternative to termination exists even though it is not in the child's best interests.

¶2 We also review whether a trial court must make express findings regarding less drastic alternatives to termination, and whether the panel majority substituted its judgment for the factual findings of the trial court.¹ We hold that the panel departed from well-established jurisprudence regarding the best interests of the child standard in termination cases; that a trial court is not required to make express less drastic alternative findings, though it is certainly the better practice to do so; and that the majority substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 A.M. was placed with her Father's stepsister ("Aunt") after A.M. tested positive for heroin at birth and after both of A.M.'s parents tested positive for illegal drugs. The trial court subsequently adjudicated A.M. dependent and neglected as to both parents and adopted appropriate treatment plans.

¶4 The People ultimately filed a motion to terminate the rights of both parents, alleging that they had not complied with their treatment plans, that no modifications to the plans could be made to enable them to regain parental fitness, that no less drastic alternatives to termination existed, and that termination of the parent-child legal relationship was in A.M.'s best interests.

¶5 Following a two-day termination hearing, the trial court found:

It would be in the best interest of the Child for the Court to terminate the Respondents' parental rights so that the Child would be available for adoption by her [A]unt S.A. Termination and adoption would provide certainly [sic] and stability in the short, medium and long term. It would give the Child the best chance of growing up in a supportive, loving and safe environment for the duration of her childhood.

However, in order the [sic] terminate a parent's rights, the Court must find that there are no less drastic alternatives short of termination. The Court cannot make that finding in this case.

¶6 The trial court denied the People's motion, holding that "the best interest of the child would be served by termination; however, permanent custody is a less drastic alternative."

¶7 The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that "any permanency option . . . was an automatic bar to termination of parental rights." In an unpublished opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that it erroneously concluded that it must award permanent custody even though that was not in the child's best interests. People in Interest of A.M., No. 18CA1091, ¶ 17 (May 2, 2019) ("A.M. I"). The division remanded the case to the trial court with directions to resolve whether the less drastic alternative of permanent custody to Aunt was in the child's best interests or whether, as the court's findings indicated, termination was in A.M.'s best interests. Id.

¶8 On remand, the trial court found that "permanent custody was an appropriate and viable option and less drastic than termination; however, termination is better for the child because it provides a slightly higher probability of permanence." The trial court, accordingly, terminated Father's and Mother's parental rights.

¶9 Father appealed the trial court's termination order. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. The majority held that instead of focusing on the best interests of the child, as the division in the first appeal ordered, the trial court was required to determine "whether there is an alternative short of termination that adequately meets the child's physical, emotional, and mental health needs." People in Interest of A.M., 2020 COA 30, ¶ 24, ___ P.3d ___ ("A.M. II").

¶10 The majority concluded that "when both an [allocation of parental responsibilities ("APR")] to a relative and termination would adequately serve the child's physical, mental, and emotional needs, termination must be denied." Id. at ¶ 26 (emphasis added). It viewed this outcome as mandated by our decision in People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1123 (Colo. 1986). It read M.M. as "requiring that before an order terminating the parent-child relationship may be entered, the court must consider and reject less drastic alternatives." A.M. II, ¶ 27.

¶11 In her dissent, Judge Terry observed that she would have affirmed because there was support in the record for the trial court's factual findings and determination that termination was in A.M.'s best interests. People in Interest of A.M., 2020 COA 30, ¶ 32, ___ P.3d ___ (Terry, J., dissenting).

¶12 We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. Analysis

¶13 We begin by outlining the appropriate standard of review. Next, we detail the law concerning termination of parental rights, less drastic alternatives, and constitutional considerations in termination cases. We then apply the relevant law and hold that the court of appeals' adoption of an adequacy standard is at odds with our prior rulings regarding the best interests of the child standard in termination cases—a standard that does not run afoul of parents' due process rights. We further hold that consideration of less drastic alternatives is implicit inthe statutory criteria for termination; that due process does not require such findings be made explicit; and that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct legal standard and, instead, substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.

¶14 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

A. Standard of Review

¶15 Where resolution of an issue necessitates application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts, it presents a mixed question of fact and law. See People in Interest of S.N. v. S.N., 2014 CO 64, ¶ 21, 329 P.3d 276, 282. The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the discretion of the trial court. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). Thus, a trial court's factual findings and conclusions will be set aside only where they are "so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record." Id. at 250 (quoting People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982)).

¶16 "Whether the court of appeals applied the correct legal standard to a case under review is a matter of law" to be reviewed de novo. Id. at 249.

B. Termination of Parental Rights

¶17 Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72, ¶ 20,363 P.3d 193, 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). Children also have an interest in the continuation of their family relationship and in preventing the erroneous termination of the parent-child legal relationship. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.

¶18 The procedure by which the parent-child relationship is terminated must satisfy due process. Id. at 753-54 (intervening in "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child" requires "fundamentally fair procedures"). Due process requires that a parent be provided with notice of the allegations in the ...