M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 October 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-CV-849
• Citation: 425 F.Supp.3d 959
• Parties: M.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

425 F.Supp.3d 959

M.A., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-CV-849

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed October 7, 2019

Steven Charles Babin, Jr., Babin Law, LLC, Columbus, OH, Anil A. Mujumdar, Pro Hac Vice, Gregory M. Zarzaur, Pro Hac Vice, Birmingham, AL, James Michael Papantonio, Pro Hac Vice, Kathryn L. Avila, Pro Hac Vice, Kimberly Lambert Adams, Pro Hac Vice, Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A, Pensacola, FL, Gregory E. O'Brien, Cavitch Familo & Durkin LPA, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Michael R. Reed, Elise Kraft Yarnell, Hahn Loeser Parks LLP, D. Patrick Kasson, Steven A. Chang, Francesca Rose Boland, Reminger Co., LPA, Alyson A. Terrell, Ulmer & Berne LLP, Chenee M. Castruita, Douglas Paul Holthus, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., LPA, Joseph L. Piccin, Joseph L. Piccin Co. LLC, Steven A. Keslar, Gallagher Sharp, LLP, Samuel Neal Lillard, Mathew A. Parker, Fisher & Phillips, LLC, Quintin Franc Lindsmith, Ali I. Haque, Lindsey A. Roberts, Bricker & Eckler LLP, Gregory Paul Barwell, Jessica A. Barwell, Jud R Mauger, Wesp/Barwell, LLC, Victoria Anne Flinn, Bartholomew T. Freeze, Freund Freeze & Arnold, Columbus, OH, Christopher B. Donovan, Pro Hac Vice, Houston, TX, David S Sager, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LLP, Short Hills, NJ, Judd R. Uhl, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Ft. Wright, KY, Aimee Elizabeth Muller, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Jennifer Snyder Heis, Ulmer & Berne, Cincinnati, OH, Jennifer Kirkpatrick Nordstrom, Garvey Shearer Nordstrom, PSC, Ft. Mitchell, KY, Kevin Charles Connell, Bruns Connell Vollmar & Armstrong, Gordon Dale Arnold, Freund Freeze & Arnold - 3, Dayton, OH, Sara M. Turner, Pro Hac Vice, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Birmingham, AL, Steven D. Strang, Gallagher Sharp, Cleveland, OH, Daniel T Downey, Paul Bernhart, Fishel, Hass, Kim & Albrecht Downey, LLP, New Albany, OH, Joshua James Fravel, Griffith Law Offices, Westerville, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants', Buckeye Hospitality, Inc., First Hotel Management, LLC, Columbus Hospitality, LLC, Krrish Lodging, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Inc., and Choice Hotels International, Inc., Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 39, 40, 42, 43, 52, 53). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions are hereby DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, M.A., was trafficked for sex from "the spring of 2014 until August 2015." (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 51). She alleges that this trafficking took place at several Days Inn by Wyndham, Comfort Inn, and Crowne Plaza locations in Columbus. (Id. ). Plaintiff now seeks to hold these hotels liable under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Plaintiff alleges that these hotel Defendants knew or should have known M.A.'s trafficking was happening on their properties. Plaintiff points to behavior that she alleges hotel staff should have recognized as signs of her trafficking: her trafficker asked for rooms near exits, "the trash cans in the rooms in which M.A. was trafficked would contain an extraordinary number of used condoms," and M.A. was told to decline housekeeping, the rooms "were frequently paid for with cash." (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 52). M.A. asserts other "obvious signs of human trafficking" including "physical deterioration, no eye contact, and duration of stay" and "bottles of lubricants, boxes of condoms, used condoms in the trash, excessive requests for towels and linens, [and] cash payments." (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 53). Plaintiff alleges that, while she was at each hotel property, "the hotel staff would have or should have observed visible physical changes, such as bruising," (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 54) and that "[d]espite her desperate pleas and screams for help, after being beaten or choked at the Defendants' hotel properties, the hotel staff ignored her and did nothing to prevent the ongoing and obvious torture she endured." (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 55). Plaintiff finally escaped in August of 2015, and her trafficker has been sentenced. M.A. alleges that these hotel brands—Wyndham, Choice Hotels, and IHG did not take adequate measures to prevent human trafficking.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion "is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Golden v. City of Columbus , 404 F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). If more than one inference may be drawn from an allegation, the Court must resolve the conflict in favor of the plaintiff. Mayer v. Mylod , 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Although liberal, Rule 12(b)(6) requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman , 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Generally, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). It must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A claim is plausible when it contains "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

M.A. has sued under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"). The TVPRA has two provisions relevant to this case. First, the TVPRA provides for criminal penalties set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1591. That section provides criminal penalties for:

(a) Whoever knowingly—

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, ... recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),

knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Section 1591 defines "participation in a venture" as "knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1)," § 1591(e)(4), and defines "venture" as "any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity," § 1591(e)(6).

18 U.S.C. § 1595 sets forth the standard for civil liability under the TVPRA, and provides the basis for Plaintiff's claims. That section provides:

An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

As a threshold matter, this Court addresses Defendant Krrish's argument that § 1595(a) cannot be a standalone claim. Plaintiff's Response, Krrish argues, appears to proceed on a theory that Defendants are liable for violating § 1595(a), not for committing an underlying offense under the sex trafficking statute, § 1591. Krrish relies in part on Paguirigan v. Prompt Nursing Emp. Agency LLC , 286 F. Supp. 3d 430, 436 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). That court did find that § 1595 "is not a standalone claim," but it did so in a footnote and without further analysis. Id.

The plain text of § 1595(a) requires is that the plaintiff be "a victim of this chapter." § 1595(a). The text evidences Congress's intent to broaden the behavior that can form the basis of civil liability to participation in ventures where the defendant "knew or should have known" that the venture was involved in sex trafficking. Krrish cites to a Report from the Congressional Research Service that supports this reading of § 1595. There, the Congressional Research Service interpreted the amendments to the TVPA to "create[ ] civil liability both for those who face criminal liability for their profiteering and those who do not." Cong. Research Serv., R40190, The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-457 ): Criminal Law Provisions, at 16 (Jan. 29, 2009). The court in Plaintiff A noted that the 2008 amendments to the TVPA "ma[de] it easier for victims of trafficking violations to bring civil suits" including by broadening the parties who could be sued for trafficking violations from only the perpetrator under the original statutory scheme to "anyone who ...