M.W. v. Doe
| Decision Date | 27 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12 C 2461 |
| Parties | M.W., a minor at the time of the incident, Plaintiff, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY JOHN DOE 1, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY JOHN DOE 2, the COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, the COOK COUNTY JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, and the COUNTY OF COOK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff M.W. filed a nine-count Complaint against Defendants Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff's Office, individual Cook County Sheriff's Deputies, and the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center alleging constitutional violations and state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. In particular, the Courtgrants Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII with prejudice and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and IX without prejudice. The Court also grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center as a Defendant to this lawsuit. Last, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint by no later than September 17, 2012 in compliance with this order.
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff's favor." AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts showing that he has nolegal claim. See Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2012); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011).
On or about February 15, 2008, police arrested Plaintiff, who was then a minor, after which they took him into custody and housed him at the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. On May 6, 2008, the Cook County State's Attorney dropped the charges against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 11.) On May 20, 2008, the State's Attorney renewed charges against Plaintiff after which the Cook County Circuit Court judge directed that Plaintiff be detained at the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.) After his court appearance, Plaintiff, along with certain Sheriff's Deputies, waited for the bus to the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center, but the bus never showed up. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Sheriff's Deputies proceeded to transfer Plaintiff with other detainees to the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC"), where they waited for the bus to transfer Plaintiff to the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. (Id. ¶ 15.) When the Juvenile Detention Center bus did not show up, Defendant Officers processed Plaintiff into the general population of Division 11 of the CCDOC. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was in custody at the Cook County Jail for three days before his mother learned of his situation and was able to get proof of his age to the Cook County Sheriff's Office, at which time he was transferred to Division 9 of the CCDOC. (Id. ¶ 17.) Later that day, a Circuit Court judge ordered that Plaintiff be transferred to the Cook County Juvenile Detention facility. (Id. ¶ 17.) In the course of the three days that Plaintiff was detained in Division 11, he was subjected to various forms of mental, physical, and sexual abuse. (Id. ¶ 18.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim; (2) a substantive due process claim; and (3) a Monell claim. Plaintiff also alleges the following state law claims pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction: (1) negligent supervision; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent failure to act; and (4) respondeat superior.
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to file his constitutional claims within the relevant two-year statute of limitations. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012) (). Defendants acknowledge that federal courts borrow state equitable and statutory tolling rules, including 720 ILCS 5/13-211, when using a state's limitations period. See Malone v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009) (). Here, the relevant statutory tolling provision states in its entirety:
Minors and persons under legal disability. If the person entitled to bring an action, specified in Sections 13-201 through 13-210 of this Act, at the time the cause of action accrued, is under the age of 18 years, or is under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the person attains the age of 18 years, or the disability is removed.
720 ILCS 5/13-211; see also Softcheck v. Imesch, 367 Ill.App.3d 148, 154-55, 305 Ill.Dec. 425, 855 N.E.2d 941 (3d Dist. 2006) ().
Despite this statutory tolling provision, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff cannot bring the present action because - based on his allegations that he was 16-years-old at the time of his arrest on February 18, 2008 - he filed the present lawsuit after he turned 20-years-old. In response, Plaintiff explains that the allegations in the Complaint concerning his age are incorrect and that he was born on April 4, 1992. Therefore, he was not 20-years-old when he filed the present lawsuit on April 3, 2012, but was 19-years-old. Based on Plaintiff's representations, it appears that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are timely under 720 ILCS 5/13-211. Nevertheless, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. Plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint including his actual date of birth in order to withstand another motion to dismiss based on timeliness issues.
Next, Defendants argue that the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center is not a suable entity. The Court agrees. Federal courts look to state law when determining if a defendant is amenable to suit. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 215, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)). Under Illinois law, a "party to litigation must have a legal existence, either natural or artificial, to sue or be sued." Jackson v. Village of Rosemont, 180 Ill.App.3d 932, 937-38, 129 Ill.Dec. 670, 536 N.E.2d 720 (1st Dist. 1988); see also DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 977 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). Moreover, "[d]epartments within a governing body lack the required separate legal existence to be held accountable." Manos v. Caira, 162 F.Supp.2d 979, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
In August 2007, the State of Illinois enacted legislation transferring the administration of the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center from the executive branch of Cook County to the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. See Doe v. Cook County, No. 99 C 3954, 2010 WL 2610644, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2010). This transition was effective as of January 1, 2008. See id. Thereafter, a transitional administrator was appointed for the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. See Coleman v. Dunlap, _ F.3d _, 2012 WL 3590809, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012). Under these circumstances, the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center is part of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and the Circuit Court of Cook County is not a suable entity. See Harris v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Ill., No. 96 C 1623, 1996 WL 145907, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1996); Newsome v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Div., No. 88 C 10493, No. 1989 WL 15960, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1989). Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center as a Defendant from this lawsuit.
Defendants further contend that Cook County is not a proper defendant to this lawsuit because there is no employer/employee relationship between the county and its sheriff. In his response brief, Plaintiff concedes that Cook County cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior under the circumstances, and thus the Court grants this aspect of Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff, however, correctly asserts that Cook County...
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