Maas v. Cornell Univ.
Decision Date | 23 November 1999 |
Citation | 721 N.E.2d 966,699 N.Y.S.2d 716,94 N.Y.2d 87 |
Parties | JAMES MAAS, Appellant, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Respondent. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
David A. Stoll, New York City, Center for Individual Rights, Washington D.C. (Michael E. Rosman of counsel), and Lo Pinto, Schlather, Solomon & Salk, Ithaca, for appellant.
Nelson E. Roth, Ithaca, James J. Mingle, Patricia A. McClary and Wendy E. Tarlow for respondent.
The overriding issue on this appeal is whether plaintiff, Professor James Maas, may assert a plenary breach of contract action against defendant Cornell University, his employer. The lawsuit is premised on the University's alleged failure to follow the procedures it had promulgated and used for the resolution of sexual harassment claims brought by four students against their teacher, Maas. We agree with the courts below that the action does not lie, and that Maas is not otherwise entitled to any judicial relief (see also, Matter of Stoll v New York State Coll. of Veterinary Medicine, 94 NY2d 162 [decided today]).
Maas is a tenured psychology professor in Cornell University's College of Arts and Sciences. In 1994, four students filed sexual harassment accusations against him. The complaints were processed and reviewed under internal, departmental University protocols, prescribed and approved in 1991 by the College of Arts and Sciences faculty; the ordinances were entitled "Procedures to Handle Accusations of Sexual Harassment Against Faculty Members of Cornell University's College of Arts and Sciences."
Following an investigative finding of merit by the College's Senior Sexual Harassment Counselor, the Professional Ethics Committee held five days of hearings. It then found unanimously that Maas had repeatedly behaved unprofessionally and inappropriately in his relationships with the complainants, and that his behavior constituted sexual harassment. The Committee recommendations included conditions on this professor's conduct in relation to students, and consideration for a five-year period of the finding of sexual harassment in determining any pay increases, promotions, honors and assignments. The Dean of the College upheld the Committee's determination. An administrative appeal by Maas to the Provost was rejected; he remains a tenured member of the College faculty.
Maas then sued Cornell, alleging eight causes of action, including unlawful adoption of procedures, breach of contract for failure to observe bylaws and procedures, and negligence. The University moved to dismiss all causes of action and, alternatively, to convert the action into a CPLR article 78 review proceeding. Maas opposed the procedural conversion and maintained that he had viable grounds to pursue the breach of contract action.
Supreme Court granted Cornell's motion. It dismissed all but the two negligence causes of action. The court stated that none of the allegations in the complaint specifies the terms of the asserted contract between Maas and Cornell which Maas claims were violated. The court also refused to convert the action to a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. It concluded that, liberally construing the complaint, the pleading fails to allege a specific agreement that the University purportedly breached. The court was unpersuaded that the procedures contained in the University's Campus Code and the College's regulations evolved into terms of an implied contract between Maas and the University. The Appellate Division did not address Maas' request for article 78 conversion at that stage of the litigation. Upon remittal, when the remaining portions of the case were again before Supreme Court, it granted Cornell's successor summary judgment motion with respect to the remaining negligence causes of action. By dismissing these claims, Supreme Court put the entire matter out of court.
On a second appeal by Maas, the Appellate Division again unanimously affirmed. With respect to his turnabout argument for procedural conversion of the action into a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the court concluded that Maas "[h]aving obviously made a tactical decision to pursue his eight causes of action in a plenary action and having succeeded on his prior objection to conversion, [he] may not now, owing to changed interests since all claims in this action have been dismissed * * * assume a contrary position" (253 AD2d 1, 5 [citations omitted]). This Court granted Maas leave to appeal, and we now affirm in all respects.
The principal substantive thrust by Maas is that the University's regulations and procedures create a contractual relationship with him. He theorizes, therefore, that any alleged violation of these procedures may form the basis for his breach of contract action against the University. He is wrong.
affd for reasons stated below 66 NY2d 946).
The complaint by Maas premises his contract action on the view that Cornell breached his contractual rights as a tenured professor. Without reference to any express contractual source, Maas contends that the University's administrative procedures form the basis for implying an agreement between them, which Cornell breached by failing to follow its own procedures. In assessing this employment relationship between the academic institution and its faculty member, we are satisfied that the University's adherence to its own internal procedures does not qualify for judicial cognizance.
lv denied 93 NY2d 804).
Maas may have been entitled to CPLR article 78 review. Ironically, he initially resisted that very relief sought by defendant Cornell in the trial court. In his latest twist, he asserts that the lower courts erred in refusing to convert his plenary action into a CPLR article 78 proceeding. His effort in this regard comes too late and the relief is now unavailable for the reasons given by the Appellate Division, and as noted above in the litigation description of this case (see, 253 AD2d 1, supra; see also, Matter of Martin v C. A. Prods. Co., 8 NY2d 226, 231
).
Because we agree that Maas cannot now seek to convert his action to a CPLR article 78 review proceeding, we must address his strained effort to avoid dismissal of his breach of contract action. To the extent his arguments may be construed as urging that an implied-in-fact agreement may be extracted out of the procedures contained in the Campus Code, as well as in the College of Arts and Sciences regulations, his...
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