Maas v. Lonstorf
| Decision Date | 17 December 1908 |
| Docket Number | 1,816. |
| Citation | 166 F. 41 |
| Parties | MAAS v. LONSTORF. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
A. C Dustin and H. O. Young, for appellant.
D. H Ball and A. B. Eldredge, for appellee.
Before LURTON, SEVERENS, and RICHARDS, Circuit Judges.
This bill was filed for the purpose of compelling the defendant below, George J. Maas, to convey to the complainant, Mrs Margaretha Lonstorf, an undivided one-sixth interest in certain parcels of land described in the bill, and for the purpose of compelling him to account to her for her proportion of all rents, profits, and royalties received by him on account of her undivided interest in the lands standing in his name and managed by him on joint account. The bill also sought an account of a fund placed in his hands to be used in taking options for purchase or lease of lands upon joint account, supposed to contain deposits of iron ore, and for their exploration for such ores. Upon the pleadings and evidence the Circuit Court found the facts to be as claimed by Mrs. Lonstorf, and entered a decree requiring the defendant Maas to convey to her an undivided one-sixth interest in the several parcels of lands described in the bill, subject to a mineral lease to the other defendant, the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company, the same being her interest under an agreement by which he was to take options of purchase and lease and make explorations of such lands for the joint interest of complainant and said Maas. The court further adjudged that said Maas was justly liable to complainant for an undivided third of all rents, profits, and royalties which he had received on account of said mineral lease, and that the said Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company should thereafter attorn to her to the extent of one-third of the future profits, rents, or royalties to accrue under its said lease. The court further decreed that Maas should account to her for his expenditure of the exploration fund, to which she had contributed, as well as for all profits, moneys, or other valuable things which he had received on the joint account, and be credited with all his joint expenditures on that account. In accordance with equity practice, the court ordered that an accounting be had between said complainant and said defendant Maas, as follows:
'It is further ordered and decreed that an accounting be had between said complainant and said defendant, George J. Maas, and that said defendant George J. Maas be required to account for all moneys and other things of value, whether personal or real estate, received by him upon the sale or disposition of the options or rights in lands mentioned in said bill of complaint, and for all profits realized by him in the exploring venture therein mentioned; that an account be taken of all expenses incurred by the said defendant George J. Maas in connection with the obtaining and selling of said options, so far as the same are properly chargeable to said exploring venture and creditable to said defendant Maas in this case; that defendant Maas also render an account of all moneys that he has realized or may realize up to the time of such accounting as royalty or rent from said lease, and all other profits that he has realized or may realize up to the time of such accounting from said exploring venture; and that the said defendant George J. Maas pay to the said complainant the balance, if any, which shall appear to be due and payable from him to said complainant upon such accounting, and, if upon such accounting it shall appear that there is a balance due and payable from said complainant to said defendant George J. Maas, the complainant pay such balance to defendant Maas; and it is further ordered that it be referred to Francis M. Moore, Esquire, as a special master of this court, to take said accounting and report the same, with his opinion thereon, to this court with all convenient speed, and that upon the coming in of said report such further decree shall be made and entered herein upon said accounting as shall appear to the court to be just and equitable between the parties.
'It is further adjudged and decreed that the said defendant the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company attorn to the said complainant as owner of the said undivided one-sixth of said lands, and pay to her her proportion, being one-third, of all rents and royalties hereafter accruing and becoming payable under said lease.
'It is further ordered and decreed that the said defendant George J. Maas pay to the said complainant her costs and charges about her suit in this behalf expended, to be taxed, and that said complainant have execution thereof.'
From this decree defendant George J. Maas alone prayed and was allowed an appeal to this court, and the cause has been fully argued upon its merits. There is, however, a question as to the jurisdiction of this court which cannot escape decision before the merits can be considered. Aside from the special provision made by the seventh section of the act creating this court, whereby an appeal is allowed from decrees of inferior courts granting interlocutory injunctions, the right of this court to review by writ of error or appeal the judgments or decrees of the Circuit or District Courts is limited to the 'final decrees' of such courts. A like limitation has always existed upon the revising power of the Supreme Court, and there are many opinions of that court defining a 'final decree' within the meaning of the statutory power of review. These decisions are conclusive upon this court, and, if the decree appealed from is not a final decree within the meaning of these decisions, it is our plain duty to dismiss the appeal as premature.
The primary proposition settled by these decisions is that a final decree is one which settles all the matters in litigation between the parties and involved by the pleadings so that an affirmance by this court will end the suit and leave nothing for the lower court to do but the execution of the decree. The law intends that there shall be but one appeal, and that that appeal shall be taken only when all the matters in litigation shall have been determined. The plain object of this limitation is to save the litigants the delay and...
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...205, 31 N.E.2d 572;General Heat & Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, 316 Mass. 3, 54 N.E.2d 676;Chase v. Driver, 8 Cir., 92 F. 780;Maas v. Lonstorf, 6 Cir., 166 F. 41, 44, 45;Kasishke v. Baker, 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 384. Compare Meier v. First Citizens Bankers Corp., 301 Mass. 410, 17 N.E.2d 106. 4. For......
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