Maasdam v. Maasdam's Estate
| Decision Date | 17 September 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 46874.,46874. |
| Parties | MAASDAM v. MAASDAM'S ESTATE. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
MAASDAM
v.
MAASDAM'S ESTATE.
No. 46874.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Sept. 17, 1946.
Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Harold V. Levis, Judge.
This is a proceeding in probate by the daughter of Jacob Maasdam, deceased, to establish a claim against the testate estate of the latter for alleged services which she rendered him and his family upon his request and promise of payment. From the judgment on a verdict for the full amount of her claim, the estate has appealed.
The judgment is reversed.
[24 N.W.2d 317]
Ralph H. Munro, of Fairfield, for appellant.
Jones & White, of Ottumwa, for appellee.
BLISS, Justice.
Jacob Maasdam, 73, died July 30, 1944, survived by his widow, Anne W., 56, William K. Maasdam, 54, a stepson, Marie E., 48, the claimant, Elizabeth L., 46, a daughter, and Fred Dennison Maasdam, 43, a son. His first wife, Catherine, the mother of all of said children, died on October 17, 1931. William K. Maasdam was the son of Catherine by her first marriage. The son's last name was Fuller, which by court action was changed to Maasdam. He was about five years old when his mother married Maasdam.
On June 22, 1936, Jacob Maasdam took Anne W., a widow, of Burlington, Iowa, as his second wife. On April 13, 1935, he executed his last will. In it he provided that the executor should first pay out of the estate all of his just debts. Respecting William K. Maasdam, the will stated that he had made cash advancements to him sufficient to fully cover his share in his present estate and more, ‘yet I shall allow him $5.00, but to his daughters, Catherine, I give $250 in cash and to Catheline I also give $250 in cash.’ These amounts were to be paid when they (twins) reached the age of 25 years, provided there were sufficient funds in the estate after paying all debts. To his children, Marie, Elizabeth and Fred he gave the remainder of his property in equal shares.
The will was probated and the son, Fred Dennison Maasdam, nominated as executor in the will, was appointed and qualified as such. He filed an inventory naming the widow and the beneficiaries under the will. It recited that an antenuptial agreement existing between the deceased and the surviving widow, ‘precludes her from all rights, or interest in and to the Jacob G. Maasdam estate as heir. It listed the real estate as a farm of 84.41 acres, of an estimated value of $200 an acre, or $16,882, subject to a mortgage of $3,989.49. It stated that there were no cash, stocks, bonds, notes, or mortgages. The only personal property listed were a harrow, a disc, a mower, a harness, a wagon, a manure spreader, and hand tools, all of an estimated value of $200, 10 tons of hay, $60, 8 bushels of clover seed, $144. The total estimated value of the entire estate was $17,286.
The debts listed were the farm mortgage of $3,989.49, two notes of deceased held by the Iowa State Bank and Trust Company of Fairfield, Iowa, for $915 and $300, and other debts, including $268.80 for medical services, estimated at $615.76. The debts altogether totalled $5,820.25. The estimated net value of the inventoried estate was $11,465.75.
Some time after the death of the testator, and apparently about October 1, 1944, Anne W. Maasdam, the surviving widow,
[24 N.W.2d 318]
filed her claim against the estate for $12,924.40 based, in part, on three promissory notes of the deceased. These notes, with interest computed to October 1, 1944, amounted to $3,023.08, $2,111.81, and $5,552.08. The statutory attorney fee taxed on each note was, respectively, $70.23, $61.18 and $95.52. The balance of her claim was based upon the antenuptial agreement. By its terms, her husband was to pay her $150 on or before the first day of January of each year of their married life, and if she survived him he was to provide a home for her as long as she remained his widow. He failed to pay her the yearly allowance during his life and for this she claimed $1460.50 as of October 1, 1944, and in settlement of his failure to provide a home for her after his death, she claimed the sum of $550. After a jury was drawn for the trial of her claim on November 21, 1944, the parties and their counsel agreed upon the claim in the sum of $12,924.40, and it was so established by the court.
It was not until January 17, 1945 that the claimant, Marie Maasdam, filed her claim against the estate. Inasmuch as the parties are in dispute as to whether the claim, as filed, states an express contract, or an implied contract, or a situation permitting claimant to sue on quantum meruit, we set out the words and figures thereof to wit, ‘Plaintiff claims of said estate the sum of Thirteen Thousand Nine Hundred and Forth and no/100 dollars with interest as allowed by law on account of services rendered deceased at his request and with his promise to pay therefor as follows, to-wit:
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¦Feb. 17, 1917 to Feb. 17, 1927, ten years, $8.00 per week ¦$4160.00 ¦
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¦Feb. 17, 1927 to Oct. 17, 1931, 4 years and 8 months during ¦3600.00 ¦
¦mother's illness at $15.00 per week ¦ ¦
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¦Oct. 17, 1931 to Jan. 1, 1942, 540 weeks at $8.00 ¦4320.00 ¦
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¦Jan. 1, 1942 to July 30, 1944, less six weeks from June 15, 1942¦1860.00 ¦
¦to Aug. 1, 1942, 124 weeks at $15.00 ¦ ¦
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¦(Duly verified) Total ¦$13,940.00'.¦
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Fred Kann, as Temporary Administrator for the estate to defend against the claim, for special defenses against it pleaded and stated:
1. That each and all of the several items of the claim were barred by the general statute of limitations, Code section 11007.
2. That each and all of the several items have been fully paid and satisfied by the decedent during his lifetime.
The appellant relies upon six errors for reversal, in substance, as follows:
I. 1. The court erred in permitting the claimant to testify that on her 21st birthday she heard her father say: ‘Well, he said that he too had thought about that, and said by all means that I should be paid for my services if I remained on.’ To which the appellant objected that the witness was incompetent under section 11257 of the 1939 Code.
2. The court erred in overruling the same objection to Will Maasdam's testimony relative to the same transaction.
3. The court erred in overruling the same objection to Elizabeth Maasdam's testimony relative to the same transaction.
4. The court erred in overruling the same objection to Elizabeth Maasdam's testimony relative to the same transaction.
5. The court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, because the claimant was bound by her own testimony that she took no part in necessary transactions and conversations, without which she could not have had an express contract, as alleged in her claim as filed. And because having alleged an express promise to pay, she could not then submit her cause to a jury on an implied promise to pay.
6. The court erred in overruling the defendant's exceptions to instructions, particularly Nos. 3 and 4, upon the theory of an implied contract.
Appellant contends that appellee's cause of action is based upon an express contract the terms of which she failed to prove, while the appellee contends that she seeks recovery on the theory of quantum meruit based upon facts and circumstances establishing
[24 N.W.2d 319]
the performance of services for the deceased and his family, for which deceased expressly stated the claimant would be compensated, and which the law implies would be the fair and reasonable value of the services.
In addition to the special defenses pleaded by the estate, there was also the statutory denial of the claim. There was no special defense by the estate that the services were gratuitously rendered by the claimant as a member of her father's family, so that many of the matters, involved in an action where the services are rendered by a member of the family to the family, are not involved.
In the brief point or proposition in Division I of appellant's argument it is stated: ‘The rule is that a claimant seeking to recover against an administrator for work or services performed for the deceased is an incompetent witness to testify to the service performed or to any fact which tends to establish an express or implied contract between himself and the deceased.’
In support of this proposition the appellant cites the following authorities. In re Estate of Kahl, 210 Iowa 903, 911, 232 N.W. 133; Ballinger v. Connable, 100 Iowa 121, 129-130, 69 N.W. 438;Peck v. McKean, 45 Iowa 18;Smith v. Johnson, 45 Iowa 308;Cowan v. Musgrave, 73 Iowa 384, 386, 35 N.W. 496;Herring v. Estate of Herring, 94 Iowa 56, 59, 62 N.W. 666;Sheldon v. Thornburg, 153 Iowa 622, 627, 133 N.W. 1076;In re Estate of Runnells, 203 Iowa 144, 152-153, 212 N.W. 327;In re Estate of Willmott, 211 Iowa 34, 37-38, 230 N.W. 330, 71 A.L.R. 1018;In re Estate of Docius, 215 Iowa 1193-1195, 247 N.W. 796.
The claimant in leading up to the challenged question had testified about the family life at the farm home, a mile south of Fairfield, to which the family, consisting of her parents, Will, Elizabeth, Fred and herself, had moved in 1911, when she was 16 years old; how she and Elizabeth had finished 8th grade, and Elizabeth had gone on to high school and she had stayed at home. She further testified: ‘My birthday is February 17th and I was 21 years of age February 17th, 1917. We were fond of birthday dinners and we usually have birthday dinners for everybody. At that time of course I was getting older and we needed help in the home and so mother spoke up and said...
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