Mable v. Wetzel, 2:20-CV-01771-CRE

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: STEVEN MABLE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WETZEL, SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; STEPHEN MONIAK, SENIOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AND PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendants,
• Docket Number: 2:20-CV-01771-CRE
• Decision Date: 23 May 2022

STEVEN MABLE, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN WETZEL, SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; STEPHEN MONIAK, SENIOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AND PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendants,

No. 2:20-CV-01771-CRE

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

May 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION ^[1]

CYNTHIA REED EDDY CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Steven Mable is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI Greene”) and initiated this civil rights action pro se against John Wetzel, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Secretary Wetzel”), Stephen Moniak, Senior Deputy Attorney General (“AG Moniak”), and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General related to his and other inmates' incarceration in solitary confinement. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 60). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 61, 63). The court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons that follow,

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Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action pro se on November 18, 2020. The original action was brought by three Plaintiffs, but subsequently, the other two Plaintiffs Antoine Walker and Dale Wakefield voluntarily dismissed their claims in this lawsuit. (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 66, 67). Therefore, only the remaining Plaintiff - Steven Mable - will be discussed.

Plaintiff was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, and his original complaint was filed on January 19, 2021. (ECF No. 16). After service of the complaint, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on May 17, 2021 (ECF No. 34). In response, Plaintiff filed both an amended complaint and a response to the motion to dismiss which was considered by the Court as a response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 40, 41). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 45). Then, Plaintiff moved to again amend his complaint, which the Court granted. (ECF Nos. 51, 55). In the Order granting leave to file a second amended complaint, the Court instructed that Plaintiff's second amended complaint

must set forth clearly identified causes of action in separate paragraphs that both identify Plaintiff[‘s] legal theories, facts suggestive of the allegedly illegal conduct, and which Defendants they assert the specific cause of action against. [Plaintiff's] second amended complaint must be one stand-alone document without reference to any other document filed in this case

(ECF No. 55). Plaintiff then filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on August 25, 2021. (ECF No. 56). Because an amended pleading like Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint “supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading[s] a nullity[, ]” only the claims and parties set forth in the Second Amended Complaint will be considered. W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013); 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2010).

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Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, in toto, reads as follows:

COMES NOW, named Plaintiff[] . . . Steven Mable, individual and on behalf of all those similarly situated in indefinite and long-term solitary confinement, timely file this second amended class action complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), (c) per Chief United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy's Order filed on the 12^th day of August 2021, asserting the following:

1. Plaintiff[] assert[s] that since November 16, 2020, the date of the original pleading naming John Wetzel as the sole Defendant, the Plaintiff[] ha[s] uncovered and determined that Stephen Moniak, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, have willfully colluded and engaged in a conspiracy with Defendant Wetzel to

a. Unlawfully warehouse the Plaintiff[] in the extreme conditions of indefinite and long-term solitary confinement;

b. Deliberately deny constitutional rights of substantive due process and equal protections(sic) to Plaintiff[] causing irreparable harm, with impunity;

c. Treat Plaintiff[] indifferently, unequally, and as a separate but distinct class of individuals discriminating against Plaintiff[] due to [his] mental health disabilities in violation of the American[s] with Disabilities Act.

2. Plaintiff[] assert[s] that the above violations and unlawful acts by Stephen Moniak and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, while acting in collusion with Defendant Wetzel, are in furtherance of the BIG business of mass incarceration where they benefited and continue to benefit from the unlawful warehousing of the Plaintiff[], in light of [his] mental health exacerbating.

3. Plaintiff[] assert[s] that Stephen Moniak and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, like Defendant Wetzel, are in violation of public trust and their oath of office. They have foregone their f[i]delity to the United States Constitution because of greed caused by the BIG business of mass incarceration.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff[] specifically add[s] Stephen Moniak, Senior Deputy Attorney General, as a named Defendant in this class action complaint, to be sued in his individual capacity, and to be sued in his official capacity as an agent of the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. Additionally, Plaintiff[] add[s] the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General as a named Defendant to be sued in their official capacity. Also due to the gravity of this serious matter where life and death are concerned, Plaintiffs seek the following additional relief:

(i) Sanctions against Senior Deputy Attorney General, Stephen Moniak;

(ii) Immediate disbarment of Stephen Moniak;

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(iii) One Hundred Thousand dollars each year for being so unlawfully held in the extreme conditions of indefinite and long-term solitary confinement;

(iv) Immediate investigation into the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General;

(v) Adding Stephen Moniak and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General as named Defendants in this class action lawsuit, as part of the caption name[;]

(vi) Expedite for immediate injunctive relief;

(vii) Expedite for immediate jury trial.

Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 56).

Given the leniency afforded to pro se litigants in discerning their purported causes of action, the Court will interpret Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as asserting the following claims against Defendants:

(1) a Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(2) a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(3) an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(4) a conspiracy to violate civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and

(5) a Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 claim.

The Court will also interpret Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as purporting to assert unspecified class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002),

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so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges, ” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (“petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”)).

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, ” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or...