Mabry v. ConocoPhillips Co.
| Decision Date | 06 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-00039-SLG |
| Parties | MONTE MABRY, Plaintiff, v. CONOCOPHILLIPS CO., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Before the Court at Docket 57 is Plaintiff Monte Mabry's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's order at Docket 49. Defendant Alight Solutions LLC ("Alight") responded at Docket 60, to which Plaintiff replied at Docket 63. Defendants ConocoPhillips Co. ("ConocoPhillips") and the Benefits Committee of the ConocoPhillips Retirement Plan ("Benefits Committee") (collectively, "ConocoPhillips Defendants") responded at Docket 62, to which Plaintiff replied at Docket 64.
The factual allegations in this case are set forth in detail in the Court's January 19, 2021 order at Docket 49, and the Court assumes familiarity here. In brief, Mr. Mabry's allegations arise from a dispute regarding his pension benefits. Specifically, Mr. Mabry alleges that Alight provided him with vastly overstated pension benefit estimates through its website while serving as a third-party administrator for the Benefits Committee, which Mr. Mabry relied on to his detriment. Mr. Mabry commenced this action against the ConocoPhillips Defendants and Alight, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") against all defendants as well as state law tort claims against Alight.1
In its January 19, 2021 order, the Court dismissed Mr. Mabry's breach of fiduciary duty claims against Alight after determining that "the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that Alight was acting as a fiduciary when it provided Mr. Mabry with pension estimates and statements."2 The Court also dismissed Mr. Mabry's state law claims against Alight as preempted by ERISA.3 Additionally, the Court dismissed Mr. Mabry's fiduciary claim against ConocoPhillips because he did not plead facts showing that ConocoPhillips had violated any fiduciary duty in appointing and monitoring members of the Benefits Committee or when it sent him letters regarding the segregation of his benefits and those of an alternate payee.4 The Court also dismissed Mr. Mabry's ERISA § 105 claim against the Benefits Committee after determining that accessing an online calculator on Alight's website to calculate benefit projections did not constitute a written request for abenefit statement under ERISA.5 On February 22, 2021, the Court ordered those claims dismissed with prejudice, as Mr. Mabry had not amended his complaint within 28 days in accordance with the January 19, 2021 order.6 On April 19, 2021, Mr. Mabry filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the Court's January 19, 2021 order on the basis of new Ninth Circuit authority.7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that:
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
When reconsideration of such an order is sought, a court has "inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it."8 "The authority of district courts to reconsider their own orders before they become final, absent some applicable rule or statute to the contrary, allows them to correct not only simple mistakes, but also decisions basedon shifting precedent, rather than waiting for the time-consuming, costly process of appeal."9 A "court may reconsider previously decided questions in cases in which there has been an intervening change of controlling authority . . . ."10
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court considers only the pleadings and documents incorporated into the pleadings by reference, as well as matters on which a court may take judicial notice.11 "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"12 A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."13 "Dismissal without leave to amend is improper, unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment."14
On April 15, 2021, subsequent to the Court's January 19, 2021 order, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Bafford v. Northrop Grumman Corp., which concerned similar allegations and claims to this case.15 In Bafford, the plaintiffs were provided grossly exaggerated benefit estimates through a third-party administrator's website based on a calculation error.16 The plaintiffs retired and initially received retirement benefits in line with the erroneous calculation.17 When the calculation error was eventually discovered, the plaintiffs' pension payments were reduced, and one plaintiff was told she must repay more than $35,000 of the benefits she had already received.18 The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging: (1) breaches of fiduciary duties under ERISA against the third-party administrator, the plan administrator, and the plan sponsor; (2) violations of ERISA § 105 against the plan administrator, and (3) professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against the third-party administrator.19 The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fiduciary claims against all defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' fiduciary claim against the third-party administrator failed because "calculation of pension benefits is a ministerial function that does not have a fiduciary duty attached to it."20 Therefore, the plan administrator and the plan sponsor likewise "did not breach a fiduciary duty by failing to ensure that [the third-party administrator] correctly calculated Plaintiffs' benefits."21
The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's dismissal of the ERISA § 105 claim against the plan administrator because the plaintiffs' "complaint does not allege that the online platform request was 'written.'"22 But the Ninth Circuit held that the "use of an online platform to request a pension benefit statement can satisfy the writing requirement" of ERISA § 105(a)(1)(B)(ii).23 The Ninth Circuit stressed that "[i]f Plaintiffs' complaint alleged facts which, if true, would show Plaintiffs' 'intentional recording of words in a visual form' that conveyed a request for a pension benefit statement, their [§ 105(a)(1)(B)(ii)] claim could survive."24 Assuch, the Ninth Circuit held that on remand, the district court should permit the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint as to this claim.
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's dismissal of the state law claims against the third-party administrator. The Ninth Circuit first noted that a state law is preempted "if it has a connection with or reference to [an ERISA-regulated] plan."25 The circuit court then held that negligence claims based on common law negligence principles are not preempted by the "reference to" prong because "[t]hese laws do not act immediately and exclusively on ERISA plans, and the existence of an ERISA plan is not essential to these laws' operation."26 The Ninth Circuit then turned to the "connection with" prong, "under which a state law claim is preempted when the claim bears on an ERISA-regulated relationship, e.g., the relationship between plan and plan member, between plan and employer, between employer and employee."27 The circuit court held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted by the "connection with" prong because those claims "d[id] not bear on the relationship between Plaintiffs and the Plan; between [the plan sponsor], [the plan administrator], and the Plan; or between Plaintiffs, [the plan sponsor], and [the plan administrator]."28
The threshold issue the Court must decide is the applicable standard for reconsideration of the January 19, 2021 and February 22, 2021 orders. Mr. Mabry styled his motion as one for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).29 This may well be due to the fact that Local Civil Rule 7.3(h) requires that a "motion for reconsideration of an order granting a dispositive motion must be filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60." Alight urges that Rule 60(b)(6) motions require a and a showing of "extraordinary circumstances."30 Mr. Mabry asserts that he "seeks reconsideration of an interlocutory order" and that "the Court should exercise its inherent power to reconsider its ruling and should reinstate Mr. Mabry's state-law claims."31
Here, the Court's January 19, 2021 and February 22, 2021 orders did not resolve "the rights and liabilities" of all the parties and therefore "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all theparties' rights and liabilities."32 No final judgment has been entered; nor has the Court certified the January 19, 2021 order as appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b). Thus, Rule 60(b) does not apply.33 Nor does Rule 60(b) cabin the Court's discretion to reconsider its own non-appealable orders over which it retains jurisdiction.34 Thus, the Court may reconsider its prior order where there has been an "intervening change in the law" without the need to identify the "extraordinary circumstances" required for Rule 60(b) relief.35
Turning to the merits of Mr. Mabry's motion, Mr. Mabry asserts that "[t]he facts of this case are not meaningfully different from those in . . . Bafford" because "Mr. Mabry's state-law claims against Alight - that Alight acted negligently in...
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