Mabry v. Lee Cnty.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-00214-SA-SAA
• Citation: 168 F.Supp.3d 940
• Parties: Nicole Mabry, as Mother and Next Friend of T.M., a Minor, Plaintiff v. Lee County, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

168 F.Supp.3d 940

Nicole Mabry, as Mother and Next Friend of T.M., a Minor, Plaintiff

v.Lee County, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-00214-SA-SAA

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division.

Signed March 9, 2016

Victor Israel Fleitas, Victor I. Fleitas, Attorney, Tupelo, MS, for Plaintiff.

Gary L. Carnathan, Carnathan & McAuley, William C. Murphree, John Samuel Hill, Stephen Pierce Spencer, Mitchell, McNutt & Sams, Tupelo, MS, Sidney Ray Hill, III, Clayton O'Donnell, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sharion Aycock, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Nicole Mabry initiated this action on behalf of her minor daughter T.M., alleging various constitutional violations arising out of T.M.'s arrest and strip search following an incident at her middle school. She initially named as Defendants in their individual capacities Dr. Kristy Luse, Officer Jon Bramble, and Officer Tasha Fant, but the Court granted them dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff's remaining claims are against government entities Lee County, the City of Tupelo, and Tupelo Public School District, which have all moved for summary judgment [97, 99, 106, 108]. The Court has considered the motions, responses, rules, and authorities, and finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

In November 2010 at Tupelo Middle School, T.M., a twelve-year old girl, was involved in a fight with another female student, Q.W. Both girls sustained injuries. While T.M. was receiving treatment in the school nurse's office, Assistant Principal Dr. Kristy Luse investigated the altercation, determined that the fight likely involved criminal conduct, and summoned Jon Bramble, a City of Tupelo police officer stationed at Tupelo High School.

Officer Bramble reviewed a video of the fight, and decided that there was probable cause to arrest both T.M. and Q.W. Officer Bramble called the Lee County Youth Court Judge Designee David Anthony, seeking permission to transport both girls to the Lee County Juvenile Detention Center. Anthony determined that probable cause existed, and issued a verbal custody order pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 43-21-301(3)(b). Officer Bramble then transported T.M. and Q.W. to the detention center.

As part of the intake procedures upon arrival at the facility, Tasha Fant, a female corrections officer, searched T.M. for contraband. She used a metal detecting wand, performed a pat down, and then conducted a private strip search.¹ Officer Fant testified that every juvenile charged with a delinquent act involving violence, theft, or drugs is strip-searched. Shortly after the search, T.M. was admitted to the detention center's general female population, where she remained until being released from detention that evening.

All charges against T.M. were eventually dismissed, and Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on T.M.'s behalf. By previous Memorandum Opinion [70], the Court addressed Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against Dr. Luse and Officer Bramble for Fourth Amendment false arrest, and against Officer Fant for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search. The Court found that Dr. Luse and Officer Bramble had probable cause to believe T.M. committed simple assault, and that Officer Fant's strip search did not violate clearly established law. Accordingly, qualified immunity shielded the individual officials from liability. The Court dismissed them from this lawsuit.

Now at issue are Plaintiff's remaining claims against Lee County, the City of Tupelo, and Tupelo Public School District. Plaintiff asserts that T.M.'s arrest violated her procedural due process rights stemming from a state-law created liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the strip search of T.M. constituted an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “set forth ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Importantly, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash. , 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.2002) ; S . E . C . v. Recile , 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1997) ; Little , 37 F.3d at 1075.

Discussion and Analysis

Due Process Claims

Plaintiff asserts that her procedural due process rights were violated by Defendants' policies of failing to follow state law regarding custody orders. Mississippi Code Section 43-21-301 permitted the judge designee to authorize T.M.'s custody for up to forty-eight hours, so long as it appeared there was probable cause to believe that (a) T.M. was within youth court jurisdiction; (b) she was endangered, she was a danger to others, she was a flight risk, or a parent, guardian, or custodian was unavailable; and (c) no reasonable alternative to custody existed. The judge designee determined that there was probable cause to believe T.M. had committed a crime, which would have placed her within youth court jurisdiction. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(i) -(j), 43-21-151(1). The judge designee deemed this finding alone to be sufficient, without regard to the two other preconditions to custody imposed by Section 43-21-301. Plaintiff argues that the failure to make the additional findings constituted a procedural due process violation.

To establish her procedural due process claims, Plaintiff must show (a) T.M. was deprived of a liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (b) the procedures relative to that deprivation were constitutionally inadequate. Wilson v. Birnberg , 667 F.3d 591, 601 (5th Cir.2012). State law may serve as the source for the requisite liberty interest in some circumstances.² Id. In assessing the adequacy of the procedures, however, it is federal constitutional law that sets the standard. Wansley v. Miss. Dep't of Corr. , 769 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir.2014) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) ). Thus, to succeed on her due process claims, Plaintiff must establish that Mississippi Code Section 43-21-301 created a liberty interest in her freedom from being arrested and detained; and that the process for making the custody determination was constitutionally deficient. Wilson , 667 F.3d at 601 ; Wansley , 769 F.3d at 312. The Court need not decide whether Section 43-21-301 creates a liberty interest, since in any event, T.M. received the process that she was due, as prescribed by the Fourth Amendment.

It is undisputed that T.M.'s custody and detention constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See C.H., II ex rel. L.H. v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 415 Fed.Appx. 541, 545–46 (5th Cir.2011) (applying standard Fourth Amendment seizure analysis to arrest of minor at school). Unlike the typical due process analysis, in Fourth Amendment seizure cases, the boundaries of the “process that is due” are defined by Fourth Amendment principles, which are “tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system ....” Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 124 n. 27, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

This could mean that Plaintiff's due process claims are subsumed by the Fourth Amendment. See C.H., II , 415 Fed.Appx. at 546 (“Since [plaintiff's] alleged liberty interest was in freedom from unlawful arrest, it is subsumed within his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim ....”); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (stating “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims”).

Or alternatively, it could mean that Plaintiff's due process claims, while conceptually freestanding, can never extend further than would a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. Pino v. Higgs , 75 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that “procedural due process affords Appellant no more protection than her right to be free from unreasonable seizure”); Ahern v. O'Donnell , 109 F.3d 809, 818–19 (1st Cir.1997) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures more specifically applies to the complained-of conduct than does the Due Process Clause, and thus defines what process is due ....”); McKinney v. George , 726 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that arrest upheld under the Fourth Amendment would preclude due process claim on same alleged conduct). Under either theory, the effect here is the same: Plaintiff's due process claims fail if she is unable to prove that T.M.'s arrest...