Macdonald v. City of Cleveland

• Decision Date: 04 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 101176,101176
• Citation: 2015 Ohio 2147
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Parties: GEORGE W. MACDONALD PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

2015 Ohio 2147

GEORGE W. MACDONALDPLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

No. 101176

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

June 4, 2015

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-13-808568

BEFORE:E.A. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, A.J., and Jones, J.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Barbara A, Langhenry, Director

City of Cleveland-Law Department

BY: John Mills

601 Lakeside Avenue

Room 106

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

FOR APPELLEE

George W. Macdonald, pro se

514 Glen Park Drive

Bay Village, Ohio 44140

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

{¶1}Defendant-appellantcity of Cleveland("the city") appeals from the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas reversing the decision of the city of Cleveland Parking Violations"Bureau" that affirmed plaintiff-appelleeGeorge W. Macdonald's liability for an automated traffic enforcement camera speeding offense.For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

{¶2} On April 23, 2013, Macdonald received a notice of liability for violating Cleveland Codified Ordinances ("CCO") 413.031.The notice stated that on April 15, 2013, Macdonald's vehicle was photographed by an automated traffic enforcement camera traveling 46 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.

{¶3} On May 16, 2013, Macdonald appeared at an administrative hearing before the city of Cleveland Parking Violations Bureau to contest the ticket and he testified that he was not exceeding the speed limit on the day in question and he objected to the city's procedure for assessing liability related to automated traffic camera tickets.The hearing officer read the facts of the ticket into evidence and found Macdonald liable and fined him in the amount of $100.

{¶4} Macdonald appealed the Bureau's decision to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.He asserted that the Bureau's decision was not supported by sufficient evidence and offered various arguments that the procedures employed pursuant to CCO 413.031 violate due process.The court of common pleas held a hearing on the matter pursuant to R.C. 2506.03(A) during which Macdonald did not provide any additionalevidence.Following the hearing, the court granted a motion to supplement filed by Macdonald which referenced this court's decision in Jodka v. Cleveland, 2014-Ohio-208, 6 N.E.3d 1208(8th Dist.).

{¶5} In Jodka, we held that the procedures set forth in CCO 413.031(k) and (l) violated the Ohio Constitution's Article IV, Section 1, by attempting to divest the municipal court of its jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of municipal ordinances.Id.at ¶ 33.Relying on Jodka, the court of common pleas reversed the Bureau's finding of liability against Macdonald, denied a motion to dismiss filed by the city and dismissed the case with prejudice.The city appeals asserting the following two assignments of error:

I.The trial court abused its discretion in considering appellee's challenges to the constitutionality of CCO 413.031.

II.The trial court erred in denying Defendant-Appellant's motion to dismiss.

{¶6}We find the city's second assignment of error to be dispositive of this appeal.In reversing the decision of the Bureau and dismissing the case with prejudice, the court of common pleas relied in good faith on this court's decisions in JodkaandDawson v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. CuyahogaNo. 99964, 2014-Ohio-500(holding that the finding inJodka that CCO 413.031 was facially unconstitutional was controlling authority applicable in administrative appeals pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506).

{¶7} However, this court's holding in Jodka was recently reversed pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Toledo, Slip OpinionNo. 2014-Ohio-5461.Jodka v. Cleveland, Slip OpinionNo. 2015-Ohio-860.In Walker, the court laid to restthe home-rule and municipal court jurisdiction challenges to automated traffic enforcement ordinances as follows:

[W]e reaffirm our holding in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that municipalities have home-rule authority under Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system.We also hold that Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, which authorizes the legislature to create municipal courts, and R.C. 1901.20, which sets the jurisdiction of municipal courts, do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations.Finally, we hold that Ohio municipalities have home-rule authority to establish administrative proceedings, including administrative hearings, in furtherance of these ordinances, that must be exhausted before offenders or the municipality can pursue judicial remedies.

Walkerat ¶ 29.

{¶8} The city correctly argues in its second assignment of error that the court of common pleas was unable to reach the merits of Macdonald's assignments of error due to its reliance on Jodka.As Jodka is no longer controlling authority pursuant to Walker, it is appropriate to reverse and remand to allow the court to consider the merits of Macdonald's appeal.

{¶9} The city's second assignment of error is sustained.

{¶10}We find the city's first assignment of error to be moot.

{¶11} The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is...