MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1902
• Citation: 71 N.H. 448,52 A. 982
• Parties: MacDONALD et al. v. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

52 A. 982

71 N.H. 448

MacDONALD et al.

v. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Coos.

June 3, 1902.

Transferred from superior court.

Action by John F. MacDonald & Co. against the Grand Trunk Railway Company. Transferred to supreme court Judgment for defendants.

Case to recover the value of goods destroyed by fire, through the defendants' negligence, while in their possession as common carriers. The pleadings and facts agreed by the parties were as follows: The goods in question were shipped upon the Allan steamship "Sarmatian," at Glasgow, Scotland, under a bill of lading which was made a part of the case, for transportation to Toronto, Canada. The goods were received by the defendants at Portland, Me., for transportation upon the terms of the original bill of lading. While in transportation across this state, they were destroyed by fire resulting from a collision caused by the defendants' negligence. The goods were insured with the Mannheim Insurance Company, which has paid the plaintiffs, MacDonald & Co., their value, $2,469.50. Prior to the commencement of this action, the consignees, who are residents of Toronto, and the insurance company, brought suit before the high court of justice in the dominion of Canada, against the defendants, in which the present plaintiffs claimed to recover of the present defendants for the loss of the goods in question; and in that action after hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants. The high court of justice is a court of record of general jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the case, and the judgment rendered was a judgment upon the merits of the issue presented, and is not reversed. The defendants pleaded the judgment in bar of this action, and also pleaded that, by the terms of the bill of lading, they were protected from liability for loss from fire, whether due to their own negligence or otherwise, and from liability for any loss which could be covered by insurance. The pleadings and record in the suit referred to were made a part of the case.

Matthews & Sawyer, for plaintiffs.

Clarence A. Hight, L. Leroy Hight, and Chamberlin & Rich, for defendants.

PARSONS, J. The plaintiffs, prior to the commencement of this suit, voluntarily submitted the claim which they now make against the defendants—their right to damages for the negligent destruction of their property while in the hands of the defendants as common carriers—to a judicial tribunal established by the government of which they were citizens, and to whose decrees they owe obedience. The tribunal to which they appealed was a court of record of general jurisdiction; it had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter of the controversy. Both parties appeared and were heard; the plaintiffs had full opportunity to present such matters of fact, and to argue such propositions of law, as they deemed essential to their case. The judgment was upon the merits, and against the plaintiffs. It is not claimed that, by any erroneous ruling of the court, the plaintiffs were prevented from fully and fairly presenting their case. Nor is it suggested that the court erred in its decision of the legal question which the parties considered decisive of their rights. No accident or mistake on the part of the plaintiffs in the presentation of their case is suggested. Fraud is not charged. It is apparent that, if the plaintiffs' claims had been sustained in Canada, the defendants would have been bound by the result, and would have been compelled to satisfy any judgment that might there have been obtained against them. Is there any reason why the plaintiffs, having compelled the defendants to litigate the claim made by them in this suit before a tribunal of their own selection, and having suffered defeat without fraud, accident, or mistake, and after a fair hearing as full as they cared to make it, by the results of which the defendants were necessarily bound, should not also be everywhere bound by the judicial determination which they invoked, and be estopped from presenting before any other tribunal the claim once judicially decided against them? The judgment in Canada was final, and is not reversed. It is conclusive against the plaintiffs in their own country. As an expression of the will of the sovereign to whom their allegiance is due, they owe obedience thereto abroad as well as at home. Upon every ground of natural right and justice, it would seem that they should be debarred from invading the courts of another country to retry a controversy settled against them at home.

Against the binding effect upon the plaintiffs here of the judgment in Canada, it is urged that, in this court, that judgment is a foreign judgment. "It is universally agreed that the laws of a state have, ex proprio vigore, no extraterritorial force." Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 549, 44 Atl. 538, 541, 46 L R. A. 467, 76 Am. St Rep. 192; Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379, 381, 382, 61 Am. Dec. 617. But the courts of the state are open to others besides our own citizens. Pub. St. c. 216, § 1. And the controversies our courts are called upon to determine are not limited to those which arise within this sovereignty or under its laws. The substance and effect of foreign laws are, therefore, subjects of frequent consideration. "There is, perhaps, no general principle of law better established than that the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where the contract is made. If valid there, it is valid elsewhere; but if void or illegal by the law of the place where made, it is void everywhere. * * * But there are some exceptions to this rule, and among them is this: that no nation is bound to recognize or enforce contracts which are injurious to its own Interests, or to those of its own citizens, or which are in fraud of its laws." Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379, 381. That the law of the country where a contract is made or to be executed is to be examined to ascertain what the agreement was which the parties made, is elementary. Bank v. Howard (N. H.) 51 Atl. 641; Insurance Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 328, 44 Atl. 516. "If there is a conflict between the lex loci and the lex fori, the former governs in torts, the same as in contracts, in respect to the legal effect and incidents of acts." Beacham v. Portsmouth Bridge, 68 N. H. 382, 40 Atl. 1066, 73 Am St. Rep. 607. If there is no ground of action' in the sovereignty where the tort is alleged to have occurred, there is none anywhere. Leazotte v. Railroad Co., 70 N. H. 5, 6, 45 Atl. 1084. To ascertain the rights resulting from acts done or omitted, attention must be paid to the circumstances under which the events took place; and one of the governing circumstances is the law of the place which characterizes the act. It is sometimes said that in such circumstances the courts of one country out of comity give effect to the laws of another (Smith v. Godfrey, supra); but a more exact view has been taken. "When the courts of one country consider the laws of another, in which any contract has been made, * * * in construing its meaning, or ascertaining its existence, they can hardly be said to act from courtesy or ex comitate; for it is of the essence of the subject-matter to ascertain the meaning of the parties, and that they did solemnly bind themselves; and it is clear that you must presume them to have intended what the law of the country sanctions or supposes; it is equally clear that their adopting the forms and solemnities which that law prescribes shows their intention to bind themselves,— nay, more, it is the only safe criterion of their having entertained such an intention. Therefore, the courts of the country where the question arises resort to the law of the country where the contract was made, not ex comitate, but ex debito justitiae, and in order to explicate their own jurisdiction by discovering that which they are in quest of, and which alone they are in quest of,—the meaning and intent of the parties." Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clark & P. 488, 530. In like manner, when a right is claimed upon acts occurring in another country, courts look to the law of that country not to extend the binding force of a foreign law beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty to which it belongs, but to ascertain whether the right claimed exists or not. It is not the foreign law, but the rights acquired under it, which are enforced by the courts of another country. And this is true whether the question be one of contract, tort, or status. As the will of the sovereign expressed in general law can of itself have no exterritorial force, the same will expressed in concrete form in a judgment between two suitors can have no greater effect. A plaintiff cannot here have execution upon a foreign judgment, nor a successful defendant have execution for costs, in the absence of legislative direction to that' effect. The question is not of the enforcement of the foreign judgment, but it is, what are the rights of the parties? The particular law declared by the judgment is evidence of the rights now in controversy, as would be the general law if the dispute related to matters to which it applied which had not passed into judgment.

The plaintiffs, MacDonald & Co., contracted with the Allan Steamship Company for the transportation of certain goods from Glasgow, Scotland, to Toronto, Canada. One of the stipulations of the written contract, called the bill of lading, provided that the carriers should not be liable for loss from fire even if resulting from their own negligence. The goods were delivered to the Grand Trunk Railway Company in Portland, Me., who accepted them upon the terms of the original bill of lading. While in transport across this state, the goods were destroyed by fire through the negligence of the defendant railroad. The claim in this suit is that the stipulation releasing the carrier from...