MacDonald v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ.
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-01942-IM |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2023 |
| Parties | BRITTANY MacDONALD, Plaintiff, v. OREGON HEALTH & SCIENCE UNIVERSITY, a Public Corporation and Governmental Entity; WAYNE MONFRIES, an Individual; RUTH BEYER, an Individual; MAHTAB BRAR, an Individual; JAMES CARLSON, an Individual; DANNY JACOBS, an Individual; SUSAN KING, an Individual; CHAD PAULSON, an Individual; SUE STEWARD, an Individual; STEVE ZIKA, an Individual; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Ray D Hacke, Pacific Justice Institute, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Brenda K. Baumgart, Rachelle Collins, Alex Van Rysselberghe, and Thomas R. Johnson, Stoel Rives LLP, Attorneys for Defendants.
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Oregon Health & Science University (“OHSU”), Wayne Monfries, Ruth Beyer, Mahtab Brar, James Carlson, Danny Jacobs, Susan King, Chad Paulson, Sue Steward, Steve Zika and Does 1-50's (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF 22.
Plaintiff Brittany MacDonald (“Plaintiff”) brings two claims against Defendants. Against Defendant OHSU, Plaintiff alleges a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act based on the failure to accommodate Plaintiff's religious beliefs. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 35-49. Against Defendants Monfries, Beyer, Brar, Carlson, Jacobs, King, Paulson Steward, Zika (collectively, “Board Defendants”) and Does 1-50 (collectively, “VERC Defendants”) Plaintiff alleges violation of her First Amendment right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at ¶¶ 50-58. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as well as economic, non-economic, and punitive damages. Id. at 15-16.[1]
For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
A motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF 1. Plaintiff is a registered nurse formerly employed by Defendant OHSU in the hospital's Mother and Baby Unit. Id. At ¶¶ 1, 18.
Plaintiff worked at OHSU for approximately nine years, from October 8, 2012 until December 2, 2021. Id. Plaintiff is also a practicing Christian. Id. at ¶ 2.
OHSU is a public corporation and governmental entity performing governmental functions and exercising governmental powers, as provided under O.R.S. § 353.020. Id. at ¶ 3. OHSU is a public hospital system and Oregon's only public medical school. Id. at ¶ 12. OHSU is also an employer as defined by Title VII. Id.
The Board Defendants are individuals who were collectively responsible for establishing policies and protocols aimed at ensuring the health and safety of OHSU's employees and patients during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at ¶ 15. The VERC Defendants, styled in Plaintiff's Complaint as “Does 1-50, inclusive,” are individuals whose identities are unknown to Plaintiff but who were members of OHSU's Vaccine Exemption Review Committee (“VERC”). Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5. The VERC consisted of individuals from various departments within OHSU, including Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity (“AAEO”), Center for Diversity and Inclusion, Human Resources, Student Health and Wellness, Occupational Health, and Legal. Id. Ex. C.
In August 2021, Oregon Governor Kate Brown issued an executive order (“Vaccine Mandate” or “Mandate”) requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18, 2021. Id. at ¶ 16; see also O.A.R. § 333-019-1010.
To comply with the Mandate, OHSU subsequently required all its employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or be granted a religious or medical exception by October 18, 2021. ECF 1 at ¶ 17; see also O.A.R. § 333-019-1010(3)(a) (effective August 25, 2021 through January 31, 2022). Exemption requests were evaluated by the VERC. Id. Ex. C. The VERC evaluated these requests against the legal criteria for communicating a “sincerely held religious belief” that conflicted with OHSU's vaccine policy. See id. Ex. C; id. Ex D. Some frequently raised personal or secular beliefs that failed to qualify as a religious exemption, according to the VERC, including “[a]rguments for free will, religious freedom or against compulsion,” “[c]oncerns over vaccine safety or content,” and objections based on “fetal cell concerns” that did not appear to stem from a bona fide religious belief. Id. Ex. C.
At the time that OHSU announced its COVID-19 vaccination policy, Plaintiff was working as a registered nurse in OHSU's Mother and Baby Unit. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff is a practicing, non-denominational Christian who opposes abortion on religious grounds. Id. at ¶ 19. As such, Plaintiff objected to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination, partly on the basis that she believed the vaccine manufacturers used cells from aborted fetuses in the testing and development of vaccines or in the vaccines themselves. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.
On or about September 19, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a religious exemption request to OHSU. Id. at ¶ 21; id. Ex. B. Plaintiff attached a five-page explanation to her exemption request which outlined her objections to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. Ex. B. These objections included Plaintiff's statement that she “firmly believe[s] [she] [has] a clear moral duty to refuse the use of medical products, including certain vaccines, that are created using human cell lines derived from abortion during any stage of the vaccine's development, including the testing phase of development of a medical product.” Id. Ex. B. at 4. Plaintiff further objected to receiving the vaccine based on her belief that “[her] body is the Temple of the Holy Spirit” and “as a Christian, [she] [is] compelled to protect it from defilement.” Id. Plaintiff also stated that she was “strongly opposed to the (illegal) requirement by the State that, as a nurse, [she] must be injected with it against [her] will and against God's will.” Id.
VERC conducted two independent assessments of Plaintiff's application and denied her request, finding her application insufficient to establish that she had a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with OHSU's employee-wide vaccination requirement. Id. Ex. C. Plaintiff remained unvaccinated, in contravention of OHSU's vaccination policy and the Mandate. OHSU ultimately terminated Plaintiff's employment on or about December 3, 2021. Id. at ¶ 31.
Plaintiff filed the present action on December 15, 2022. ECF 1. On March 10, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 22 at 1. After the parties had fully briefed the motion, ECF 23; ECF 26, this Court held oral argument, ECF 28. Following oral argument, and at the request of this Court, the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue of Defendants' request for judicial notice of several documents not contained or referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF 29; ECF 30. This Court then took this matter under advisement as of May 31, 2023.
On June 29, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S.Ct. 2279 (2023). That case considered the definition of “undue hardship” as applied to Title VII religious discrimination claims. Id. at 2294. This Court requested, and received, joint supplemental briefing from the parties on whether and to what extent the Supreme Court's decision in Groff impacts this Court's “undue hardship” analysis. ECF 32; ECF 33.
Defendants ask this Court to dismiss both Plaintiff's Title VII cla...
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