Macdougall v. Levick
| Decision Date | 10 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | CL-2011-0004071 |
| Parties | Re: Deborah MacDougall v. Richard S. Levick |
| Court | Circuit Court of Virginia |
Mr. James Ray Cottrell, Esq.
Mr. Christopher W. Schinstock, Esq.
Counsel for Plaintiff Deborah MacDougall.
Mr. Richard J. Colten, Esq.
Ms. Edna Ruth Vincent, Esq.
Ms. Colleen M. Haddow, Esq.
Ms. Marry C. Huff, Esq.
Colten Cummins Watson & Vincent, P.C.
Counsel for Defendant Richard S. Levick
Dear Counsel:
Before the Court is the Defendant's Petition for Declaration of Marriage Status and Related Relief. On September 30-October 1, 2013, the parties presented their evidence and the Court took the matter under advisement. After considering the evidence and briefs of both parties, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Defendant's motion and finds that the parties' marriage is void ab initio.
This is a case about a marriage ceremony without a marriage license, followed by a marriage license without a marriage ceremony. Neither the former, nor the latter, nor some combination of the both, created a legal marriage. The marriage is void, not merely voidable. The Court reaches this result because it believes the statutes in question are absolutely clear, unequivocal, and mandatory as to the core requirements for the creation of a legal marriage in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and those requirements were not met in the instant case.
A marriage ceremony without a marriage license has no legal effect. Similarly, a marriage license without a marriage ceremony has no legal effect. That the parties intended to be married, believed they were married, and held themselves out to be married for years, does not permit the Court to reach a different result. A void marriage does not become legal or merely voidable because the parties intended to be married, thought they were married, or engaged in divorce litigation. Nor can a void marriage be deemed legal by resort to the curative statute that permits a court to recognize the validity of a marriage despite "defect, omission, or imperfection," for that statute only applies to a "marriage solemnized under a license." Va. Code §20-31. Here, there was no license. Finally, because this Court finds the marriage to be void, not voidable, the Court does not reach the issue of laches or estoppel, legal principles that would only be applicable, if at all, if the Court found the marriage to be voidable. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant's motion to declare the marriage void is granted.
On March 21, 2011, the Plaintiff, Deborah MacDougall, filed a complaint for divorce from the Defendant, Richard Levick. In the following two years, the Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in extensive litigation, including numerous discovery disputes, pendente lite matters, a plea in bar, motions for declaratory judgment, sanctions motions, the filing of amended complaints and counterclaims, and other matters. Multiple hearings, including several evidentiary hearings, have been conducted to resolve pending disputes. Much of the litigation has concerned a July 2009 written agreement entered into by the parties, in particular, whether it was a marital agreement or a separation agreement, whether it was abrogated by reconciliation, and whether the Defendant had waived his right to challenge the validity of the agreement.
On August 27, 2012, the Court signed an Order finding that the Defendant had waived his right to contest the validity of the marital agreement. The Plaintiff sought sanctions with regard to the Defendant's continuing efforts to invalidate the marital agreement, which the Court denied on November 30, 2012. Resolution of the protracted litigation regarding the marital agreement set the stage for the Court to resolve in a subsequent hearing all remaining matters of equitable distribution, spousal support, and the grounds for divorce. However, in late February 2013, that situation changed.
On February 27, 2013, the Defendant filed a Petition for Declaration of Marriage Status and Related Relief, alleging that the parties' marriage was void ab initio. In his Petition, the Defendant asserted that the parties' marriage was null and void because the marriage license was obtained after the marriage ceremony and was subsequently signed by the officiant without either party being present. In light of the allegedly void nature of the marriage, the Defendant requested that the Court vacate all of its prior orders and decrees, find the July 20, 2009 Marital Agreement invalid and unenforceable, order recoupment and restitution from the Plaintiff to the Defendant for monies and benefits received, and partition jointly titled real and personal property.
On March 15, 2013, after obtaining leave of court to file amended pleadings, the Defendant filed an Amended Counterclaim alleging the nullity of the parties' marriage and requesting related relief. On April 5, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an Answer to Defendant's Amended Counterclaim, asserting affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the issue of the validity of the July 20, 2009 agreement, and laches and estoppel as to the Defendant's contest of the validity of the parties' marriage.
The Defendant's Petition for Declaration of Marriage Status and Related Relief proceeded to trial on September 30, 2013 on the issue of the validity of the parties' marriage. The motion was heard in a bench trial before this Court on September 30-October 1, 2013. In this Letter Opinion, the Court resolves the issue of the validity of the parties' marriage as presented by the Defendant's Petition for Declaration of Marriage Status and Related Relief, the extensive briefing of the issues by the parties, and the evidence presented during the trial.
On December 21, 2002, the parties gathered together, with their family and friends, at their home in McLean, Virginia to participate in a marriage ceremony. Stipulation ("Stip."), Def. Ex. 42, p. 2, ¶ 1. Prior to the ceremony, during a discussion with the officiant—Rabbi Binyamin Biber—the parties realized that they had not obtained a Virginia marriage license prior to the ceremony. Def. Br., p. 5; Pl. Br., p. 2. Despite the lack of a marriage license, and despite the fact that the Rabbi had never performed a wedding before where the marriage license was not already present, the parties and Rabbi Biber decided to go forward with the ceremony on December 21, 2002. Deposition of Binyamin Biber ("Biber Dep."), 12:6-9, June 20, 2013; Def. Br., p. 5; Pl. Br., p. 2. At the time, Rabbi Biber informed the parties that whenever they obtained a marriage license, they could send it to him and he would sign it. Biber Dep., 15:11-15.
Approximately two weeks later, on January 6, 2003, the parties went to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, filed a sworn Application for Marriage License, and were issued a marriage license permitting lawful matrimony in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Stip., Def. Ex. 42, p. 3, ¶ 4; Marriage Register ("License"), Def. Ex. 4.1 Evidence at trial demonstrated that, after receiving the license on January 6, the parties agreed that the Defendantwould send the license to Rabbi Biber. Further evidence showed that the Defendant, or one of his employees, sent the marriage license by Federal Express mail to Rabbi Biber.
Rabbi Biber testified that he received the license on January 21, 2003 when he returned from vacation and found the license in a stack of mail. Biber Dep., 15:18-22. Upon receipt of the license, Rabbi Biber signed the license and listed the date of marriage as January 21, 2003. Biber Dep., 17:4-7, 20:5-9. Rabbi Biber testified that he put January 21, 2003 as the marriage date because he "wasn't sure if it was proper to backdate it . . . [he was] not sure if that was the correct legal thing to do, but that's what [he] did because [he] wasn't sure if [he] should do anything else." Biber Dep., 20:3-4, 7-9.
When asked whether he performed a ceremony or officiated the exchanging of vows between the parties on January 21, 2003, Rabbi Biber stated that he did not do another ceremony other than that performed on December 21, 2002. Biber Dep., 20:19-22; 21:1-2. In explanation, he testified that:
I did the ceremony on December 21st, 2002, and - I mean, maybe mistakenly, but I conceived that when I received the marriage license, that was completing the whole thing that we had done on December 21st. And so I just simply, you know, filled out the rest of it that I would have filled out in McLean, Virginia. And, again, maybe I should have put the date of the ceremony. I don't know what would have been the proper legal thing to do, but I signed it as I would have had we filled it out the day of the wedding. . . . I assumed when I received the marriage license that that was their - the intention was to complete the ceremony which normally does include the signing of a marriage license when that's possible. Biber Dep., 21:1-11; 25:5-9.
Evidence at trial confirmed that neither party was present on January 21, 2003 when Rabbi Biber signed the marriage license; in fact, the...
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