Mace v. City of Akron, 5:96 CV 1875.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 5:96 CV 1875.,5:96 CV 1875.
• Citation: 989 F.Supp. 949
• Parties: Regina A. MACE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF AKRON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

989 F.Supp. 949

Regina A. MACE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF AKRON, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:96 CV 1875.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

January 16, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edmund M. Sawan, Sawan & Farris, Akron, OH, Nancy Holland Myers, Holland & Myers, Akron, OH, for Regina A Mace.

Elaine B. Davidson, Patricia Ambrose Rubright, City of Akron Law Dept., Akron, OH, for City of Akron.

Hilary S. Taylor, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, OH, for Elaine B. Davidson, Patricia Ambrose Rubright, City of Akron Law Dept., Akron, OH, for Mary T. Sammon.

ORDER

SAM H. BELL, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the court is a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by Defendants City of Akron and Mary Sammon. (Docket # 13.) Plaintiff Regina A. Mace filed this suit pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., and Ohio common law. On September 23, 1996, the court granted the parties discovery as to the limited issues of jurisdiction and immunity. (Docket # 5.) In light of such discovery, Defendants assert that Ms. Mace has failed both to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and to establish that there are any genuine issues of material fact. For the reasons that follow, the court agrees, and shall grant Defendants' motion as it relates to Mace's federal claims.

II. BACKGROUND

In June, 1979, Regina Mace began work as a "Sessions Clerk" at the Akron Municipal Court. (Pl.'s Ex. B, Attach. 1.) At some time in the 1980's, Ms. Mace was reclassified as a "Felony Court Bailiff," a job in which she performed until 1995. (Mace Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5.) In January, 1995, Mace came under the supervision of Mary Sammon, a new administrator for the Court. Soon after Ms. Sammon assumed her position, Mace informed Sammon that she suffered from certain physical problems which required that she use a workstation computer with calendar software. (Id. ¶ 5.) Mace's request for the computer and software was never granted. (Id. ¶ 6.)

In the months that followed, Mace's relationship with Sammon quickly deteriorated. Mace's personnel file reveals a series of entries, made by Sammon, that detail the extent of that deterioration. In each entry, Sammon notes a particular workplace incident or issue that implicates Mace. For example, in some entries, Sammon notes that Mace was tardy in arriving for work. (See, e.g., Defs.' Ex. 17.) In others, she indicates that Mace had difficulty communicating with various judicial officers of the Court. (See, e.g., Defs.' Ex. 22.) Mace was disciplined for certain incidents, while others occurred but were not brought to Mace's attention. (Mace Aff. ¶ 14.)

While working as a Felony Court Bailiff, Mace has engaged in various activities outside of her job that ultimately came to the attention of Sammon. At one point, she spoke with a representative of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees about general "union activity." (Id. ¶ 10.) She also organized various after-hours social activities for court employees. (Id. ¶ 9.) In Summer, 1995 Mace signed a proposal for the creation of a grievance panel to resolve employee disciplinary disputes. (Pl.'s Ex. B, Attach. 7.)

On November 22, 1995, Sammon informed Mace that she was suspended from her position for two weeks. (Mace Aff. ¶ 15.) Subsequently, Mace learned that she had been permanently demoted from the Felony Court Bailiff position to a position as a "Traffic Court Clerk." (Id. ¶ 16.) On December 5, 1995, that demotion was approved by a unanimous vote of all judges of the Akron Municipal Court. (Sammon Aff. ¶ 30.) As a Traffic Court Clerk, Mace earns over $5 per hour less than she did previously. (Pl.s' Ex. E-1 at 4.) On January 1, 1996, Mace filed a complaint about her demotion with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, which granted her a right-to-sue letter. In her complaint, Mace alleged that Sammon and the City of Akron deprived her of rights secured to her under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She also alleged that she was deprived of her rights under the Americans with Disability Act, and Ohio common law. On August 2, 1996, Mace filed suit in the Summit Court of Common Pleas, naming Sammon and the City of Akron as defendants. Sammon and the City then petitioned for removal of the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).¹

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has summarized the standard of review governing motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as follows:

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact ... and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... [The] court must view all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

The moving party has the burden of conclusively showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Nevertheless, in the face of a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings but must come forward with some probative evidence to support its claim. By its very terms, this standard provides that the existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. The dispute must be genuine and the facts must be such that if they were proven at trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. If the disputed evidence "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."

LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). With this standard in mind, the court shall analyze Defendants' present motion.²

IV. ANALYSIS

A.

In Count One of her complaint, Mace brings an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. That section provides, in pertinent part, that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mace specifically asserts that, in demoting her, Sammon deprived her of her right to free speech under the First Amendment and her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1.

Defendants first challenge Mace's ability to bring an action against the City of Akron. They argue that any actions taken by Sammon were taken on behalf of the Akron Municipal Court, not the City of Akron. As an arm of the State of Ohio, the Court is not subject to liability as a "person" under the terms of § 1983. See Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir.1988) ("The Akron Municipal Court is part of the Ohio state court system, established by the Ohio state legislature."); Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir.1997) (noting that "unlike counties and municipalities, state governments, and their arms, officers, and instrumentalities, are generally immune from private lawsuit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution") (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Moor v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1799-801, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973)). Conversely, as a municipality, the City of Akron is subject to a suit brought under § 1983, at least under certain circumstances. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1358 (6th Cir.1993) ("Local governments can be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing Monell).

The parties devote much effort debating whether or not Sammon and Mace are "employees" of the City. Each proffers its own conception of employment, and cites to various cases that describe the employment relationship. This discussion, however, is largely irrelevant; since Monell, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a municipality may not be held liable under any theory of respondeat superior. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics and Intell. Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1162, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1387, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). In fact, in Monell itself, the Supreme Court specifically prohibited any attempt to hold a municipality liable simply because one of its agents or employees deprived an individual of his constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.

It is also irrelevant that the City would provide any funds that might be used to pay a damage award. In Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit held that a government entity could not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it would provide the funds for an award of backpay damages. The plaintiff in Mumford brought suit against an administrative judge of an Ohio common pleas court. After dismissing the case against the judge in his official capacity, the district court concluded that the "true remaining defendant" was the county in which the court was located. Mumford v. Zieba, 915 F.Supp. 917, 919 (N.D.Ohio 1995). Just as Ohio municipalities provide support for municipal courts, Ohio counties provide support for the state's courts of common pleas. See Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d at 269 ("[T]he Ohio legislature has compelled the county governments to provide support for the operation of the common pleas courts within their...