Maceachern v. City of Manhattan Beach

• Citation: 623 F.Supp.2d 1092
• Decision Date: 08 June 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. SACV 08-0523 DOC (RNBx).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Ruth MacEACHERN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, Manhattan Beach Police Department, Kristopher Thompson and Does 1 to 100, Defendants.

623 F.Supp.2d 1092

Ruth MacEACHERN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, Manhattan Beach Police Department, Kristopher Thompson and Does 1 to 100, Defendants.

Case No. SACV 08-0523 DOC (RNBx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

June 8, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian Charles Carlin, David W.T. Brown, Paul E. Heidenreich, Huskinson Brown Heidenreich Amd Carlin LLP, Manhattan Beach, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Nathan A. Oyster, Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVID O. CARTER, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants City of Manhattan Beach ("City"), Manhattan Beach Police Department ("MBPD"), and Officer Kristopher Thompson's ("Thompson") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (the "Motion"). After considering the moving, opposing, and replying papers, as well as the parties' oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court presents the parties' version of the facts separately in order to highlight any disputes.

a. Defendants' Version of the Facts

At approximately 7:15 p.m. on May 10, 2007, Manhattan Beach Police Officer Kristopher Thompson received a radio call informing him that a man had just threatened a woman with a knife at the Chevron Gas Station in Manhattan Beach near the intersection of Rosecrans and Sepulveda. Officer Thompson is a K-9 officer, and on that day, his canine partner was a male Dutch Shepard named Kraft. After hearing the call, Officer Thompson spoke to the dispatcher to clarify that the woman had actually seen a knife. The dispatcher confirmed that the woman had seen the suspect with a knife. The dispatcher also gave Thompson a physical description of the suspect, including that the man was carrying a dark backpack.

Due to Officer Thompson's close proximity to the scene, he arrived at the intersection of Rosecrans and Sepulveda within 15 seconds. He saw a man fitting the suspect's description, decedent Andrew MacEachern ("MacEachern"), walking northbound across Rosecrans Avenue. Thompson contends that he saw a dark backpack in MacEachern's left hand but could not see MacEachern's right hand. Due to the match in description, Thompson decided to initiate a stop of MacEachern. Thompson had to drive his vehicle over the concrete median that separated eastbound and westbound traffic on Rosecrans Avenue. Thompson then stopped his car in a northeast direction across the westbound lanes of Rosecrans. He contends that MacEachern was on the northwest sidewalk slightly west of Sepulveda at that time.

Officer Thompson then exited his car and MacEachern turned to face him. The parties were approximately 25 feet apart. Officer Thompson contends that when MacEachern turned towards him, Thompson saw that MacEachern held a knife with a silver blade in his right hand. Upon seeing the knife, Officer Thompson raised his gun and ordered MacEachern to drop the knife and get on the ground. Thompson avers that MacEachern ignored him and then made a few steps towards Thompson. MacEachern then allegedly raised his left hand "in an extended position, perpendicular to his body, exposing his open left palm as if the guard hand would protect the suspect from a blow by an assailant." Defs.'s Mot. at 4-5. He then jabbed the knife at Officer Thompson. Officer Thompson contends that he repeatedly ordered MacEachern to drop the knife and get on the ground. He avers that he made such requests at least ten times.

Thompson contends that as he continued to order MacEachern to drop the knife, MacEachern took a few more steps towards Thompson and continued walking closer. Fearing for his life, Officer Thompson then fired three rounds from his pistol at MacEachern. At the time Officer Thompson shot his gun, MacEachern was approximately ten feet away from Thompson. Thompson immediately made a call of "shots fired." The entire interaction with MacEachern was no longer than 67 seconds. MacEachern died from the shooting. Officer Thompson's police dog remained in the police vehicle during the entire interaction.

Officer Thompson contends that he fully cooperated with the investigation into the shooting by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. On May 1, 2008, he received the 2008 South Bay Medal of Valor for his actions during the May 10, 2007 incident.

b. Plaintiff's Disputed Facts

Plaintiff does not dispute any facts leading up to Officer Thompson arriving at the scene. However, Plaintiff points out that Defendant Thompson indicates he responded Code 3 to the dispatch. By responding Code 3, an officer's video camera on his or her patrol car is supposed to immediately activate. Yet, Officer Thompson's camera appears to have malfunctioned, so no recording of the incident was made.

Second, Plaintiff points out that two witnesses, April Marano-Ford and John Ford, who were in their car at the scene, saw decedent MacEachern cross the street. They both claim that they did not see MacEachern with a knife but instead thought he may have had a piece of paper in his right hand. They also indicate that they did not feel MacEachern was acting in an aggressive manner. However, they both admit that once MacEachern began interacting with Defendant Thompson, MacEachern's back was to them so they could no longer see his hands. While acknowledging that during the quick interaction between MacEachern and Thompson, the Fords saw the two men get closer to each other, the Fords do not make clear exactly which man moved closer to the other person and can only estimate the distance between the two men at the time of the shooting. Further, while the Fords could not hear any communications between Thompson and MacEachern, Ms. Marano-Ford acknowledges that she could tell Thompson was yelling at MacEachern.

In addition, Plaintiff provides the deposition testimony of a third witness, Paula Parker. Ms. Parker also indicates that she did not see MacEachern with a knife but states that, just like the Fords, she could not see MacEachern's hands at the time he was interacting with Officer Thompson. Further, she contends that she saw MacEachern raise his hand prior to Thompson shooting MacEachern and that she felt threatened. See Parker Dep. at 74:24-75:3 ("What I can say is that prior to the actions of the gentleman on the corner made me feel threatened enough where I would certainly see how the officer who was there at the same point in time would feel threatened as well.").

Plaintiff also points out that decedent MacEachern is alleged to have been holding the knife in his right hand even though he was left-handed. In response to photographic evidence presented by Defendants showing a knife next to MacEachern after the shooting, Plaintiff also directs the Court to fingerprint testing that was conducted on the knife that did not pick up any latent fingerprints on the knife. Though these facts are not disputed, Plaintiff also emphasizes that Thompson was wearing a bulletproof vest and had a button on his belt that could have opened the door of his police vehicle, releasing his dog. Further, other officers were on their way to the scene. It is also undisputed that MacEachern, a white male in his mid-fifties, was homeless.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The Court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1992). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, but it need not disprove the other party's case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out that the non-moving party has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.1990).

Once the moving party meets its burden, the "adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Furthermore, a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by making assertions in its legal papers. There must be specific, admissible evidence identifying the basis for the dispute. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir.1982). The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the opposing party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a claim for deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory rights under the color of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any [law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at...