Macey v. Rozbicki

• Citation: 18 N.Y.2d 289,221 N.E.2d 380,274 N.Y.S.2d 591
• Parties: , 221 N.E.2d 380 Jean MACEY, Appellant, v. Rita ROZBICKI et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 20 October 1966
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 591

274 N.Y.S.2d 591

18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380

Jean MACEY, Appellant, v. Rita ROZBICKI et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 20, 1966.

Sherwood E. Freed, Buffalo, for appellant.

Stephen R. Cochrane, Buffalo, for respondents.

DESMOND, Chief Judge.

The question of law is: should there be applied to this personal injury negligence suit the law of the place of the wrong, which would be Ontario's 'guest statute' (Ontario Rev.Stat.1960, ch. 172, § 105 subd. 2) or should the applicable law be held to be that of New York State? As explained in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963)), the Ontario act immunizes an automobile owner or driver as against liability for personal injury to or death of his passenger, while New York's substantive law contains no bar to such liabilities. Our immediate problem is to assign this present case to the categories covered by Babcock-Jackson where New York law was used, or to those situations governed by Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965)). In both Babcock-Jackson and Dym-Gordon, the accident occurred outside New York State, the injured guest and the driver were both New Yorkers, and the automobile was licensed, usually garaged and presumably insured in New York State.

The principal fact difference between Babcock and Dym (supra) were these: the Babcock week-end automobile trip began in this State and but for the accident would have ended here, whereas Mrs. Dym was a guest in Mr. Gordon's car on a short ride between two places in Colorado with no prior arrangement therefor having been made in New York. In the Dym case both parties, though domiciled in New York, were temporary residents (summer students at a university) of Colorado, and had arrived in Colorado at different times.

With the Babcock and Dym facts (supra) as background, we examine the factual situation in this lawsuit. Plaintiff Macey is a sister of defendant-driver Rita Rozbicki and sister-in-law of defendant-owner Vincent Rozbicki. All three lived in Buffalo but the Rozbickis had a summer residence at Waverly Beach, Ontario, just across the Niagara River from Buffalo. In late June, 1962, plaintiff went from Buffalo to the summer place to stay with her relatives for about 10 days. A week later, riding as a passenger in the Rozbicki automobile, she was injured in a collision in a Canadian village near the Waverly Beach house. The parties had intended to drive on a Canadian highway to Niagara Falls, Ontario, and to return to Waverly Beach. Defendants' answer pleaded the Ontario guest statute as a complete defense, which plaintiff moved to dismiss for insufficiency. Defendants countered with a motion for summary judgment. Special Term, concluding that Babcock-Jackson (supra) did not control, gave judgment for defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. We agree with the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division that New York law is to be applied in this case.

The Babcock rule (supra) is that in such conflict situations controlling effect is to be given 'to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation' (12 N.Y.2d p. 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d p. 749, 191 N.E.2d p. 283). The Babcock facts which pursuant to this rule dictated that New York law be used were that the parties were New Yorkers, that the car was garaged, licensed and insured in this State and that the journey began and ended in New York. In the present case the relationship of two sisters living permanently in New York was not affected or changed by their temporary meeting together in Canada for a short visit there, especially since the arrangements for that visit had undoubtedly been made in New York State. Every fact in this case was New York related, save only the not particularly significant one that the particular trip on the day of the accident was between two points in Canada. The important 'contacts' here were all with New York State, not Ontario.

The Dym decision (supra), as the majority Dym opinion clearly states, 'represents no departure from the rule announced in Babcock; merely an example of its application' (16 N.Y.2d p. 128, 262 N.Y.S.2d p. 469, 209 N.E.2d p. 796). The notable differences between the Babcock situation and that in Dym was that in the latter the parties had separately gone to Colorado for a comparatively long stay, that there had been no arrangement made in New York for their meeting in Colorado, but merely a chance encounter in Colorado and a casual invitation to Mrs. Dym to ride in Gordon's car to a place where they were both going. The principal situs of the relationship was in Colorado.

The order appealed from should be reversed, with costs in all courts, defendants' motion denied and plaintiff's motion to strike the defense granted.

KEATING, Judge (concurring).

I concur for reversal, but on entirely different grounds from those stated by the Chief Judge.

Rita and Vincent Rozbicki, the defendants in this action, are New York domiliciaries residing in the City of Buffalo. They own and maintain a summer home at Waverly Beach, in the Province of Ontario, Canada.

The Rozbickis had moved into their Ontario home on the 15th day of May in the summer of 1962. On the 29th day of June, the plaintiff, Jean Macey, a sister of the defendant, Rita Rozbicki, came to the defendants' home in Ontario for at least a 10-day visit. On the date of the accident, July 6, the plaintiff and the defendant Rita Rozbicki left the Rozbicki home in Waverly Beach and drove to Fort Erie, Ontario, to attend Mass. After Mass and while the defendant was driving the automobile, owned by her husband, it became involved in a collision with another vehicle owned and operated by a Canadian. The plaintiff who was seriously injured in the collision returned to her home in New York and thereafter commenced an action against the defendants asserting that the accident occurred as a result of the negligent operation of the Rozbicki vehicle.

The automobile was insured in New York and hence the defendant Rozbicki paid for and received coverage for Any liability resulting from the negligent operation of his automobile.

The Legislature sometime ago enacted a compulsory insurance law. The purpose of that enactment is outlined in section 310 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which states that: 'The legislature is concerned over the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and the suffering and loss thereby inflicted. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that motorists shall be financially able to respond in damages for their negligent acts, so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them.' Neither this declaration of policy nor the standard required provisions for an auto liability insurance policy make any distinction between guests, pedestrians or other injured parties. Nor is there any provision indicating that the legislative concern extended only to those injured within the political lines that separate New York from her sister States and the Canadian Provinces. (Insurance Law, Consol.Laws, c. 28, § 167, subd. 2.) Indeed, section 311 (subd. 4) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71 provides that every automobile liability insurance policy issued under the compulsory insurance act shall provide insurance 'against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages * * * arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, or operation of (said) motor vehicle * * * within the state of New York, or elsewhere where in the United States in North America or the Dominion of Canada'.

Keeping in mind this strong and unequivocal declaration of public policy, we must decide whether any reason in law, logic or policy exists for denying this injured New York resident recovery against this negligent tort-feasor.

The defendants urge us, as they have successfully urged the two courts below, to disregard the mandate of our Legislature and deny recovery because the Province of Ontario where the accident occurred proscribes all tort actions by a guest-passenger against a host-driver. Although we specifically rejected this argument in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, the defendant asserts that that case is not controlling here because 'the relationship of guest and host was created in Canada * * * because the parties were remaining in Canada (for more than a week end) * * * (and) the accident with the other car was in Canada'. These distinguishing factors are presumably of such import, the defendants tell us, that it is our duty to ignore New York law.

In Babcock v. Jackson (supra) we refused to apply the Ontario guest statute where both parties were residents of New York and the automobile was insured here. The parties had been on a week-end trip through the Province when the automobile in which they were traveling crashed into a stone wall. We found that the purpose of the Ontario statute was to protect Ontario insurers from fraudulent claims by guests against hosts which in turn resulted in increased premium rates to purchasers of insurance in Ontario. However, since the car was insured in New York by a New York insurer and since the parties were both New York residents and the suit had been commenced in our courts it became obvious that Ontario had no real interest in the application of its law. And we, therefore, found no sound reason for ignoring the mandate of the supreme law and policy-making body of this State.

In determining which law should govern cases involving the guest statute of a foreign jurisdiction and whether a particular State has an interest in the application of its law it seems to me to be of no more than minor significance where the guest-host relationship...