MacFarlane v. Walter
| Decision Date | 05 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-35725.,97-35725. |
| Citation | 179 F.3d 1131 |
| Parties | Donald MACFARLANE and James Fogle, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Kay WALTER and Kenneth Ducharme, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
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James E. Lobsenz, Carney Badley Smith & Spellman, Seattle, Washington, for the petitioners-appellants and Meredith Rountree, Law Office of Meredith Martin Rountree, Seattle, Washington, for Petitioners-Appellants.
Donna H. Mullen, Office of General Counsel, Corrections Division, Olympia, Washington, for the Respondents-Appellees.
Before: SKOPIL, REINHARDT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
The panel has voted to deny Appellees' petition for rehearing. Judge Reinhardt and Judge Graber have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Skopil has recommended denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
The opinion is amended as follows:
(1) At Slip Op. 4197, second paragraph, line 4:
"one-third" is changed to "one-quarter"
(2) At Slip Op. 4197, second paragraph, line 6:
"two days" is changed to "three days"
(3) At Slip Op. 4198, top paragraph, line 1:
"two-thirds" is changed to "three-quarters" and the citation to In re Williams is deleted
(4) At Slip Op. 4198, top paragraph, line 3:
"five days" is changed to "six days"
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last sentence is deleted ("Accordingly ... would be superfluous")
(6) At Slip Op. 4199, top paragraph, line 2:
"2" is changed to "3"
(7) At Slip Op. 4199, top paragraph, line 16:
"approximately a third as much as" is changed to "less than half that which"
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"20" is changed to "30" and "51" is changed to "34"
(9) At Slip Op. 4200, lines 11-12:
"nearly triple the" is changed to "double the" and n. 7 is deleted
(10) At Slip Op. 4201, top paragraph, line 3:
"20 served" is changed to "30 served" and "72 days" is changed to "48 days"
(11) At Slip Op. 4201, top paragraph, line 5:
"nearly triple" is changed to "more than double"
(12) At Slip Op 4210, top paragraph, line 9:
"33 days" is changed to "16 days"
(13) At Slip Op. 4210, top paragraph, line 12:
"47 days" is changed to "23 days"
(14) At Slip Op. 4212, second paragraph is amended to read as follows:
MacFarlane and Fogle also challenge the counties' good-performance policies, which raise the same constitutional question as the good-conduct policies, but require a different answer.
(15) At Slip Op. 4213, line 3:
"it is their" is deleted
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"that" is deleted
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(18) At Slip Op. 4213, lines 25-33:
sentence is deleted ("In addition ... given the statutory maximum")
Petitioners Donald MacFarlane ("MacFarlane") and James Fogle ("Fogle") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials Kay Walter and Kenneth Ducharme in petitioners' consolidated 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petitions. MacFarlane's and Fogle's state habeas petitions alleged that the Pierce and Clark County Jails' "early release," or "good conduct" and "good performance," policies, as applied to them, violate equal protection and due process. These early-release policies prevent county pre-sentence detainees, such as MacFarlane and Fogle, who are unable to afford bail and are ultimately sentenced to a state facility operated by the Department of Corrections, from earning the same early-release credit as prisoners who are financially able to post bail and thus serve their entire sentences in a state facility. We must determine whether the Washington courts' denial of MacFarlane's and Fogle's petitions was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because we conclude that the denial was contrary to clearly established federal law, we reverse in part, and affirm in part, the decision of the district court, and order that the petitioners' writs of habeas corpus be granted.
The State of Washington operates a determinate sentencing system, under which persons convicted of felonies receive a sentence of a specific number of months based upon a sentencing grid contained in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. Wash. Rev.Code Chapter 9.94A. When a sentence exceeds twelve months, the prisoner must serve the sentence in a state facility. RCW 9.94A.190(1). Prior to sentencing, however, many prisoners who are ultimately confined in a state facility serve time in a county jail because they have not posted, or have been denied, bail. The time actually served in county jail as pre-trial detainees is ultimately credited against their sentences.
In addition to being reduced for time served, a sentence imposed under the Sentencing Reform Act is reduced when a prisoner is credited with early-release time, either for good conduct or for good performance. In In re Mota, 114 Wash.2d 465, 472, 788 P.2d 538 (1990), the Washington Supreme Court held that equal protection requires that all prisoners be eligible for early-release credit for time served, both in pre-sentence detention and post-sentence incarceration. Mota did not, however, concern the issue presented here—whether all prisoners must be eligible for the same amount of early-release credit. The Washington legislature, in accordance with In re Mota, authorized correctional agencies, both state and county, to develop procedures for implementing a system of granting early-release credit. Wash. Rev.Code 9.94A.150(1). Pursuant to the statutory mandate, the Department of Corrections, whose policies apply only in state facilities, and the authorities who operate the county jails, have developed independent early-release credit policies. Ultimately, however, in the case of prisoners like MacFarlane and Fogle, who are considered to have served part of their sentences in a county jail and part in a state facility, it is the Department of Corrections which must compute the total amount of early-release credits to be applied to their sentences, combining the amount of early-release credit certified by the county jail with the amount of early-release credit accumulated at the state facility. See In re Williams, 121 Wash.2d 655, 658-59, 853 P.2d 444 (1993).
The Department of Corrections' early-release credit system, applicable in state facilities, consists of two types of credit: good conduct and good performance.1 A prisoner in a state facility can earn good-conduct credit of up to one-quarter of his sentence—a prisoner, that is, can earn one day of good-conduct credit for every three days served. In other words, a prisoner who earns the maximum credit serves only three-quarters of the sentence imposed. In addition, a prisoner can earn good performance credit of up to one day for every six days served, if he participates in work, academic, or treatment programs. The Department of Corrections then combines the total good-conduct and good-performance credit to determine the final sentence reduction, but only up to the statutory maximum of one-third of the imposed sentence. Wash. Rev.Code 9.94A.150(1).
The Clark County Jail and Pierce County Detention and Corrections Center (the county jails at issue in this case) used tiered credit systems to award early release credits at the time the petitions were filed: All general population inmates (like MacFarlane and Fogle) were eligible for good-conduct credit at a rate of 15% of their sentences.2 This means, of course, that they were able to earn substantially less good-time credit than prisoners confined in state facilities. Specifically, as construed by the Washington Supreme Court, the counties' policies provided that detainees received 1 day of credit for every 5-2/3 days of good conduct, instead of 1 for every 3.3 Some inmates can also receive additional good-performance credit through work programs. When the credit from the good-conduct and performance programs is combined, Clark County Jail allows inmates to achieve a maximum early-release credit of 30% of the sentence, and Pierce County Jail allows up to either 30% or 20%, depending on the type of work or other program involved. However, because pre-sentence detainees are not eligible to participate in work or other good performance programs, see In re Fogle, 128 Wash.2d 56, 63, 904 P.2d 722 (1995), they can earn only good-conduct and not good-performance credit. Accordingly, the maximum early-release time that can be earned by pre-sentence detainees, such as Fogle and MacFarlane, in these county jails is less than half that which can be earned by defendants who are able to post bail and begin to serve their time in a state facility after sentencing.4
Fogle and MacFarlane were unable to afford to post bail because of indigence and were, therefore, detained in county jails prior to trial and sentencing.5In re Fogle, 128 Wash.2d at 63, 904 P.2d 722. Both Fogle and MacFarlane received the maximum 15% good-conduct credit as general population county jail prisoners. Neither was eligible to participate in any program that would have allowed him to accumulate good-performance credit in the county jails. Fogle spent 102 pre-sentence days in the Pierce County Jail on a 60-month sentence and received 17 days of early-release time upon transfer to the state facility.6 Had Fogle posted bail, not been held in custody until after sentencing, and then been committed to the state facility after sentencing, he would have earned 10 days for every 30 served, or 34 days of early-release credit for his good conduct during his initial period of custody, or double the time he was credited with by the county jail. MacFarlane spent 144 pre-sentence days in the Clark...
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