Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n

• Decision Date: 29 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1019.,13–1019.
• Citation: 575 U.S. 480,135 S.Ct. 1645,191 L.Ed.2d 607
• Parties: MACH MINING, LLC, Petitioner v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

575 U.S. 480
135 S.Ct. 1645
191 L.Ed.2d 607

MACH MINING, LLC, Petitioner
v.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.

No. 13–1019.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 13, 2015.
Decided April 29, 2015.

Thomas C. Goldstein, Bethesda, MD, for Petitioner.

Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

R. Lance Witcher, David L. Schenberg, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., St. Louis, MO, Thomas C. Goldstein, Counsel of Record, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD, for Petitioner.

P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler, Acting Associate General Counsel, Gail S. Coleman, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Solicitor General, Nicole A. Saharsky, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Before suing an employer for discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) must try to remedy unlawful workplace practices

575 U.S. 483

through informal methods of conciliation. This case requires us to decide whether and how courts may review those efforts. We hold that a court may review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit. But we find that the scope of that review is narrow, thus recognizing the EEOC's extensive discretion to determine the kind and amount of communication with an employer appropriate in any given case.

I

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., sets out a detailed, multi-step procedure through which the Commission enforces the statute's prohibition on employment discrimination. The process generally starts when "a person claiming to be aggrieved" files a charge of an unlawful workplace practice with the EEOC. § 2000e–5(b). At that point, the EEOC notifies the employer of the complaint and undertakes an investigation. See ibid. If the Commission finds no "reasonable cause" to think that the allegation has merit, it dismisses the charge and notifies the parties. Ibid. The complainant may then pursue her own lawsuit if she chooses. See § 2000e–5(f)(1).

If, on the other hand, the Commission finds reasonable cause, it must first "endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 2000e–5(b). To ensure candor in those discussions, the statute limits the disclosure and use of the participants' statements: "Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors" may be publicized by the Commission or "used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned." Ibid. The statute leaves to the EEOC the ultimate decision whether to accept a settlement or instead to bring a lawsuit. So long as "the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation

575 U.S. 484

agreement acceptable to the Commission" itself, the

135 S.Ct. 1650

EEOC may sue the employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

This case began when a woman filed a charge with the EEOC claiming that petitioner Mach Mining, LLC, had refused to hire her as a coal miner because of her sex. The Commission investigated the allegation and found reasonable cause to believe that Mach Mining had discriminated against the complainant, along with a class of women who had similarly applied for mining jobs. See App. 15. In a letter announcing that determination, the EEOC invited both the company and the complainant to participate in "informal methods" of dispute resolution, promising that a Commission representative would soon "contact [them] to begin the conciliation process." Id., at 16. The record does not disclose what happened next. But about a year later, the Commission sent Mach Mining a second letter, stating that "such conciliation efforts as are required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful" and that any further efforts would be "futile." Id., at 18–19.

The EEOC then sued Mach Mining in federal district court alleging sex discrimination in hiring. The Commission's complaint maintained that "[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit"—including an attempt to end the challenged practice through conciliation—"ha[d] been fulfilled." Id., at 22. In its answer, Mach Mining contested that statement, asserting that the EEOC had failed to "conciliat[e] in good faith" prior to filing suit. Id., at 30.

The Commission subsequently moved for summary judgment on that issue, contending that its "conciliation efforts are not subject to judicial review." Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 3:11–cv–00879 (SD Ill.), p. 1. At most, the Commission argued, the court could inspect the EEOC's two letters to Mach Mining to confirm that the EEOC had met its duty to attempt conciliation. See id., at 11, 19. Mach Mining responded by urging the court to consider the overall "reasonable[ness]" of the EEOC's efforts, based on evidence the company would present about the conciliation process.

575 U.S. 485

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in No. 3:11–cv–00879 (SD Ill.), p. 20. The trial court agreed with Mach Mining that it should review whether the Commission had made "a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate." Civ. No. 11–879 (S.D.Ill., Jan. 28, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a, 2013 WL 319337, *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the EEOC's request, the court then authorized an immediate appeal of its ruling. See Civ. No. 11–879 (S.D.Ill., May 20, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a–55a, 2013 WL 2177770, *5–*6 ; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that "the statutory directive to attempt conciliation" is "not subject to judicial review." 738 F.3d 171, 177 (2013). According to the court, that provision entrusts conciliation "solely to the EEOC's expert judgment" and thus provides no "workable standard" of review for courts to apply. Id., at 174, 177. The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that judicial review of the conciliation process would "undermine enforcement of Title VII" by "protract[ing] and complicat[ing]" discrimination suits. Id., at 178–179 (quoting Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 710 (C.A.7 2006) ). In its concluding paragraph, however, the court indicated that it had in fact subjected the EEOC's activities to a smidgen of review: Because the Commission "pled on the face of its complaint that it ha[d] complied with all" prerequisites to suit and because its two letters to Mach Mining were "facially sufficient" to show that conciliation had occurred, the

135 S.Ct. 1651

court stated, "our review of [that process] is satisfied." 738 F.3d, at 184.

Other Courts of Appeals have held that Title VII allows judicial review of the EEOC's conciliation efforts, but without agreeing on what that review entails.¹ We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2872, 189 L.Ed.2d 831 (2014), to address whether and to what

575 U.S. 486

extent such an attempt to conciliate is subject to judicial consideration.

II

Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to federal agencies. For that reason, this Court applies a "strong presumption" favoring judicial review of administrative action. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). That presumption is rebuttable: It fails when a statute's language or structure demonstrates that Congress wanted an agency to police its own conduct. See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 349, 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). But the agency bears a "heavy burden" in attempting to show that Congress "prohibit [ed] all judicial review" of the agency's compliance with a legislative mandate. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975).

Title VII, as the Government acknowledges, imposes a duty on the EEOC to attempt conciliation of a discrimination charge prior to filing a lawsuit. See Brief for Respondent 20. That obligation is a key component of the statutory scheme. In pursuing the goal of "bring[ing] employment discrimination to an end," Congress chose "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance" as its "preferred means." Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner–Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) ). Accordingly, the statute provides, as earlier noted, that the Commission "shall endeavor to eliminate [an] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 2000e–5(b) ; see supra, at 1649. That language is mandatory, not precatory. Cf. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (noting that the word "shall" admits of no discretion). And the duty it...