Machado v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & RS OF STATE OF FLA.
Decision Date | 06 April 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1843-Civ-CA.,72-1843-Civ-CA. |
Citation | 357 F. Supp. 890 |
Parties | Jose MACHADO et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES OF the STATE OF FLORIDA and Emmett S. Roberts, Individually and as Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Alfred Feinberg, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs.
Chester G. Senf, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.
Before DYER, Circuit Judge, and ATKINS and ROETTGER, District Judges.
This cause came before the Court for a hearing on plaintiffs' prayer to declare unconstitutional and permanently enjoin the operation of F.S.A. § 409.266(1)(b).1 The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, Sections 1343(3), 2201, 2202, 2281, and 2284; the cause of action is premised on Title 42, Section 1983. The provision challenged reads in pertinent part:
The suit was filed on behalf of several plaintiffs who had been refused certification to participate in the Medicaid Program. Although they could not be certain as to the reason for refusal, this statute appeared to offer at least one possible justification—a justification that the plaintiffs allege should not exist.
At the hearing, however, the testimony offered by the defendant purported to show that since the Zarate v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 347 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D.Fla.1971), aff'd, Satte Dept. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 2462, 32 L.Ed.2d 803 (1972), decision in November of 1971, the department has not used this statutory provision to prevent otherwise categorically indigent aliens who ordinarily would be eligible to receive Medicaid from qualifying under the Medicaid program. The director of the program stated on the stand that he considered the subsection a "dead letter". It was further established that the only otherwise eligible individuals prevented from participating in the Medicaid program after November of 1971 were a select group of persons defined as "refugees"2 who were covered by similar benefits available under the Cuban Refugee Assistance Program.
1) The only real question before this Court is whether the plaintiffs have a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, or standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in question. An identically worded subsection of another statute has previously been declared unconstitutional by a Three Judge Court from this district in Zarate, supra.
The court finds that there is a case or controversy in the present action. Without belaboring the point, this question is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review". Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). No purpose would be accomplished if this Court refused the relief requested—the provision is clearly unconstitutional and we should eliminate the possibility of it being used to refuse eligibility to otherwise qualified individuals. Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L. Ed.2d 214 (1969).
the opinion indicated that remanding the case to the District Court with leave to amend the complaint, rather than remanding with orders to dismiss, was appropriate since the "appellants may wish to amend their complaint so as to demonstrate that the repealed statute retains some continuing force . . . ." 404 U.S. at 414, 92 S.Ct. at 576. In this instance the statute has not been repealed; the "public interest" requires this Court to lay to rest any "continuing force" the statute possesses. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), and Ihrke v. Northern States Power Company, 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
2) A determination that the plaintiffs have standing must be made by applying the facts of this case to tests set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed.2d 184 (1970). Have the plaintiffs alleged "that the challenged action has caused them injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and are the interests sought to be protected "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"? 397 U.S. at 152, 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed.2d 947 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973), and Johnson v. Morton, 456 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1972). The complaint clearly meets both the tests set forth by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs allege that they "are State Welfare recipients (Old Age Assistance)" who have been refused certification to participate in the "Florida Medicaid Program," making the alleged injury "economic" in the literal sense. There can be no question but that they have interests within the necessary "zone".
The subsection complained of is clearly unconstitutional. Counsel for the defendant admitted that there was no case law to support his position. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Zarate v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 347 F.Supp. 1004 (S. D.Fla.1971), aff'd, State Dept. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 2462, 32 L.Ed.2d 803 (1972). A stipulation as to this aspect of the case could have been reached by both parties, except that the only person authorized to stipulate to the unconstitutionality of a Florida statute is the Attorney General of Florida, and he of course was not a party.
This Court is of course aware of the precedent for such retroactive payments in special situations: Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973); Zarate, supra. But see Rothstein...
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