Machesney v. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | 162 |
| Citation | 252 Pa. 225,97 A. 397 |
| Parties | Machesney v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville Railroad Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 25, 1915
Appeal, No. 162, Oct. T., 1915, by defendants, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1913, No. 2316, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Caroline J. Machesney v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville Railroad Company, a corporation, now merged into Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company in Pennsylvania. Reversed.
Appeal from the award of viewers. Before EVANS, J.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Verdict for plaintiff for $38,994.00 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were the various rulings on evidence referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The judgment of the court below is reversed with a venire facias de novo.
John G Buchanan, with him William Watson Smith and Ralph Longenecker, for appellant.
B. J Jarrett, with him Willis F. McCook, for appellee.
Before BROWN, C.J., MESTREZAT, POTTER, MOSCHZISKER and FRAZER, JJ.
The plaintiff secured a verdict for damages suffered through the appropriation by the defendant, under its right of eminent domain, of certain real estate belonging to her; judgment was entered accordingly, and the defendant has appealed.
The property was formally appropriated and the defendant's bond filed on January 12, 1907. Viewers were not appointed until 1913, and the trial on the appeal from their report, taken by the defendant company, did not occur till April 26, 1915. At this trial a blue-print was offered, "showing the plaintiff's property and the portion thereof appropriated," which was accepted in evidence without objection. Subsequently a second blueprint was offered and accepted, under objection and exception to the defendant, and rulings relating thereto are complained of in two assignments of error, which we shall now consider in connection with another assignment. When a certain witness for the plaintiff was upon the stand, he testified that a construction, known as a "crib," had recently been built out into the river upon which plaintiff's property fronted; whereupon counsel for the defendant objected to "the testimony in regard to any structures that have been built since the day of the condemnation, which was January 12, 1907." Notwithstanding this objection, the witness was permitted to testify that the building of the crib "improved" the property. This is the matter covered by the first assignment of error. When upon the stand, the witness had before him the second blue-print, and this subsequently was offered in evidence, "in connection with his testimony." The offer was promptly objected to, but, before the objection was ruled upon, the witness said that "the map showed the crib recently built by the United States . . ., in 1912." The objection to the map was then renewed, for the reason, inter alia, "because it showed improvements that had been made since the condemnation in this case." The objection was overruled and an exception noted. This is the matter complained of in the second assignment. Later in the trial, a real estate expert called by the defendant was permitted to testify, on cross-examination, under objection and exception, as follows: This is the matter complained of in the eighth assignment.
The jury viewed the premises and saw the "crib" referred to in the testimony, and the court below thought that, for this reason, the evidence complained of in the first two assignments was permissible; but we do not know why the testimony covered by the eighth assignment was admitted. When, in cases of this kind, the jury pay a visit of inspection, if a physical change in the immediate surroundings apparently affecting the property in question appears upon the view, and the change, in point of fact, took place after the date of the appropriation, then, and in such a case, if the trial judge deems it essential in order to avoid confusion, it is permissible for either party to show the fact that such change actually occurred after the property was taken by the defendant; but, ordinarily, evidence upon the point should not be permitted to go further than just indicated. We see nothing in the present case to justify a departure from this rule, and we can appreciate how it is quite possible that here the failure to confine the proofs to the condition of the property at or about the time of the appropriation might well have harmed the defendant. We say this, for nowhere in the...
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