Macias v. N.M. Dep't of Labor
Decision Date | 31 March 2014 |
Docket Number | No. CIV 91-0509 JB/WPL,CIV 91-0509 JB/WPL |
Parties | OSCAR MACIAS; LEONARDO GALLEGOS; MANUEL DELGADO; HIPOLITO GAONA; JESUS CANO; UNION DE TRABAJADORES AGRICOLAS FRONTERIZOS; JOSE ANGEL ORTIZ, and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and PATRICK BACA, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
Court | United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Defendant New Mexico Department of Labor's Motion to Reopen Matter and Amend Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement, filed March 21, 2013 (Doc. 105)("Motion to Reopen"); and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Putative Motion to Amend/Correct Settlement Agreement by New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions, Doc. No. 105, filed April 10, 2013 (Doc. 108)("MTD"). The Court held a hearing on November 7, 2013. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion filed pursuant to a term of a settlement agreement, where the underlying federal case was dismissed with prejudice in 1992; (ii) whether the Court should grant the Motion to Reopen pursuant to the stock provisions rule 60(b), rather than the custom provisions of the settlement agreement; (iii) whether the Court would have subject-matter jurisdiction over the substance of the Motion to Reopen if it were re-filed as anindependent action; and (iv) whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff non-movant Union de Trabajadores Agricolas Fronterizos ("UTAF"), where process was recently served solely on the lawyer who represented them in the case twenty years ago. The Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the Motion to Reopen under its terms, because the order of dismissal in the case did not retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement. The Court will then style the Motion to Reopen as a motion pursuant to rule 60(b), conclude that it is time-barred and, regardless, satisfies none of the grounds justifying relief under that provision, and deny the Motion to Reopen. The Court will reserve judgment on whether it would have subject-matter jurisdiction over a future independent cause of action on the settlement agreement, because that question is not presently before the Court; it will, however, briefly outline the findings it would need to make to establish possible diversity jurisdiction over the dispute. Last, the Court will avoid the issue of personal jurisdiction: it is not necessary to the disposition of the case, which can be resolved on subject-matter jurisdiction; the Court lacks key facts needed to evaluate whether UTAF's putative attorney -- who represented it twenty years ago, but who has little contact with it now -- is a proper service recipient for UTAF under rule 5(b)(1); and, if the parties were to litigate this dispute as a new case, the factual circumstances and legal standards attendant to the personal jurisdiction issue would be so different from those presented here that the Court's holding would be of little practical use to them. The Court denies the Motion to Reopen, and denies the MTD as moot. The Court will leave the final judgment and all orders entered in the case intact.
Agreement ¶ 15, at 8. The parties then filed a Joint Motion of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed June 16, 1992 (Doc. 88), stating that, "upon approval of the Court of the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice," the Agreement "shall henceforth bind the parties regarding the issues contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement," id. ¶ 1, at 1. The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, United States District Judge, entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed June 22, 1992 (Doc. 89), available on CM/ECF as Exhibit C to the Reply to New Mexico Department of Labor's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 108 (Doc. 111-3)("Order"), in which he stated "[t]hat the terms and conditions contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement are hereby binding upon the parties," Order ¶ 2, at 1.
For over twenty years, NMDOL abided by the Agreement and maintained a physical office in Sunland Park. See Motion to Reopen ¶ 22, at 4. In mid-2012, a representative of NMDOL contacted Ms. Simmons to ask if she "still represent[s] Oscar Macias, et al.," and, if so, whether the Plaintiffs would consent to NMDOL exercising the Agreement's contingency provision and closing its office in Sunland Park. Electronic Mail Transmission from Jason Dean to Nancy Simmons at 1-2, filed April 10, 2013 (Doc. 108-2)("Dean Email"). See Motion to Reopen ¶ 24, at 4. Ms. Simmons had resigned from TRLA in 1993, after the signing of the Agreement and the entry of the subsequent Order, but before the resolution of the final claim in the case, apparently withdrawing her representation at that time. See MTD ¶¶ 5-6, at 3. NMDOL contacted Ms. Simmons, rather than another TRLA lawyer, in part because CM/ECF"apparently automatically changes the address for counsel in a closed case, such that counsel appears in her own name, rather than as an employee of TRLA, as 'lead attorney' for UTAF in this closed case." MTD ¶ 6, at 3. Ms. Simmons replied that she "no longer represent[s] Mr. Macias, but [she] do[es] represent Sin Fronteras,4 the representative plaintiff." Dean Email at 2 (emphasis added). Ms. Simmons then consulted with UTAF and relayed to NMDOL that "[her] client does not consent to the motion." Electronic Mail Transmission from Tami Keating to Nancy Simmons, filed April 10, 2013 (Doc. 108-3)("Keating Email"). She also stated that, "[o]nce the motion is filed, [she would] accept a copy of the motion as a courtesy, and [NMDOL is] welcome to list [her] on the certificate of service for the motion, but this should not be deemed acceptance of personal service on [her] client." Keating Email at 5.
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