MacIntosh v. Brunswick Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 479,479 |
| Citation | 241 Md. 24,215 A.2d 222 |
| Parties | Francis J. MacINTOSH v. BRUNSWICK CORPORATION. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Frank W. Wilson, Silver Spring (Wheeler, Moore & Korpeck, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellant.
Plummer M. Shearin and Patrick C. McKeever, Rockville (Shearin, McKeever & Fitzpatrick, Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.
Before PRESCOTT, C. J., and HAMMOND, HORNEY, OPPENHEIMER and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
This is an appeal by Francis J. MacIntosh (plaintiff-appellant or employee) from a lower court judgment granting a motion for a directed verdict made by Brunswick Corporation (defendant-appellee or employer) at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. Two questions are presented by the appeal: (i) whether the lower court erred in not granting a motion for summary judgment and (ii) whether the post-employment restraints proposed by the employer as a part of the employment contract were valid and enforceable against the employee.
As to the first question, which is relatively easy to determine, it seems to us that the lower court committed error in not granting one of the motions for summary judgment. The fact that the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment clearly indicates that they did not believe there was a genuine dispute between them as to any material fact. That this was so is also supported by the fact that on appeal both contend that a summary judgment should have been rendered, albeit each asserts that the motion should have been granted in his (its) favor. That there was no genuine dispute was further evidenced by the fact that the lower court judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case--thereby taking the factual determination of the case away from the jury. Finally, as a review of the records shows, it is obvious that the lower court should have entered judgment as a matter of law on the pleadings, the supporting and opposing offidavits and the exhibits pursuant to Maryland Rule 610 d.
The remaining problem as to which party was entitled to summary judgment poses the major question of whether the proposed post-employment restraints were valid and enforceable against the employee. While the decision of the question is a matter of law, a determination of it necessitates an understanding of the factual situation out of which the controversy arose.
In 1946, the plaintiff-appellant entered into the employment of the defendant-appellee--a manufacturer of recreation equipment doing a nation-wide business--as a counter salesman and, pursuant to an oral employment contract, received a straight weekly salary. He was subsequently promoted to a regular sales position in 1948 and came under a 'salary and bonus' pay arrangement by which he received a straight base salary and, in addition, incentive or 'bonus' compensation computed on the aggregate amount of sales in excess of a stipulated quota based on the volume of sales necessary to cover basic selling costs. The payment of bonus compensation was made once each year as soon as possible after the end of the year in which the bonus had been earned. During the period of his employment, the employee served in several different sales positions but continued to be paid under basically the same 'salary and bonus' plan until shortly before he was discharged by the employer.
In April of 1960 the plan was revised by the employer to the extent that (at the beginning of the year following the one in which the bonus had been earned) a salesman would receive only a portion of the bonus. This portion was the equivalent of the total salary earned during the previous year. And the balance was payable in five equal yearly installments beginning three years from the date of the original payment on account thereof: as a result the bonus would not be fully paid for eight years. The revision also provided that 'should the salesman engage in an occupation or perform an act or acts derogatory to the best interests of [the employer], the salesman * * * [would] lose all rights to future payments whether or not payments [had] commenced previously.' Although this revised plan was issued '4-14-60,' it was not stated when it would become effective and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the employer ever made any effort to implement it.
Subsequent to the revision in April of 1960, the employer issued another revision specifically concerning bonus payments to sales engineers--the classification of the job held by the employee at that time--which became effective on January 1, 1961. Its provisions were similar to the April revision except that the payment of the balance of the deferred bonus began, one year, instead of three, from the date of the payment of the nondeferred portion of the bonus. As in the prior revision, the balance was to be paid in five equal yearly installments. The employer concedes, however, that the record does not show that the employee was notified of either of these revisions until March of 1961. And the employee specifically denies having any knowledge thereof until that date.
In 1959, the employee had received a salary of $6,900.00 and in March in 1960 was paid the entire bonus of $14,237.76 he had earned for the year 1959 on sales exceeding his quota. In 1960, he again received a salary of $6,900.00 but, instead of being paid his entire bonus of $17,509.27 for that year as had been the practice in prior years, he received only an additional $6,900.00. This portion of the 1960 bonus was received on March 14, 1961, along with a letter from the employer explaining that the balance of the bonus, amounting to $10,609.27, was being withheld and deferred to be paid over the succeeding five years in equal installments. The letter further stated that----
'In the event you, either during or after your employment by the Company [tne employer] shall wilfully perform any act contrary to the welfare [or] best interest of the Company, you *...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co.
...preventing competition in Baltimore City for two years severed in its entirety as excessive in time and scope); MacIntosh v. Brunswick, 241 Md. 24, 27-31, 215 A.2d 222 (1965) (noncompetition clause voided in its entirety where area and duration were excessive). Faw, Casson claims that there......
-
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co.
...the employee to an economic loss designed to deter competition. See id. at 116, 285 A.2d at 638; see also MacIntosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 30, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965) (forfeiture of deferred bonus upon competition with former employer contained in revised bonus plan "constituted a......
-
Fowler v. Printers II, Inc.
...without supplementation or rearrangement of any language is entirely in accord with Maryland law. See, e.g., MacIntosh v. Brunswick, 241 Md. 24, 27-31, 215 A.2d 222 (1965); Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372 (1946); Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, 25 Md.App. at......
-
Dahl v. Brunswick Corp.
...policy statement regarding bonuses, ironically issued by this very same company, Brunswick Corporation, held, in MacIntosh v. Brunswick, 241 Md. 24, 30-31, 215 A.2d 222 (1965), that the provision of the directive which imposed certain post-employment restraints on employees was unenforceabl......