Macissac v. Town of Poughkeepsie

• Decision Date: 09 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09 CIV 02828–WGY.,09 CIV 02828–WGY.
• Citation: 770 F.Supp.2d 587
• Parties: Duncan P. MacISSAC, Jr., Plaintiff,v.TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE, John O'Rourke, Dattell Honkala, Craig Meisel, Jason Guy, and Edward Kolor, Police Officers sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

770 F.Supp.2d 587

Duncan P. MacISSAC, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE, John O'Rourke, Dattell Honkala, Craig Meisel, Jason Guy, and Edward Kolor, Police Officers sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 09 CIV 02828–WGY.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

March 9, 2011.

Michael Howard Sussman, Sussman & Watkins, Goshen, NY, for Plaintiff.David Lewis Posner, McCabe & Mack LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY, for Defendants.

Memorandum and Order

WILLIAM G. YOUNG, District Judge.¹I. INTRODUCTION

It is said that hard cases make bad law. This is a hard case. The plaintiff, Duncan P. MacIssac, Jr. (“MacIssac”), alleges that he was subject to the use of excessive force by five police officers, John O'Rourke, Dattell Honkala, Craig Meisel, Jason Guy, and Edward Kolor (collectively “the Officers”), who were employed by the Town of Poughkeepsie (“the Town”) and acting under color of state law. MacIssac seeks compensatory and punitive damages as against the Officers, compensatory damages and injunctive relief as against the Town, and attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. The Town now moves for dismissal of MacIssac's claim for an injunction on the ground that he lacks standing to sue for such equitable relief under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), and its progeny.

A. Alleged Facts

MacIssac is a resident of the City of Poughkeepsie.² Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. The Town is a municipal corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of New York. Id. ¶ 3. The Officers were employees of the Town on March 1, 2008. Id. ¶ 4.

On that date, MacIssac was operating his vehicle on a public highway in the Town. Id. ¶ 8. The Officers, wearing their police uniforms and operating police cruisers, stopped MacIssac's vehicle and arrested him on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).³ Id. ¶¶ 5, 9–10, MacIssac admits that both the stop and the arrest were undertaken with “arguable probable cause.” Id. ¶¶ 9–10.

While in police custody, but before he was handcuffed, MacIssac informed the Officers that he had back surgery scheduled for the following week and that he was suffering from low blood sugar. Id. ¶ 11(a).⁴ He contends that, after he was handcuffed, the Officers used a Taser stun gun on him three times; bent his back, arms, and legs in a manner that caused significant pain; and otherwise used excessive force beyond that needed to control him. Id. ¶ 11(b). He denies that he was resisting arrest, Id. ¶¶ 11(b)–12. The individual officers who did not directly apply excessive force to him watched and observed the conduct of their fellow officers without taking any affirmative step to prevent or stop it. Id. ¶ 13. The Officers' treatment of MacIssac was captured on a videotape with intermittent audio. Id. ¶ 15.

MacIssac claims that the Officers' excessive use of force against him was directly caused by the Town's failure adequately to train and supervise its police officers, including the five named defendants in this case. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. After the incident, MacIssac filed a complaint with the Town, but alleges that the Town neither disciplined the Officers nor retrained them in light of his complaint. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

B. Procedural History

On March 24, 2009, MacIssac filed a civil complaint against the Town and the Officers, alleging that the excessive use of force by the Officers and the Town's policies, practices, and customs (specifically its failure to train, supervise, and discipline its police officers) violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, made actionable by Section 1983. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. MacIssac claims that the Officers' conduct caused him to suffer significant pain, physical and mental injuries, anxiety, and a diminution in the enjoyment of life. Id. ¶ 20. In his prayer for relief, he seeks, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages, to “enjoin the defendant Town from failing to train, supervise and discipline its police officers and appoint a Master to supervise the proper implementation of constitutionally requisite practices.” Id. at 5. In essence, he asks this Court to order the Town to instruct its police officers not to use Taser stun guns when making otherwise peaceful stops and arrests.

On October 23, 2009, the Town filed a motion and supporting memorandum of law to dismiss only MacIssac's claim for injunctive relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Def.'s Mot. Partial Dismissal, ECF No. 17; Mem. Law Supp. Def.'s Mot. Partial Dismissal (“Def.'s Mem.”), ECF No. 17–5. MacIssac responded with a memorandum of law opposing the Town's motion, dated November 9, 2009. Pl.'s Mem. On November 19, 2009, the Town filed a reply memorandum of law in support of its motion. Def.'s Reply. The case was reassigned to this Court on July 29, 2010.

C. Federal Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, as this case arises under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.II. ANALYSISA. The Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is an appropriate mechanism for challenging a plaintiff's constitutional standing to bring a particular claim. See W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir.2008); Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 169 n. 3 (2d Cir.1999). “[s]tanding ... is intended to be a threshold issue at least tentatively decided at the outset of the litigation.” Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir.2009); see Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir.2008) (“Standing is ‘the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ ” (quoting Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir.2006))).

“Because ‘standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, [the Court must] accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’ ” Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir.1998)) (other internal quotation marks omitted); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). “[A]t the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be crafted with precise detail,” Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills, 701 F.Supp.2d 568, 581 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted), yet the plaintiff's “[s]tanding for an equitable claim must appear on the face of the complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F.Supp.2d 211, 221 (N.D.N.Y.2002) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)).

B. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief

To meet the “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, a plaintiff must establish that he has standing to bring suit. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Standing, broadly speaking, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543–44, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Formulated as a three-part test, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [he] has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

The third prong of this test—redressability—has been interpreted to mean that a plaintiff's standing depends on the form of relief requested. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185, 120 S.Ct. 693 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”)In seeking prospective relief like an injunction, a plaintiff must show that he can reasonably expect to encounter the same injury again in the future—otherwise there is no remedial benefit that he can derive from such judicial decree. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102–05, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (collecting cases). Past injury alone does not establish a present case or controversy for injunctive relief, O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96, 94 S.Ct. 669; Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir.1998). Rather, “the injury alleged must be capable of being redressed through injunctive relief ‘at that moment.’ ” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 938 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991)).

In Lyons, the seminal case on the issue of equitable standing, the plaintiff, Adolph Lyons, claimed that, during a traffic stop and without provocation or justification, Los Angeles police officers put him into a chokehold, which caused him to lose consciousness and suffer injury to his larynx. 461 U.S. at 97–98, 103 S.Ct. 1660. He sought injunctive relief against the City of Los Angeles to prevent its police squad from using chokeholds except where officers were reasonably threatened with the immediate use of deadly force. Id. at 98, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Despite Lyons's allegation that he justifiably feared being choked again, given the extensive use of chokeholds by the Los Angeles police, id., the Supreme Court held that the risk that he himself would come into contact with the police and suffer a subsequent unlawful chokehold was speculative in nature and insufficient to confer equitable standing, id. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660. For injunctive relief, “Lyons...