Mack v. Berghuis
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:08-CV-13204 |
| Parties | TONY MACK, Petitioner, v. MARY BERGHUIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Tony Mack pleaded guilty to one count of conducting a criminal enterprise, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.159i(1), four counts of uttering and publishing, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.249, and one count of driver's license forgery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.310(7)(a), in the Saginaw County Circuit Court and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 13 years four months to 20 years imprisonment, nine years four months to 14 years imprisonment, and six years eight months to 10 years imprisonment on those convictions in 2003.
In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims challenging the validity of his plea and sentences. Respondent, through the Michigan Attorney General's Office, has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denies a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner's convictions arise from his conduct in driving four co-defendants to Frankenmuth in Saginaw County, Michigan and Richville in Tuscola County, Michigan for the purpose of cashing fraudulent checks. Petitioner knew that each of his co-defendants would be passing bad checks. Petitioner also drove his cohorts to local offices of the Secretary of State so that they could falsely change their addresses on their driver's licenses and then open credit union accounts as if they were local residents. Petitioner tendered his plea on July 11, 2003. At the plea hearing, Petitioner stated that he was pleading guilty of his own free will and indicated that he understood the charges, as well as the terms and consequences of his plea. He acknowledged that there was no sentencing agreement and the trial court informed him of the maximum possible sentences for each charge. Petitioner confirmed that his plea was voluntary and that he had not been threatened or promised anything beyond what was stated on the record. The factual basis for the plea was entered into the record and agreed upon by the parties. The trial court accepted the plea, finding it to be knowing and voluntary.
Petitioner's sentencing hearing began on August 3, 2003, continued on other days, and concluded on September 10, 2003. During the course of those hearings, the prosecution presented law enforcement testimony which showed that Petitioner had used multiple identities and conducted similar fraudulent activities in other counties and other states and had recruited the co-defendants for his illegal enterprise. The prosecution requested an upward departure from the state sentencing guidelines. Petitioner challenged the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, opposed an upward departure from those guidelines, and requested a sentence in the 30-month range similar to his co-defendants. The trial court found that Petitioner's criminal conduct was not adequately covered by the sentencing guidelines and departed above the guideline range in sentencing him to the terms of imprisonment previously set forth.
Following his plea and sentencing, Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting several claims of error, including the same plea and sentencing claims raised on habeas review. The Michigan Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, but affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. See People v. Mack, No. 261912, 2006 WL 3826744 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006) (unpublished per curiam). Petitioner also filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. See People v. Mack, 479 Mich. 860, 735 N.W.2d 252 (2007).
Petitioner, through counsel, thereafter filed the instant petition raising the following claims:
I. He was deprived of his liberty without due process of law under the Constitution because his guilty plea was not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowing made when: (A) his attorney misled him to believe that he would receive a guideline sentence similar to his co-defendants; (B) he was in fact innocent of allegations that lead to his convictions of conducting a criminal enterprise and did not understand the plea; and (C) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest when his attorney represented a co-defendant.
II. His plea was not intelligently and adequately made because he pled guilty to conducting a criminal enterprise which the facts of the case did not legally support.
III. His sentences were imposed in violation of the Constitution because they were based upon: (A) inaccurate information; (B) alleged facts not admitted to by him or found beyond a reasonable doubt; and (C) prosecutorial misconduct.
IV. He is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit. Petitioner has filed a reply to that answer.
Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to'... clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in reme Court cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, ' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) "does not require citation of reme Court cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of reme Court cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. While the requirements of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by the holdings of the Supreme Court, the decisions of lower federal courts are useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court's resolution of an issue. See Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Additionally, a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
Lastly, when a state court fails to consider an issue or does not specifically address whether the alleged error constitutes a denial of a petitioner's federal constitutional rights, the deference due under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply, and habeas review of such a claim is de novo. See Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2006) ().
Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because his plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. Specifically, he claims that his attorney misled him to believe that he would receive a guideline sentence similar to his co-defendants, that he did not conduct a criminal enterprise and did not understand his plea, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest because his attorney represented a co-defendant.
When a petitioner is convicted as a result of a plea, habeas review is limited to whether the plea was made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (19...
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