Mack v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

• Decision Date: 21 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 02-30068-MAP.,CIV.A. 02-30068-MAP.
• Parties: Harold Omar MACK, Plaintiff v. The COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

204 F.Supp.2d 163

Harold Omar MACK, Plaintiff v. The COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al, Defendants

No. CIV.A. 02-30068-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 21, 2002.

Harold Omar Mack, Springfield, MA, Pro se.

ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

PONSOR, District Judge.

Upon de novo review, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Kenneth P. Neiman dated April 26, 2002 is hereby adopted, without objection. For the reasons stated, the complaint is ordered DISMISSED.

It is So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)¹

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Harold "Omar" Mack ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, has submitted for filing a complaint against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and numerous other individuals and entities. It appears from Plaintiff's twenty-nine page, rambling handwritten complaint that he is attempting to appeal his January 29, 2002 civil commitment to a state mental health facility. Plaintiff also complains of several particularized circumstances leading up to the commitment proceedings. Together with his complaint, Plaintiff has filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The court has determined that Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. Accordingly, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, summonses have not issued in order to allow the court to review Plaintiff's complaint to determine whether it satisfies the requirements of the federal in forma pauperis statute. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that it does not.

I. BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:

[O]n ... January 13, 2002, Plaintiff's [p]rescription medication was [d]elivered to ... [his][s]elf-directed [g]roup home .... [D]ue to Plaintiff's [p]rescription medication being maliciously take (sic) by [another resident], Plaintiff's mental [s]tate was seriously (NOT) adjusting to being without the medication .... (Sic.)

(Complaint at 15-16.) The complaint also states as follows:

On ... January 23, Plaintiff arrived ... for his weekly visit to his [t]herapist appointment with defendant, Amy Crysel [("Crysal")] ... While there, ... Crysel ... offered ... Plaintiff ... a cup of water from a water cooler located in [her] office. Plaintiff accepted the water, and began to sip the water. After Plaintiff dranked (sic) about a half of cup of water ... [he] started feeling very [s]edated. So Plaintiff told ... Crysel to call the police. She refused. So I asked [h]er what did [s]he put in the water. She said it's just water. She became very [n]ervous[;] ... her whole facial expression [c]hanged while walking back and [f]orth in her office. Then she ask (sic) me did [s]he want her to call the Psychiatric Crisis Center. Plaintiff said [y]es. While ... Crysel was on the phone to the Crisis Center, Plaintiff calapsed (sic) in the [c]hair, (NOT) being able to even [f]ocus on the conversation [b]eing discussed on the telephone by [h]er. (Sic.)

(Id. at 13 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).)

According to the complaint, Crysel's action began a chain of events which led to Plaintiff being taken to the Mercy Hospital emergency room and, thereafter, to the Providence Hospital Department of Psychiatry ("Providence"). On January 29, 2002, Providence filed in the Holyoke Division of the Massachusetts District Court a petition for a temporary commitment to a mental health facility pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. ch. 123, §§ 7 and 8. Plaintiff attaches a copy of the petition to the complaint.² Apparently, Plaintiff was in fact committed to Providence from where he tendered this complaint on March 19, 2002. (See Complaint at 2, 29.)

The complaint has three causes of action which allege as follows: that Plaintiff was "mis-diagnosed" at Mercy Hospital and, thus, "illegally" committed to Providence (First Cause of Action); that Crysel's actions in giving him a "[d]angerous [n]arcotic mixed with water" requires that she be arrested and prosecuted by the Massachusetts Attorney General on an attempted murder charge (Second Cause of Action); and that both Providence's President and a psychiatrist there "failed to provide Plaintiff adequate [m]edical, [p]sychiatric and [p]sychological [c]are" (Third Cause of Action). As a jurisdictional base, the complaint states that this court "has [g]eneral [j]urisdiction ... because the [a]cts [c]omplained of [o]ccurred in the United States, and all [p]arties are [c]itizens of the United States, and have their resident (sic) in the State of Massachusetts." (Complaint at 8.) In his civil cover sheet, Plaintiff describes the nature of his suit as a "tort," i.e., "personal injury" action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 1915 of title 28 requires a federal court to dismiss an action brought thereunder if the court determines that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Section 1915 also requires dismissal if the court is satisfied that the action is "frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A claim "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). "Where the court has no subject matter jurisdiction there is `no rational argument in law or fact' to support the claim for relief and the case must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)." Mobley v. Ryan, 2000 WL 1898856, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 29, 2000) (citing Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir.1985)). See Maldonado v. Maldonado, 1997 WL 786585 (E.D.Pa. Dec.11, 1997) (similar). See also Bolden v. Mixa, 2001 WL 1356133, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 31, 2001) (holding that where there is "no subject matter jurisdiction" in forma pauperis actions "must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)").³

III. DISCUSSION

The court will recommend that the complaint be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In making this recommendation, the court is aware that the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Moreover, the court has been scrupulous in reviewing the allegations insofar as they are made by a pro se complainant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). At bottom, however, even though the complaint mentions Plaintiff's "constitutional and civil rights," there is nothing in Plaintiff's three causes of action justifying their being brought in this federal forum.⁴

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is either a medical malpractice claim against care-givers at Mercy Hospital for their "mis-diagnos[is]" or an attempted appeal of his temporary commitment to Providence. If it is the former, then the questions raised therein are purely state-law based. See Dias v. Vose, 865 F.Supp. 53, 58 (D.Mass.1994) (applying precept that "mere negligence or medical malpractice has no constitutional dimension"), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1995). If it is the latter, then Plaintiff has appellate rights in the Massachusetts courts, see Mass. Gen. L. ch. 123, § 9(a), and this court cannot insert itself into such state proceedings, see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) (holding that "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions"). In either event, the First Cause of Action does not comprise a federal question suitable for review.

To be sure, on the very last page of the complaint—in his prayer for relief and twenty pages past the First Cause of Action itself—Plaintiff alludes to "the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution." (Complaint at 29.) However, mere offhanded mention of the Constitution does not invoke the court's federal question jurisdiction. Cf. Gallego v. Wilson, 882 F.Supp. 1169, 1171 (D.Mass.1995) ("The court need not conjure up implied allegations or contrive elaborately arcane scripts in order to carry the blushing bride through the portal.") (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1 Cir., 1988)). In any event, it is clear from the language used in the First Cause of Action, however inartfully pled, that Plaintiff is seeking to challenge the fact that he was committed, not the conditions of his confinement. (See Complaint at 9 (alleging that Plaintiff's rights were violated "[b]y causing the attempted and illegal [c]ommitment of Plaintiff to Providence . . .").) Thus, the First Cause of Action contains nothing approaching constitutional magnitude. Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 527-28 (1st Cir.1990).⁵

Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action —his request that Crysel be charged criminally with attempted murder—is also not appropriate for resolution in this forum. See Feeley v. United States, 16 F.3d 401, 1993 WL 557109, at *1, 16 F.3d 401 (1st Cir.1993) (unpublished) (upholding summary dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint and noting that the plaintiff "has no constitutional right to have certain prosecutions undertaken at his behest") (citing Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.1988)). Indeed, even Plaintiff recognizes that the "crime" he complains of is purely a creature of state criminal law. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, §§ 16, 28. Accordingly, the court suggests that that claim, too, should be summarily dismissed.

Finally, the court believes that Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action—that both a psychiatrist and Providence's President "failed to provide Plaintiff adequate [m]edical, [p]sychiatric and [p]sychological [c]are"—should also...