Mack v. RPC, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:19-cv-00319,6:19-cv-00319 |
| Citation | 439 F.Supp.3d 897 |
| Parties | Coris MACK, Plaintiff, v. RPC, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Marc Christopher Mayfield, Mayfield Weedon, Longview, TX, for Plaintiff.
Gregory Blake Thompson, Mann Tindel & Thompson, Henderson, TX, for Defendant.
J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge
Coris Mack sues RPC, Inc. for injuries he suffered while working for RPC's subsidiary, Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. RPC moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, that motion (Doc. 6) is granted .
According to the complaint, Mack was injured in an accident that occurred "at a facility located in Kilgore, Gregg County, Texas." Mack was walking near a group of workers who were trying to fix a jam in a pipe. The workers had driven two tractor-trailers over the pipe in order to hold the pipe still while they worked on it. For some reason, one of the tractor-trailers drove backward off the pipe. That caused the pipe to swing toward Mack and smack him so hard that he was "thrown approximately thirty feet in the air."
At the time of the accident, Mack was "working in the course and scope of his employment for Cudd Pressure Control." CPC is owned by the defendant, RPC. Mack claims that "Defendant, by and through its Safety Policy, voluntarily undertook the duty to ‘provide a safe working environment’ to Plaintiff." But Mack gives no more details about RPC's safety policy. He never indicates that RPC, as opposed to CPC, owned or operated the facility where the accident occurred. And he never indicates that RPC, rather than CPC, hired or directed the workers who were handling the pipe.
RPC moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Under Texas law, RPC argues, a company does not have a duty of care to the employees of its subsidiary just because it issues a policy statement like the one Mack quotes. Mack responds by attempting to distinguish the cases that RPC cites in its motion. Additionally, Mack argues that his complaint withstands Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny because it gives RPC "fair notice of the basis for Plaintiff's claim."
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss only if it contains a "statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). To make the necessary showing, the claim must have "facial plausibility." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim has facial plausibility only if, when the plaintiff's factual allegations are "accepted as true," the court may "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable." Id. Determining whether the factual allegations support such an inference is a "context-specific task." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court gives no weight to the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But the court pays close attention to the body of law that determines what facts the plaintiff must prove to hold the defendant liable for the alleged misconduct. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Here, the relevant body of law is Texas state law. See Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 710 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2013) ().
Neither party identifies a Texas Supreme Court case that directly controls the disposition of the state law issues in RPC's motion to dismiss. When a federal court sitting in diversity considers a state-law issue that has not been addressed by the relevant state's highest court, the federal court should "defer to intermediate state appellate court decisions, unless convinced by other persuasive data that the higher court of the state would decide otherwise." Learmonth , 710 F.3d at 258 (cleaned up). Deference to the state's intermediate appellate courts is appropriate because, when sitting in diversity, a federal court's job is to "predict state law." Id. Here, a collection of decisions from Texas's intermediate appellate courts shows how they would decide the relevant legal issue, and the available case law indicates that the Texas Supreme Court would reach the same result.
In Texas, when a plaintiff sues in negligence, the "threshold inquiry" is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler , 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). A person owes a duty of care to another person only if that duty arises out of a limited set of "special relationships or circumstances." Torrington Co. v. Stutzman , 46 S.W.3d 829, 837 (Tex. 2000). One of those relationships is between employer and employee: an employer owes its employee a duty to "provid[e] a safe workplace." Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell , 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993). But, where the employer is a corporate subsidiary, this duty is not necessarily shared by the employer's corporate parent. See Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc. , 696 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. 1984) ().
Nevertheless, several of Texas's intermediate appellate courts have held that a parent corporation owes a duty of care to the employees of its subsidiary where the parent corporation "undertakes" to perform workplace safety services for the subsidiary. See Little v. Delta Steel, Inc. , 409 S.W.3d 704, 717-19 (Tex. App. 2013) (collecting cases). This is an application of the negligent-undertaking theory of liability that is set forth in § 324A of the Second Restatement of Torts. See id. at 717 ; see also Fort Bend Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch , 818 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. 1991) (). A party commits an undertaking when it performs a service for another party, whether voluntarily or for consideration. Torrington , 46 S.W.3d at 837 ; Sbrusch , 818 S.W.2d at 395-96. Additionally, a party may commit an undertaking when it promises to perform a service for another party if the promise is followed by partial performance or reliance. Sbrusch , 818 S.W.2d at 396-97. Either way, when one person undertakes to perform a service for another person, the service-provider has a duty to the service-recipient to use reasonable care when performing the service. Torrington , 46 S.W.3d at 837. The service provider may also have a duty of care to third-party beneficiaries of the undertaking. Sbrusch , 818 S.W.2d at 396 (citing § 324A). Therefore, when a parent corporation undertakes to perform workplace-safety services for its subsidiary, it owes a duty of care to the subsidiary's employees as third-party beneficiaries of the undertaking. Little , 409 S.W.3d at 717-19 ; Morvant v. Oil States Int'l, Inc. , 3 F. Supp. 3d 561, 565 (E.D. La. 2014) (applying Texas law) ; Johnson v. Abbe Eng'g Co. , 749 F.2d 1131, 1132 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984) ().
But not all undertakings give the parent corporation a duty to protect its subsidiary's employees from workplace injuries. To establish such a duty to a particular worker, an undertaking must lead the parent corporation to assume "actual control or a right of control over the specific aspect of safety and security ... that led to the plaintiff's injury." Morris v. Scotsman Indus., Inc. , 106 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Tidwell , 867 S.W.2d at 23 ); see also Johnson , 749 F.2d at 1133 () (quoting Patentas v. United States , 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1982) ). This is called "specific control." Id. at 755. By applying the specific-control requirement in the negligent-undertaking context, the Texas intermediate appellate courts have mirrored the approach that other jurisdictions have taken when deciding whether parent corporations have incurred negligent-undertaking liability in workplace-injury cases brought by their subsidiaries' employees. See Patentas , 687 F.2d at 716 ; see also Muniz v. Nat'l Can Corp. , 737 F.2d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 1984) ().
To determine whether a parent corporation undertook to exercise specific control over an aspect of safety or security for its subsidiary, courts conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into the specific acts that the parent performed or had a right to perform. For example, in Little v. Delta Steel, Inc. , the court found that the parent corporation had a duty to an employee of its subsidiary who was crushed by a steel plate that fell off an electromagnetic crane. 409 S.W.3d 704, 721 (Tex. App. 2013). In finding that the parent corporation undertook to protect the worker from the incident with the crane, the court observed that the parent corporation (1) required the subsidiary to include specific provisions in its safety manual; (2) required the subsidiary to hire an outside company to inspect its cranes; (3) had the right to audit the plant where the accident occurred and had the right to require the subsidiary to correct any safety issues that the auditors identified; (4) had the right to compel the subsidiary to stop using a faulty crane; and (5) required the subsidiary to submit accident reports each month. Id.
By contrast, a parent corporation does not undertake to exercise specific control over an aspect of safety at its subsidiary just because the parent expresses a general commitment to workplace safety. For...
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