MacKenzie v. School Committee of Ipswich

• Decision Date: 09 May 1961
• Citation: 174 N.E.2d 657,342 Mass. 612
• Parties: Cecelia Z. MacKENZIE v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF IPSWICH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 657

174 N.E.2d 657

342 Mass. 612

Cecelia Z. MacKENZIE v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF IPSWICH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Feb. 8, 1961.

Decided May 9, 1961.

A. Kenneth Carey, Boston (Donald E. Carey, Boston, with him), for petitioner.

Harold M. Wilcox, Town Counsel, Boston, for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

This is the appeal of the Ipswich School Committee from a final decree in the Superior Court, entered May 13, 1960, which reversed the vote of the committee of June 4, 1959, to dismiss the petitioner, Cecelia Z. MacKenzie, from her position as a teacher.

General Laws c. 71, § 42, provides that a 'teacher * * * employed at discretion * * * shall not be dismissed, except for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher * * * insubordination or other good cause, * * * nor unless [at a hearing if requested] the charge or charges shall have been substantiated.'

General Laws c. 71, § 43A, inserted by St.1958, c. 462, provides: 'Any teacher * * * employed at discretion who has been dismissed by vote of a school committee under the provisions of section forty-two or section sixty-three may, within thirty days after the vote of dismissal appeal therefrom to the superior court in the county in which he was employed. The court shall advance the appeal for a speedy hearing and after such notice to the parties as it deems reasonable hear the cause 'de novo'. If the court finds in favor of the school committee, the vote of the school committee shall be affirmed; otherwise it shall be reversed and the appellant shall be reinstated to his position without loss of compensation. The decision of the court shall be final, except as to matters of law.'

1. We are constrained to hold that errors of law in proceedings in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 71, § 43A, may not be brought to this court by an appeal, and that a writ of certiorari is the only available method of review. ¹

Apart from review under the State Administrative Procedure Act (G.L. c. 30A), if available, certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute. Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544-545, 111 N.E. 386; McLaughlin v. Mayor of Cambridge, 253 Mass. 193, 199-200, 148 N.E. 458; Whitney v. Judge of District Court of North Berkshire, 271 Mass. 448, 458, 171 N.E. 648; Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Justices of the Superior Court, 291 Mass. 164, 165, 197 N.E. 166; Hough v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 309 Mass. 534, 535, 36 N.E.2d 415; Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of House of Representatives, 331 Mass. 135, 139, 117 N.E.2d 817; Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, Mass., 171 N.E.2d 273. ²

We construe the exception in c. 71, § 43A ('except as to matters of law'), as a recognition of the inevitable right of review by certiorari rather than an intention to provide for review by exceptions or appeal. The omission to grant 'rights of appeal and exception' (see, for example, G.L. c. 40A, § 21; c. 41, § 81BB) and the specification of finality are determinative.

Although this appeal is without standing, the issues have been fully argued and the period within which a petition may be filed for a writ of certiorari has not expired. G.L. c. 249, § 4. It is appropriate therefore that we consider the issues on the merits, as though the case had reached us in certiorari proceedings. ³ See Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731, 49 N.E.2d 220; Scott v Manager State Airport, Hanscom Field, 336 Mass. 372, 375, 377, 145 N.E.2d 706.

2. The provision in G.L. c. 71, § 43A, to 'hear the cause 'de novo" reads as a mandate to determine anew whether the charge or charges are substantiated. The 'cause' on appeal is the cause which was tried before the school committee. That cause is not what action is appropriate or wise, the offences being established; it is, has the teacher offended in the way charged?

For cases showing the paramount power of the school committee under G.L. c. 71, in respect of the employment and discharge of teachers subject only to such express restrictions as the Legislature has imposed on its general grant of power, see Knowles v. City of Boston, 12 Gray, 339, 340; Leonard v. School Comm. of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 329, 135 N.E. 459; Corrigan v. School Comm. of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 334, 145 N.E. 530; Toothaker v. School Comm. of Rockland, 256 Mass. 584, 152 N.E. 743; Sheldon v. School Comm. of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230, 235, 177 N.E. 94; Rinaldo v. School Comm. of Revere, 294 Mass. 167, 1 N.E.2d 37; Graves v. School Comm. of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80, 12 N.E.2d 176; Davis v. School Comm. of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 362, 30 N.E.2d 401; Moran v. School Comm. of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591, 59 N.E.2d 279; Faxon v. School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772, 44 A.L.R.2d 781.

The statute differs in an important respect from G.L. c. 31, § 45, and statutes predecessor thereto, under which District Courts have reviewed removals, suspensions, etc. in civil service cases, and which have been held not to involve a transfer of executive power to the courts. General Laws c. 31, § 45, specifies that if 'the court finds that such action was justified * * * [it] shall be affirmed; otherwise * * * the petitioner shall be reinstated.' The word 'justified' means 'done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.' Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482, 160 N.E. 427, 430. Sullivan v. Municipal Court of Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 573, 78 N.E.2d 618. Under that statute, the findings of the civil service commission on oral testimony are not to be reversed unless plainly wrong. Mayor of Beverly v. First Dist. Court of Essex, 327 Mass. 56, 61, 97 N.E.2d 181.

General Laws c. 71, § 43A, by contrast requires the continued employment of a teacher, notwithstanding the reasonable conclusion of the committee on adequate evidence that a charge or charges have been substantiated, if the reasonable conclusion of the judge in the Superior Court, on the evidence there presented, is that the charge has not been made out. The parties have not argued the issue whether this invades the executive power. ⁴ See Driscoll v. Mayor of Somerville, 213 Mass. 493, 100 N.E. 640. Compare Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 558-559, 120 N.E.2d 916. We reserve the point for, assuming the constitutionality of the statute, the decree below was not justified on a critical finding of fact made by the judge.

3. The school committee rightly relies on its charge, in the words of G.L. c. 71, § 42, of 'conduct unbecoming a teacher' and the finding of the judge of 'improper and unbecoming conduct' as shown in these facts: The teacher had received a letter directing her to appear at a special meeting of the committee on January 6, 1959, to be questioned. There were present the seven members of the committee; a reporter; Dr. Robert O'Kane, the superintendent of schools; the teacher and her attorney. At this meeting the teacher 'muttered 's. o. b.' to Dr. O'Kane, as testified [to] by him; * * * it was audible to him * * * not said in a normal tone of voice * * * it was either lip read or audible to two other adult persons present * * * namely, a reporter and a member of the School Committee.' It is apparent from the record that although the initials 's. o. b.' were used at the hearing, what was spoken were the words 'son of a bitch.' We construe the finding accordingly as a finding that those words were used.

The judge's finding that the teacher's utterance was improper and unbecoming conduct was plainly justified, if not required. The judge, however, also ruled that this was nevertheless not conduct contemplated by the statute as a cause for dismissal. That ruling was wrong. The judge specified as the basis for her conclusion the teacher's 'good character, qualifications, school and public service,' and 'the following described circumstances.' ⁵ For the reasons next stated these specifications do not justify the conclusion.

The general considerations specified, although relevant to the exercise by the committee of its discretion, do not in any way alter the nature of the unbecoming act. The special considerations set forth are in the same aspect. The absence of a basis for a finding of other instances of unbecoming conduct in the twenty-three year period of the teacher's service is not significant. There was no occasion for the committee to prove long past conduct. The implication of the finding that this was a 'single isolated case' is that it did not reflect the otherwise unquestionably exemplary conduct of the teacher. This was a consideration for the committee in the exercise of its discretion. We note, however, that the full implication is unjustified in the light of other findings which tended to show a pattern of conduct likely to interfere with the orderly administration of the school system. ⁶

The findings that the teacher was under a very severe strain and felt resentment to the superintendent are undoubtedly justified inferences. ⁷ But while such circumstances would be highly relevant to the discretionary action of the committee they do not bar the unbecoming conduct as a ground of removal.

The absence of effect of the unbecoming conduct upon pupils was irrelevant. Whether it interfered with the efficiency of the school system had to be determined by the committee in context. It was conduct in the course of administering the school department, and in a highly sensitive aspect of administration. If the specification is a ruling that the committee could not rationally find the unbecoming conduct relevant in removal proceedings it is in error.

The judge's findings in respect of other charges in...