Mackereth v. G.D. Searle and Co.
Decision Date | 20 December 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 1-95-4194,1-95-4194 |
Citation | 674 N.E.2d 936,221 Ill. Dec. 143,285 Ill.App.3d 1070 |
Parties | , 221 Ill.Dec. 143 Sharon MACKERETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.D. SEARLE AND COMPANY, Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Searle Laboratories, a Division of Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jeffrey M. Goldberg of Jeffrey M. Goldberg & Associates, Chicago, and Roger L. Pardieck of Pardieck, Gill & Vargo, Seymour, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Anne E. Rea of Sidley & Austin, Chicago, and Paul F. Strain, Dino S. Sangiamo of Venable, Baetjer & Howard, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants-Appellees.
Sharon Mackereth (plaintiff), a Minnesota resident, brought this action against G.D. Searle & Co. (Searle) to recover damages for injuries that she attributes to her use of a Copper-7 intrauterine contraceptive (IUD or CU-7) manufactured and marketed by Searle. Plaintiff's complaint consisted of three counts, alleging fraud, negligence and strict liability. Pursuant to a section 2-619 motion brought by Searle (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1992)), the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint as time-barred under the Minnesota statute of limitations. The issue before this court is whether plaintiff's complaint was timely filed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
Plaintiff began using the CU-7 in July of 1981. The IUD was prescribed and inserted in Minnesota. Plaintiff used the IUD for a two-year period, during which time she experienced irregular bleeding, heavier menstrual periods, cramps and painful intercourse. Plaintiff had the IUD removed in July of 1983.
Subsequently, plaintiff suffered a series of gynecological injuries and underwent several remedial procedures, including a diagnostic laparoscopy in 1985, which revealed that both her ovaries were covered with adhesions; surgery in 1989 which revealed adhesions covering plaintiff's fallopian tube and a diagnosis of pelvic inflammatory disease (PID); surgical intervention of three ectopic pregnancies in 1991, 1992 and 1993; the removal of a fallopian tube; and residual infertility.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that, although she was examined and treated by numerous physicians since 1983, she was not informed until May of 1993 that her injuries were likely caused by use of the CU-7 10 years earlier.
On February 23, 1995, 12 years after the CU-7 was removed, plaintiff filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County, Searle's principal place of business being Illinois. The trial court granted Searle's motion to dismiss, finding her claim had expired under the applicable Minnesota statute of limitations.
Initially, we must determine which law is to be applied in this case. Statutes of limitation are procedural, affecting only the remedy available and not the substantive rights of the parties, and are generally governed by the law of the forum state. Cox v. Kaufman, 212 Ill.App.3d 1056, 156 Ill.Dec. 1031, 571 N.E.2d 1011 (1991). Accordingly, since Illinois is the forum state, this court looks to Illinois' law relating to the limitation of actions.
Our General Assembly has enacted a "borrowing statute" addressing the statute of limitations to be applied where the cause of action has arisen outside our state. It provides:
735 ILCS 5/13-210 (West 1992).
Plaintiff's cause of action undeniably arose in Minnesota, where the IUD was prescribed, placed, used and caused injury. Accordingly, we look to Minnesota law in order to determine whether plaintiff's claim was timely. The applicable Minnesota statute of limitation states that the following actions shall be commenced within six years:
"(5) For criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated;
(6) For relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud[.]" Minn.Stat.Ann., sec. 541.05, subd. 1, (West 1988).
Minnesota law further provides that "any action based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product shall be commenced within four years." Minn.Stat.Ann., sec. 541.05, subd. 2 (West 1988). Therefore, under Minnesota law, plaintiff's negligence and fraud claims must have been brought within six years of the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action and within four years for the product liability claim.
Section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was not commenced within the time prescribed by law. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1992). For purposes of the motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the pleadings as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts are taken as true. Waterford Executive Group, Ltd. v. Clark/Bardes, Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 338, 343, 199 Ill.Dec. 207, 633 N.E.2d 1003 (1994).
A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss if, after construing the relevant documents supporting the motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the court finds no disputed factual issues (Meyers v. Rockford Systems, Inc., 254 Ill.App.3d 56, 61, 192 Ill.Dec. 761, 625 N.E.2d 916 (1993)) and finds that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle plaintiff to recover. Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 242 Ill.App.3d 96, 99, 182 Ill.Dec. 753, 610 N.E.2d 177 (1993). A reviewing court must consider whether, on de novo review, there are genuine issues of material fact that precluded dismissal or, absent such facts, whether dismissal was proper as a matter of law. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 116-17, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993).
Minnesota's supreme court has recognized that accrual of a claim for limitations purposes begins after the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the defendant's alleged negligence. See, Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co., 280 Minn. 147, 158 N.W.2d 580 (1968); Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hospitals & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425 (Minn.1988). In Dalton, a case involving a worker's exposure to a harmful chemical, the court found that the plaintiff's claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has suffered some injury as a result of the alleged negligence. Dalton, 280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 583. The court further observed:
Dalton, 280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584.
Searle relies heavily on Dalton, asserting that the clock began ticking as early as 1985, when plaintiff had surgery that revealed scarring and adhesions on her ovaries. We concur that the holding of Dalton indicates that, once some damage is manifest, the statute begins to run, regardless of whether plaintiff is at that time aware of the cause of damage or injury. As the court observed in Dalton, "[t]he subjective determination of the accrual of his cause of action contended for by plaintiff is obviously without support in our decisions." Dalton, 280 Minn. at 154, 158 N.W.2d at 585. Accordingly, it appears that plaintiff's cause of action indeed accrued in 1985 and thus would be time-barred by the applicable Minnesota statutes of limitations.
Similarly, in Offerdahl, the plaintiff brought suit against the University Hospital, alleging malpractice in failing to disclose the risks associated with CU-7 IUD use and seeking damages incurred as a result of the insertion of the IUD. Citing Dalton, the court determined that "[a]lleged negligence coupled with the alleged resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date when the cause of action accrued." Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429. The court observed further:
Under both Dalton and Offerdahl, plaintiff's cause of action accrued, and the limitations period commenced, following medical diagnosis of injury in 1985. Since plaintiff initiated this action in 1995, the trial court was correct to dismiss all three counts as untimely.
Plaintiff relies on two federal decisions construing Minnesota law to avoid such a conclusion. In Hildebrandt v. Allied Corp., 839 F.2d 396 (8th Cir.1987), the court observed:
"Under Minnesota law, two elements must be satisfied under the discovery rule before a cause of action accrues in cases involving injuries caused by a defective product: (1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant's product, act, or omission." Hildebrandt, ...
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