Mackey v. Compass
Citation | 391 Md. 117,892 A.2d 479 |
Decision Date | 09 February 2006 |
Docket Number | Misc. No. 4, September Term, 2005. |
Parties | James J. MACKEY, et al. v. COMPASS MARKETING, INC. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Anthony Herman (Robert J. Lundman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC), Lawrence S. Robbins (Alison C. Barnes, Max Huffman, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner, LLP, Washington, DC, Herbert Better, Sean Vitrano, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, Baltimore, on brief), for appellants.
Jeffrey Jacobovitz (Schiff Hardin, Washington, DC), Ellen S. Cooper, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief as amicus), for appellee.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
In this Certified Question case, pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), §§ 12-601 through 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 8-305, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has certified the following questions of Maryland law:
Our answer to the first question shall be YES, and we shall answer the second question by adopting the standard articulated in Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F.Supp. 133 (D.Md.1982).
We recite the facts as set out in the certification order.
Appellants Mackey and Severino argue before this Court that Maryland law does not recognize the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction because it is inconsistent with the plain language of the Maryland "longarm" statute, Md.Code , § 6-103(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1 They argue further that the conspiracy theory violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by not satisfying the minimum contacts test required by Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny because it permits the contacts of one person with the forum state to serve as the contacts of another person for purposes of the minimum contacts test.
Appellee Compass Marketing urges this Court to recognize the conspiracy theory. In response to appellants' arguments, appellee notes that the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have recognized the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. Appellee recommends that we adopt the standard set out in Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F.Supp. 133 (D.Md.1982). Appellee contends that Cawley's requirement that it be reasonable for the co-conspirators to expect that their contemplated conspiracy will lead to consequences in a particular forum gives the co-conspirators fair warning sufficient to satisfy due process concerns that they could be subject to the forum's jurisdiction because of acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The question of whether Maryland recognizes the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction as a matter of state law presents an issue of first impression for this Court. It is clear today that physical presence within a state is not a necessary prerequisite to the proper assertion of personal jurisdiction and that under most states' long-arm statutes, certain acts and effects of those acts may be the basis for a court to exercise jurisdiction of a nonresident as well as a person who has not physically entered within the territorial borders of the state.
Courts have drawn routinely from the substantive law of agency to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Imputation, or attribution, of jurisdictional contacts is not a new notion. It is long-established that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant on the basis of the actions of the nonresident defendant's agent. Maryland's long-arm statute explicitly grants jurisdiction over a principal based on acts performed through an agent. See § 6-103(b) ( ).2 Since the inception of the International Shoe line of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has not expressed any doubt that the acts of corporate agents may be attributed to a corporation for purposes of determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper over the principal. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-19, 66 S.Ct. at 158-60 ( ).
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...the conspirators was sold at a correspondingly inflated retail price in every state, including Florida. Likewise, in Mackey v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 892 A.2d 479 (2006), the Maryland Supreme Court found the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction to be consistent with due process. The court obser......
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