Mackintosh v. Lyft, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2:19-cv-1849-MCE-KJN PS,2:19-cv-1849-MCE-KJN PS
• Parties: ADAM JOHN MACKINTOSH, Plaintiff, v. LYFT, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

ADAM JOHN MACKINTOSH, Plaintiff, v. LYFT, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1849-MCE-KJN PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 31, 2019

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS, MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO REMAND, AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; ORDER

(ECF Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 34, and 50)

Plaintiff Adam John Mackintosh, who proceeds without counsel, asserts he invented a healthcare-rideshare program that was misappropriated. Plaintiff filed an action in California Superior Court against Defendants Lyft, John Zimmer, Logan Green, Uber Health, Uber Technologies, AH Capital Management, Ben Horowitz, two Benchmark Capital entities, Matt Cohler, Josef Arvin Acebedo, Louis Darnell Pritchett, Jerry Wang, Amy Biddle, and the Better Business Bureau. (ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff's 738-page Complaint lists twenty-nine federal and state law claims, as alleged against all Defendants. (Id. at pp. 88-825.)

Defendants filed a notice of removal. (ECF No. 1.) Thereafter, multiple Defendants moved to strike portions of the Complaint and moved to dismiss - alleging the Complaint fails to notify each Defendant of the claims against them. (ECF Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20). Plaintiff opposed, moved to strike each of Defendants' motions, sought remand back to California Superior Court, requested sanctions for Defendants' "bad faith" removal and moved for default against four defendants. (ECF Nos. 23, 34, 50.) A hearing was held. (See ECF No. 64.)

For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends dismissal with leave to amend.

Parties' Arguments¹

I. Arguments re: Removal/Remand (and Associated Sanctions)

Plaintiff moves to remand this action back to California Superior Court, asserting numerous arguments for why jurisdiction does not lie and why the removal was procedurally improper. (ECF No. 23.) Additionally, Plaintiff requested sanctions for Defendants' alleged "bad faith removal" from superior court. (Id. at p. 20.)

Defendants oppose, asserting that the jurisdictional and procedural prerequisites have been met, and no basis for sanctions exist. (ECF Nos. 49, 51, 52, 53, 54.)

II. Arguments re: Dismissal/More Definite Statement/Striking Portions of the Complaint

Defendants Lyft/Zimmer/Green, Benchmark/Cohler, Uber Tech/Uber Health, AH Capital/Horowitz, and the Better Business Bureau ("BBB") each moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to file a short and plain statement. (ECF Nos. 5, 7, 8, 11, 20.) The Defendants cite to Plaintiff's 700+ page Complaint, noting the inconsistency in the number of counts (somewhere between twelve and twenty-nine claims) as well as the shotgun pleading style - that all Defendants violated every claim raised (despite a lack of facts linking the acts of each Defendant to the particular claim raised). Thus, Defendants aver they cannot possibly respond to Plaintiff's Complaint, and request either dismissal or a more definite statement. Additionally, some Defendants assert the Complaint fails to state facts supporting certain claims, while others moved to strike the "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, [or] scandalous" portions of Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF Nos. 5, 8, 9, 11, 20).

Plaintiff filed a "motion to strike" citing to each and every one of Defendants' motions to dismiss, and also filed an opposition to each motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 34, 41, 55.) Therein, Plaintiff reasserts many of his statements from the Complaint, inserts more documentary evidence, contends Defendants ignored the California Superior Court's scheduling order, and lodges ad hominem attacks against certain individual Defendants. The Court construes these filings as Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motions.

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Motion for Sanctions

A defendant may remove to federal court a claim filed in state court that also could have initially been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). However, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [over the removed claims], the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 1106-07.

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . ." 28 U.S.C. §1367.

Here, the caption to Plaintiff's Complaint states that he is bringing claims under, among other sources of law, the "Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" (18 U.S.C. § 1830) and "The Defense of Trade Secrets Act" (18 U.S.C. § 1836). Plaintiff refers to these statutes at various points in the Complaint. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 188, 189, 216, 233, 258, 285, 481.) Because some of Plaintiff's rights are created by these federal statutes, Defendants have adequately demonstrated why the Court has "federal question" jurisdiction over this matter.² 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Ryan v. Salisbury, 380 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1047 (D. Haw. 2019) ("Federal question jurisdiction exists when a complaint facially presents a federal question.") (citing Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency,994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also e.g., Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim in federal court). Additionally, Plaintiff's numerous state-law claims appear to arise out of the same nucleus of facts as his federal claims, and so the Court maintains supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367; see also, e.g., WeRide Corp. v. Kun Huang, 379 F. Supp. 3d 834, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (federal court reviewing a plaintiff's trade secret misappropriations brought under both the Defense of Trade Secrets Act and the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act).

Plaintiff asserts numerous arguments why he believes removal was improper. (ECF No. 29.) He asserts the removing defendants "cherry picked" a few laws in its notice of removal. However, just because Plaintiff also appears to assert numerous state law claims does not obviate this Court's jurisdiction. Federal courts often maintain jurisdiction over claims that might also be brought in state court, so long a jurisdiction lies in this court. Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[I]f these claims give rise to concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff may choose to file in either state or federal court. But if the plaintiff elects state court, the defendant then has the option of removing the case from state court to federal court under the general removal statute . . . .").

Plaintiff also asserts removal was improper because a case management order was issued by the Superior Court Judge prior to removal. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 allows for removal, despite this pending case-management order, so long as the notice was filed within 30 days of service of the pleadings. Here, Defendants Lyft, Zimmer, and Green did so file their notice of removal within the allotted timeframe, and indicated they concurrently notified the Superior Court of the removal. (See ECF No. 1.) Thus, the Superior Court was deprived of further jurisdiction over the matter, and its case management order was no longer of consequence. Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Jan. 20, 1995) ("After removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) prohibits any proceedings in the state court unless and until the case is remanded.").

/// The Court does note Plaintiff's concern that two of the named Defendants, Jerry Wang and the BBB, did not sign a consent form joining in with the other Defendants' notice of removal. (See ECF No. 29, citing ECF No. 1-3.) However, the BBB timely filed a motion to dismiss in this case, and thus has implicitly consented to removal. See, e.g., Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, 409 F. App'x 70, 72 (9th Cir. 2010) (consent to removal was shown where party joined with other defendants in moving to dismiss). Further, it appears from the service documents submitted by Plaintiff that Mr. Wang may not have been personally served yet, mooting any issue with his consent. See, e.g., Walker v. Los Angeles Cty., 2008 WL 4447011, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2008) (finding that joinder of all defendants was not required where the absent defendants had yet to receive proper service of process) (citing Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that the joinder requirement "only applies to Defendants who have been properly served in the action."). As for the remainder of Plaintiff's concerns regarding the removal process,³ the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit takes a flexible position regarding a party's joining in on removal. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2011) ("All defendants who have been properly served in the action must join a petition for removal. If this is not true when the notice of removal is filed, the district court may allow the removing defendants to cure the defect by obtaining joinder of all defendants prior to the entry of judgment.") Thus, Defendants have time to make any technical corrections that may be required.

For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand (ECF No. 23) is denied. Further, none of Defendants' actions in removing this case to federal court appear to have...