MacLeay v. Arden Hill Hosp.

Decision Date29 November 1990
Citation164 A.D.2d 228,563 N.Y.S.2d 333
PartiesFrancis R. MACLEAY, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia MacLeay, Deceased, Appellant, v. ARDEN HILL HOSPITAL et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

David Ullman, Brooklyn, for appellant.

Drake, Sommers, Loeb, Tarshis & Catania (Bernard Sommers, of counsel), Newburgh, for Arden Hill Hosp. and another, respondents.

David E. Worby (William E. Dumke, of counsel), White Plains, for John Egberton and others, respondents.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and CASEY, WEISS, LEVINE and MERCURE, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

This action arose out of a dispute which occurred while plaintiff's mother was hospitalized at defendant Arden Hill Hospital during the final days of her struggle with terminal cancer. The dispute apparently centered on plaintiff's concerns about the medications administered to his mother. Although plaintiff characterizes his concerns as legitimate and reasonable, hospital staff apparently viewed the conduct of plaintiff and his brother as increasingly disruptive. After plaintiff's mother lost consciousness, the hospital obtained a court order authorizing treatment, and ultimately plaintiff and his brother were arrested upon a warrant issued after a hospital administrator filed a complaint charging them with criminal trespass.

Plaintiff commenced this action, pro se, against the hospital, the administrator who filed the complaint, the two police officers who arrested him and the municipality which employs the two officers. Plaintiff sued in his individual capacity and as the administrator of his mother's estate. In his brief on appeal from the order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff asserts that the complaint alleges causes of action on his behalf sounding in malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress and "denial of civil and constitutional rights", and causes of action on his mother's behalf based upon false imprisonment and "denial of civil and constitutional rights".

One element of a malicious prosecution cause of action is the termination of a prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused (Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. denied sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257). In the case at bar, the criminal charges against plaintiff were dismissed in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40. In Miller v. Star, 123 A.D.2d 750, 751, 507 N.Y.S.2d 223, the Second Department held that "a dismissal in the interest of justice [pursuant to CPL 170.40] is not an indication of innocence. Therefore, this type of disposition cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a resolution favorable to the accused." Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Miller case on the ground that it was the defendant therein who sought dismissal in the interest of justice, whereas it was the prosecutor who sought the dismissal herein.

In Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 504-505, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487, the Court of Appeals said:

[T]he eventual dismissal of the criminal charges on the motion of the prosecutor "in the interest of justice" does not constitute an adjudication * * * of [plaintiff's] innocence of the charges. * * * A dismissal "in the interest of justice" is neither an acquittal of the charges nor any determination of the merits. Rather it leaves the question of guilt or innocence unanswered.

We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of the criminal charges herein, upon a motion by the prosecutor pursuant to CPL 170.40, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution. To the extent that our holding in Brown v. Brown (87 A.D.2d 680, 449 N.Y.S.2d 63) is to the contrary, it is no longer valid in light of the Court of Appeals' clear and unequivocal language in the Ryan case.

As to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff contends that this cause of action is one sounding in negligence and that summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence ...

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27 cases
  • Rounseville v. Zahl
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • 15 Abril 1993
    ...(E.D.N.Y.1992); Manno v. State, 176 A.D.2d 1222, 1223, 576 N.Y.S.2d 717, 717 (4th Dep't 1991); MacLeay v. Arden Hill Hospital, 164 A.D.2d 228, 230, 563 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334-35 (3d Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 806, 568 N.Y.S.2d 913, 571 N.E.2d 83 (1991). The Second Circuit, using diffe......
  • Coakley v. Jaffe, 98 Civ. 2473 (JSR).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 23 Abril 1999
    ...cannot constitute a favorable termination, see Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1992); MacLeay v. Arden Hill Hospital, 164 A.D.2d 228, 563 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334-35 (3d Dep't 1990), cf. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 504-505, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984), unless th......
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  • Ahern v. City of Syracuse
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • 13 Enero 2006
    ...considered not to be dispositions in favor of the accused." Murphy, 118 F.3d at 949 (citing MacLeay v. Arden Hill Hospital, 164 A.D.2d 228, 230-31, 563 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334-35 (3d Dep't 1990)); Miller v. Star, 123 A.D.2d 750, 751, 507 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (2d Dep't 1986); Hygh, 961 F.2d at 368 ("......
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